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Abstract 
 
Enclosing Queer and Crip Futures:  
California Eugenics and Technologies of Liberal Governance 
 
Jess Whatcott 
 
Enclosing Queer and Crip Futures examines the state-sponsored discourse 
and practice of eugenics in late nineteenth and early twentieth century California. At 
the time, eugenics reformers collaborated with the state government to implement 
programs designed to curb the reproduction of the so-called defective class. These 
programs included sterilization, institutionalization, and deportation. This chapter of 
California history is seldom mentioned today, but when it is, eugenics policies are 
described as having been discredited along with the “fake” science of racial 
improvement. I challenge the presumption that eugenics policies are aberrant to an 
otherwise progressive march of history. Instead, the dissertation implicates eugenics 
as central to the project of building a modern liberal state in California.  
Based on original research in the California State Archives and the California 
Historical Society, the dissertation tracks how turn of the century eugenics discourse 
expanded and developed new technologies of power for the state to wield over 
bodies, temporality, land, capital, and desire. These technologies of liberal power 
rooted in eugenics discourses included, first, the violent attachment of difference to 
bodies. I analyze the discursive construction of the gendered, racialized, and disabling 
“defective class” and the process of attaching difference to bodies through 
institutional medicine. Second, eugenics expanded the carceral infrastructure of the 
state and a gendered logic of confinement, by legitimating mass institutionalization at 
  vi  
state hospitals, state homes for the feeble-minded, and adult and youth reformatories. 
Third, eugenics discourse signals a break from laissez-faire political economy, and 
the establishment of a state biopolitical power that exceeds the interests of capital. I 
examine how Progressives enforced a version of freedom secured through liberal 
state power, challenging capitalist notions of freedom and the radical dreams of 
freedom articulated by the underclass.  
Examining these technologies of governance as forms of enclosure, I 
demonstrate that the practice of eugenics in California asserted power over the 
possible futures that could unfold. Eugenics determined the present structure of 
liberal governance by foreclosing other possible queer and crip ways of being, forms 
of sociality, ways of organizing space and time, and other desires for freedom. 
Revisiting the era to reveal the contingency of the present splits the future wide open 
from eugenicist determination, creating time for queer and crip possibilities to 
emerge. 
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Introduction 
A Materialist Genealogy of California Eugenics 
 
Elise was committed to Sonoma State Home for the Feeble-Minded in 
Eldridge, California in 1914.1 She was but one of the tens of thousands of people 
whose lives were shaped by the theory of eugenics in the state of California in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite the widespread impact, this chapter 
in California history is rarely discussed. When it is, eugenics tends to be portrayed as 
an aberration to the otherwise progressive trajectory of the state. By tracing the web 
of ideas, laws, institutions, and practices connected to eugenics in California, I argue 
instead that there is a deep relationship between the logic of eugenics and the 
development of modern liberal governance in the state.     
Elise’s case will introduce some of the discourses and practices of eugenic 
governance examined in the following chapters. What is known about Elise comes 
from a casebook entry completed by a staff member at the Sonoma State Home upon 
Elise’s arrival. This staff member guessed that Elise was approximately 20 years old, 
clarifying that, “Little is known about [Elise]. She came from Los Angeles County 
Hospital. They received her from Whittier Reform School…Was then tried twice for 
insanity and both times dismissed.” Failing to acquire a legal ruling of insanity, Elise 
was quickly diagnosed a “moral imbecile” to justify her placement at the home.  
At the time of Elise’s commitment to Sonoma State Home, the facility housed 
around a thousand people ranging from young children to people in their 70’s. Almost 
                                                      
1 Names and identifying information have been changed to protect the confidentiality of patients in 
compliance with California state law governing archived patient records over 75 years old.  
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half of those inmates were categorized as female. Originally a single building 
dedicated to housing so-called feeble-minded children whose families could not care 
for them, the Sonoma State Home had by 1914 grown into a “farm colony” that was 
over fifteen-hundred acres in size. Several large brick buildings mixed with small 
cottage dormitories and, at times, an outdoor tent sleeping area used for people with 
respiratory diseases. The facility included a dairy, vegetable gardens, fruit orchards, a 
laundry, a bakery, and a kitchen, all staffed by the inmates of the home.  
While farm life could have been in some ways a pleasant reprieve from the 
demands of modern capitalism, life at Sonoma State Home was also inflected by the 
use of invasive therapies that were also punishments; an increased risk of premature 
death; sex segregation and the separation of parents and children; and policies that 
forbade inmates from leaving the grounds without authorization. Escapees were 
returned by the sheriff. By policy, once committed, Elise’s life at Sonoma State Home 
was indefinite. As of 1921, when the casebook was no longer updated, Elise was still 
living at the home 7 years after her institutionalization. 
As an inmate of the home, Elise was a candidate for reproductive sterilization 
under California’s Asexualization Law. In 1917, the Asexualization Law was 
amended for the third time to include persons such as Elise who were determined to 
be:  
[A]fflicted with mental disease which may have been inherited and is likely to 
be transmitted to descendants, the various grades of feeble-mindedness, those 
suffering from perversions or marked departures from normal mentality or 
from disease of a syphilitic nature.  
 
Soon after this version of the law passed, Elise, then approximately 24 years old, 
  3 
underwent an elective, but not necessarily consensual, “double partial salpingectomy 
for sterilization.” The Asexualization Law did not require that institutional physicians 
ask for or obtain consent from patients. The most advanced sterilization procedure at 
the time, salpingectomy involved the complete removal of both of Elise’s fallopian 
tubes and would have required several weeks of recovery.  
The early twentieth century institutionalization and sterilization of those with 
“departures from normal mentality,” otherwise referred to as “defectives,” was 
legitimated by the widely accepted theory of eugenics. In a 1918 report to the 
California legislature regarding the activities of state institutions, the government 
body in charge of regulating state institutions outlined its adoption of the theory of 
eugenics. According to the State Board of Charities and Corrections: 
We must make it our business to awaken the people to a realization of the fact 
that it is as foolish to permit human defectives to reproduce themselves as to 
permit defective domestic animals to beget offspring. The whole stream of 
human life is constantly polluted by the admixture of the tainted blood of the 
extremely defective. If this source of contamination could be cut off, the 
beneficial effects would begin to show in a single generation, and in a very 
few generations the average level of human society would be very materially 
lifted.2 
 
As the passage illustrates, eugenics theory insisted that “human defectives” passed on 
weaknesses to their children and thus caused a number of social problems, including 
juvenile delinquency and dependency, criminality, insanity, poverty, and immorality. 
Consequently, sex and reproduction among the defective class threatened the health 
                                                      
2 “Report of the State Board of Charities and Corrections, 1916-18” (Appendix to the Journals of the 
Senate and Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California: Sacramento, California: California 
State Printing, 1919), 62. 
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of human society and the futurity of human life. Accepting this eugenics conclusion, 
progressive reformers, institutional administrators, and state-appointed oversight 
boards urged the California legislature to take action to contain the spread of the ever-
expanding defective class. In response, the California legislature passed a number of 
eugenics inspired policies, including the aforementioned sterilization law, as well as 
appropriations for building and expanding institutions of confinement, including state 
hospitals, state homes for the feeble-minded, and adult and youth reformatories. 
Through their investment in eugenics programs, elite Californians were 
emblematic of Progressive Era beliefs in scientific rationality, professionalism, and 
faith in the state to rationally manage social problems.3 Yet, eugenicists also 
revitalized older, long-standing tropes, including the Malthusian belief that the poor 
could not control their own fertility, and colonial ideologies of racial purity.4  
Eugenicists faith in scientific solutions were also connected to popular concerns about 
morality, specifically regarding the moral implications of commercial sex, resulting in 
theories of deviance and criminality that conflated biological threats with moral ones.  
While many people associate eugenics policies with the Nazi regime and the 
Holocaust in Europe, scholars have established that the development of eugenics 
ideas and programs in the United States preceded their implantation in Germany.5 
                                                      
3 Nicole Hahn Rafter, Partial Justice: Women, Prison, and Social Control, 2nd ed (New Brunswick, 
New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1990). 
4 Nancy Ordover, American Eugenics: Race, Queer Anatomy, and the Science of Nationalism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 
5 Dorothy E. Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1997); Laura Briggs, Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex, Science, and U.S. 
Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Ordover, American 
Eugenics; Harriet A. Washington, Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentation 
  5 
According to Nancy Ordover, the first eugenics policy in the U.S. was a program to 
sterilize those labeled “manifestly unfit … written in 1887 by the superintendent of 
the Cincinnati Sanitarium, targeting prisoners.”6 The passage of state-level forced 
sterilization bills began in Indiana in 1907; these laws were upheld by the Supreme 
Court in the Buck v. Bell ruling in 1927. The state bills varied, but generally targeted 
the incarcerated, the institutionalized, and others who were considered “unfit,” 
“insane,” or “feeble-minded.” Estimates of the number of people sterilized in the 
United State between 1907 and the end of World War II are between 60,000-70,000.7 
Other eugenics-based policies in the U.S. are less studied. To my knowledge, no 
estimates exist of how many people were institutionalized in state facilities under 
eugenics rationalization. 
Although there is an impressive range of scholarship on aspects of the 
eugenics movement, only a handful of scholars have explored California’s specific 
policies.8 California, however, was among the most active state governments in 
developing eugenics theory, and in adopting and implementing eugenics programs. 
                                                      
on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Doubleday, 2006); Paul A. 
Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: Eugenics, the Supreme Court, and Buck v. Bell 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Paul A. Lombardo, ed., A Century of Eugenics in 
America: From the Indiana Experiment to the Human Genome Era, Bioethics and the Humanities 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011). 
6 Ordover, American Eugenics, 133. 
7 Ordover, American Eugenics; Alexandra Stern, Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better 
Breeding in Modern America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
8 Wendy Kline, Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from the Turn of the Century 
to the Baby Boom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Stern, Eugenic Nation; Alex 
Wellerstein, “States of Eugenics: Institutions and Practices of Compulsory Sterilization in California,” 
in Reframing Rights: Bioconstitutionalism in the Genetic Age, ed. Sheila Jasanoff (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2011); Natalie Lira and Alexandra Minna Stern, “Mexican Americans and Eugenic 
Sterilization,” Aztlan 39, no. 2 (Fall 2014): 9–34. 
  6 
The state has estimated that almost one-third of the people sterilized nationwide under 
eugenics law, approximately 20,000 people, met this fate in California. My own 
calculation shows that, additionally, tens of thousands of people were institutionalized 
in California under eugenics reasoning in the first decades of the twentieth century.  
Recent growing awareness of California’s eugenics history prompted a 
movement to force the state to acknowledge the history of state-sponsored eugenics 
programs. As a response, in 2003 the California Senate passed Resolution No. 20, 
declaring:  
Whereas, Under California’s eugenics law, and subsequent amendments to it, 
inmates of state hospitals and institutions for the mentally retarded, certain 
prison inmates who were considered sexual or moral ‘degenerates’ or were 
serving life sentences, and epileptics could be involuntarily sterilized so that 
they would not produce similarly disabled offspring; and 
 
Whereas, In practice, the eugenics laws were used to target virtually any 
human shortcoming or illness, including alcoholism, drug addiction, 
pauperism, syphilis, and criminal behavior… 
 
Whereas, The ‘science’ of eugenics has since been discredited; now, 
therefore, be it 
 
Resolved by the Senate of the State of California, That it hereby expresses its 
profound regret over the state’s past role in the eugenics movement and the 
injustice done to thousands of California men and women; and be it further… 
 
Resolved, That the Senate urges every citizen of the state to become familiar 
with the history of the eugenics movement, in the hope that more educated 
and tolerant populace will reject any similar abhorrent pseudoscientific 
movement should it arise in the future.9 
 
                                                      
9 “Cali. Senate Res. 20: ‘Relative to Eugenics’” (2003), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=200320040SR20. 
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While acknowledgement of the impact of the Asexualization Law on many citizens is 
important, my concern with this apology is that it depicts eugenics as an aberration in 
the otherwise liberal and progressive trajectory of the state. The apology also assumes 
that the mistake of eugenics is now over, so that Californians can collectively move 
toward a future of mutual respect and dignity for all groups previously treated as 
defective by the state. In this way, the apology is emblematic of the desire of 
twentieth century liberal states to appear as if they are always moving forward into 
the destiny of modernity by overcoming the mistakes of the past, and that it is 
equality – not hierarchies of status – that have always been their foundation. The final 
line reinforces this insistence on the post-eugenics future; the apology was not 
accompanied by any type of state accountability that might tie the state and the 
populace unnecessarily to the past, such as offers for reparations to the victims, or 
remediation to undo the legacy of eugenics.  
Further, in the apology, the end point of eugenics is clearly marked as 1964 – 
a bracket that is supposed to signal the end of non-consensual sterilizations on 
inmates in state prisons, state homes for the feeble-minded, and state hospitals. 
However, feminist scholarship disputes this endpoint by examining how eugenics 
ideology persisted throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. While 
institutional sterilizations declined in California in the 1950’s due to court rulings that 
made it more burdensome for physicians to secure state approval, coercive 
sterilizations continued in other venues as alleged in the Madrigal v. Quilligan class 
  8 
action lawsuit decided in 1978.10 The plaintiffs in Madrigal argued that in Los 
Angeles County Hospitals, doctors were targeting Mexican-American women for 
sterilization, using a number of tactics (ranging from refusing to translate the consent 
documents into the patient’s language to threatening to cause injury) to coerce them 
when they refused.11 Similar accusations were made in the same time period against a 
variety of federal and state institutions in other parts of the country by African 
American, Puerto Rican, and Native American women.12  
The continuation of sterilization abuse was brought to light in the 1970’s by 
organizations including the Committee to End Sterilization Abuse, Indian Women 
United for Social Justice, the National Black Feminist Organization, and the National 
Welfare Rights Organization.13 Strengthening informed consent was posed at the 
national level as a key way to regulate medical systems that were systematically 
targeting women of color for sterilizations.14 One demand was to increase the waiting 
period between the time of the signed consent form and the time the procedure took 
place. Consequently, in 1979, federal regulations went into effect that required strict 
informed consent procedures, including 30 day waiting periods, for anyone receiving 
medical care under a program that is fully or partially funded by the federal 
                                                      
10 Stern, Eugenic Nation. 
11 Renee Tajima-Pena, No Más Bebés/No More Babies (Moon Canyon Films, 2015). 
12 Roberts, Killing the Black Body; Briggs, Reproducing Empire; Myla Vicenti Carpio, “The Lost 
Generation: American Indian Women and Sterilization Abuse,” Social Justice 31, no. 4 (98) (2004): 
40–53; Andrea Smith, Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide (Cambridge, MA: 
South End Press, 2005). 
13 Ordover, American Eugenics. 
14 Carpio, “The Lost Generation.” 
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government.15 That same year, federal regulations based on the Belmont Report went 
into effect that listed people in prison as a vulnerable population that required strict 
informed consent procedures and institutional review oversight before medical 
research could be conducted. Also in 1979, The California legislature finally repealed 
its eugenics laws in response to the Madrigal case.  
However, after 1979 sterilizations of people in prison and remaining 
institutions could still technically be performed by states as long as federal funds 
were not used, and as long as it was not undertaken in the name of eugenics. 
Additional protections specifically for prisoners were added to California’s Title 15 in 
1994 that only released state funds for procedures that result in sterilization if the life 
of the patient was at risk and if top medical officials gave approval in advance of the 
surgery.16  
In spite of these changes in policy and the “wins” gained by advocates, 
practices of nonconsensual sterilization have continued, recalling the eugenics 
programs of the past. For example, advocates at Justice Now, an Oakland-based 
human rights legal clinic specializing in serving people in California women’s 
prisons, collected testimony from prisoners about being non-consensually 
reproductively sterilized while incarcerated. In 2013, an investigative journalist 
published several stories accusing medical staff employed by the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation of conducting unauthorized 
                                                      
15 Stern, Eugenic Nation. 
16 Elaine Howle, California State Auditor, “Sterilization of Female Inmates: Report 2013-120” (State 
of California, June 2014), https://www.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2013-120.pdf. 
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reproductive sterilizations as late as 2010. One of these news stories included 
comments from a physician and his medical director at a state women’s prison, both 
of whom repeated eugenicist ideas.17 A Dr. Heinrich argued that paying for 
reproductive sterilization “now” would save the state money in the long run as the 
children of imprisoned people were likely to engage in criminality, live in poverty 
and claim welfare benefits, or even develop mental illness.18  
Given the continued practice of state-sponsored sterilization, and the citation 
of eugenics rationale for such a program, I disagree that the state’s adoption of 
eugenics theory is a problem only of the past. Why do state interventions on 
marginalized populations continue to occur in the present, especially given that 
federal and state policies have been passed in the name of, once and for all, rejecting 
eugenics? Rather than relegate eugenics history to an aberration in our otherwise 
liberal trajectory, a presumption that attempts to affirm our existence in a collective 
post-eugenics future, I propose that the answer to this question is that the logic of 
eugenics has been and continues to be entangled in liberal governance in the state. I 
argue that eugenics policies played a crucial role in modernizing and 
institutionalizing the apparatus of liberal state power in California. Theorizing this 
relationship between eugenics and liberal governance through original research at the 
California State Archives and California Historical Society, the dissertation shows 
                                                      
17 Corey G. Johnson, “Female Inmates Sterilized in California Prisons Without Approval,” Center for 
Investigative Reporting, July 7, 2013, https://www.revealnews.org/article/female-inmates-sterilized-in-
california-prisons-without-approval/. 
18 Johnson. 
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how some technologies of modern liberal governance developed precisely through the 
rubric of eugenics.  
Indeed, the dissertation demonstrates that eugenics theory and policies 
elaborated technologies of power that many of us in the present have come to accept 
as legitimate liberal state governance without recognizing or questioning their 
pernicious historical underpinnings. Eugenics transformed the previous mode of 
laissez-faire governance of California and provided new rationality for transforming 
old modes of racialized and gendered colonial governance to the unique California 
context. Through my analysis, I show that the trajectory of the liberal state in 
California was not inevitable or natural, but that it took specific shape in relation to 
the discourse of eugenics. In the chapters that follow, I track how eugenics discourse 
produced specific subjects, spatially organized a territory, and organized a 
temporality, logic, and affect through which to govern. Providing evidence that 
eugenics and liberalism are not mutually exclusive modes of governance, but rather 
interrelated technologies of power, this analysis illuminates how the practice of 
eugenics in California determined the present by foreclosing on other possible futures 
in the past.  
Liberal Governance and the Logic of Eugenics 
Embedded in the logic and practice of California governance, eugenics is an 
example of the inherent violence that constitutes the modern liberal state. By 
theorizing the violence of liberal state governance, the dissertation follows in the 
critical tradition of political theory, and also draws on an interdisciplinary body of 
  12 
scholarship critical of liberalism, including black and Native feminisms, critical 
ethnic studies, post-colonial theory, queer theory and queer of color critique, and 
critical disability studies.  
Within the discipline of political science, liberalism conventionally references 
a school of thought that is concerned with how best to organize society to maximize 
individual liberty and freedom. Grounded in the Western European Enlightenment, 
“liberalism” is closely associated with a series of reforms intended to create “a more 
open and tolerant society in which people would be free to pursue their own ideas and 
interests with as little interference as possible.”19 Lisa Lowe conceives of liberalism 
as a “modernization project” that makes a series of “universal promises” including 
political freedom for individuals through citizenship; economic freedom for 
individuals through the establishment of private property laws; and modernity 
through a civilized education, including a transition from religious thinking to secular 
humanism and scientific rationality.20 Many American politics scholars have 
embraced these universal promises, narrating early twentieth century reforms as 
working towards the creation of an inclusive and tolerant modern scientific social 
welfare state. These celebratory theories of the liberal state include pluralist theories 
that the state is a neutral structure for weighing competing interests; progressive 
theories that the liberal state is a benevolent force for increasing the well-being of 
citizens; and teleological theories that the liberal state is the destiny of civilized man.  
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Challenging the universality and desirability of these projects, Lowe identifies 
at least two inherent contradictions contained within these promises of liberalism. 
First, Lowe asserts that the condition of possibility for these universal promises is the 
exclusion of some people from the very definitions of citizen, individual, and 
human.21 Walter Mignolo similarly argues that the concept of the human upon which 
liberal ideals are organized was invented originally by European Renaissance 
humanists, who strategically positioned Christians as the universal reference point 
through which all other “Saracens, Heathens, Pagans, Indians and Blacks” (all of 
whom were articulated as engaging in non-normative sexual preferences) were to be 
judged.22 Women also served as foil to rational man, and liberalism left in place older 
gender hierarchies such as coverture. Finally, as the nation-state emerged as the sole 
legitimate governing structure in the modern, the “foreigner” was constituted to bring 
meaning to citizenship.23 All of these particular categories of the “other” are 
racialized and gendered, leaving the universal human -- to whom the promise of 
freedom has been made – inherently defined by his whiteness, maleness, able-
bodiedness, and sexual normativity.  
Second, Lowe argues that, “liberal affirmations of individualism, civility, 
mobility, and free enterprise simultaneously innovate new means and forms of 
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subjection, administration, and governance.”24 Simultaneous to the creation of 
tolerance of difference and room for individual freedom, liberal governance 
inaugurates intimate forms of intervention over body, subjectivity, and collectivities. 
No body can escape liberal governance, yet subjection to these forms of violence is 
gendered and racialized, impacting in intensive ways those bodies that cannot 
assimilate to the white, male, heterosexual, and able-body-minded norm. Liberalism 
as such is part of what Frantz Fanon calls “that peaceful violence that the world is 
steeped in”; or, what Haunani-Kay Trask describes as the racialized and gendered 
“ordered realities of confinement, degradation, ill-health, and early death.”25 
My examination of eugenics in early twentieth century affirms the argument 
that liberalism involves a persistent peaceful violence. I show how, through the 
discourse and practice of eugenics, a defective “other” is excluded from the universal 
promises of liberalism, simultaneous to their subjection to intensified state 
interventions. In contrast to a story about the “bad past” that has been progressively 
overcome to build the tolerant and human rights-loving Golden State of today, my 
centering eugenics provides a troubling story of California that calls for more critical 
reflection on the conditions of the present. 
Centering eugenics in the story of California first demands acknowledgment 
that California’s emergence as a settler colonial state set the initial foundations for the 
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logics of racial hierarchy and violence that underpin eugenics. The place that 
European settlers call California has been home to a linguistically and culturally 
diverse array of indigenous peoples since “time immemorial.”26 The Spanish 
conquistadors explored what they called Baja and Alta California in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, when they claimed the land as a possession of the Spanish 
crown. Spanish missionaries then colonized the area as far north as the city of Santa 
Rosa through the construction of a Mission system over a 70-year period that began 
in the mid-eighteenth century. The Franciscan monks who developed the mission 
system envisioned a mass conversion of the native heathens to Christianity, but they 
relied on the forced labor of those natives, and on military protection from Spanish 
soldiers. The soldiers engaged in rampant sexualized violence against native women, 
kidnapped native children, and allowed their animal herds to decimate the edible 
landscapes, threatening the food supply of native communities, and forcing many to 
indigenous people to evacuate or turn to the missions for help.27 Following 
independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, the Mexican government 
secularized the mission system and distributed the church’s vast land holdings in 
California among a few families. Indigenous people were then forced to work the 
land for Mexican land grantees in order to survive. Following the Mexican-American 
War, California became a U.S. territory in 1847 following the Treaty of Guadalupe 
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Hidalgo. Shortly after news of the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill reached the 
United States government, California was quickly granted statehood in 1851.  
Fueled by interest in exploiting the place called California’s vast natural 
resources, the western portion of the transcontinental railroad was completed in 1869, 
built using the exploited labor of mostly Chinese workers. The last third of the 
nineteenth  century through the early twentieth century then saw a rapid expansion in 
the non-indigenous and non-miner population in California. The railroad also 
increased the circulation of capital, technology, and ideas between the west coast of 
the U.S., the growing urban areas of the eastern and mid-western U.S., and the Pacific 
Rim.  
Increasing connection ushered in a twentieth century in California that was, as 
the rest of the United States, characterized by, according to Michael Rembis, 
“profound global restructuring characterized by massive migration, social and 
economic displacement, vicious and often bloody class conflict, and ultimately by the 
emergence of a new modern urban, industrial, capitalist order.”28 The period includes 
what Sarah Haley calls “Jim Crow modernity” being constructed in the U.S. south 
following the collapse of post-Civil War Reconstruction;29 the imperialist projects of 
the United States in the Caribbean, Hawai’i and South Pacific, and the Philippines; 
and the build-up to the great European state racisms that culminated in World War II. 
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These economic, social, and political changes spurred a variety of challenges to 
sexual relationships and kinship networks that inevitably influenced California.30  
While affected by national and global economic and social changes, 
California has a racial and gender history that is quite different from other parts of the 
United States. First, California, as part of the greater southwest region, experienced a 
unique form of genocide and ethnic cleansing of indigenous people through Spanish 
colonization under the mission system. At the same time, white settlers and 
indigenous people in the northernmost part of the state had relatively late contact, in 
some cases not until after 1850. The late settlement of California by people of 
European descent compared to the Northeast, Midwest and Southern United States, 
makes palpable California’s status as a settler colonial state. By settler colonial state, 
I mean that California invented itself through the land dispossession, slaughter, and 
assimilation of indigenous people who had lived there since time immemorial. 
Simultaneous to the project of making California empty, a concomitant project of 
settlement of the land by non-Natives, primarily Europeans and European 
descendants, repurposed it as a place that could become a state that governed citizens 
– a concept that inherently excluded indigenous people.31 California is a settler 
                                                      
30 Regina G. Kunzel, Fallen Women, Problem Girls: Unmarried Mothers and the Professionalization 
of Benevolence, 1890-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); John D’Emilio and Estelle B. 
Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America, 2nd ed (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997); Margot Canaday, The Straight State: Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-
Century America (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2009); Nayan Shah, Stranger Intimacy: 
Contesting Race, Sexuality, and the Law in the North American West (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011). 
31 Audra Simpson, Mohawk Interruptus: Political Life across the Borders of Settler States (Durham, 
N.C: Duke University Press, 2014). 
  18 
colonial state because it came into being as an imagined nation of U.S. citizens who 
claimed jurisdiction over land and resources, usurping the people who had lived and 
governed there before.  
 Second, California was uniquely shaped because it was the destination for 
Chinese laborers and other immigrants from the Pacific Rim, including Japanese, 
Punjabi, Southeast Asian, Mexican, South American, and Pacific Islander people.32 
Slavery was illegal in California, and the illegal practice of enslaving black people 
was limited – though still present – in California. Instead, diverse Asian and Pacific 
Islander peoples, particularly the Chinese, were used as exploited labor in building 
California’s infrastructure. After the construction of the rails, Chinese laborers were 
discarded, triggering a state-sponsored racist backlash against them in the late 
nineteenth century. Forms of multi-ethnic and multi-racial intimacy between 
migratory populations of miners, farmworkers, and vagrant laborers were especially 
troubling to bourgeois whites in California.33 Following the crackdown on Chinese 
migrants, California turned to the large population of Mexican descended people for 
labor. Because it shares a border with Mexico, southern California became a 
destination for Mexicans fleeing the violence of the revolution in the early twentieth 
century.34 Mexicans secured work on Californian farms and shipyards, and during 
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economic downturns, they became the new target of xenophobic anti-immigrant 
policies once reserved for the Chinese. 
Into this racialized context, a new movement of middle-class whites began 
organizing under the name of Progressivism in the early twentieth century. 
Progressives enacted a series of reform projects designed to build a modern liberal 
state that could respond to social, economic, and political problems brought on by 
urbanization and industrialization. My contention is that eugenics played a key role in 
imagining and enacting these Progressive modernization projects in California. I 
argue that it is through this entanglement with Progressivism, that the theory and 
practice of eugenics became embedded in liberal governance in California. In the 
chapters that follow, I make the case that eugenics elaborated specifically a 
knowledge of difference that asserted control over the human body and the body 
politic; an infrastructure of containment and a logic of carcerality; and a 
legitimization of state power that exceeded the needs of capital through a 
reorientation of affect and desire. All of these technologies of liberal governance 
drew on and consequently became infused with the logic and practice of eugenics 
with consequences that linger today. 
While contributing much needed knowledge about California eugenics 
practices and California modernity specifically, the dissertation also builds a critical 
perspective that has import onto liberal governance more broadly. By analyzing the 
dynamics of eugenics in a place like California that is often held up as the progressive 
bastion of tolerance – capital L Liberalism – I illuminate areas for attention in 
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analyses of liberal state governance in other places and other times. In so doing, I 
invite scholars to look anew at localized liberal governance, in order to interrogate the 
assumption that the liberal state is timeless (has always existed) and/or an inevitable 
natural development in the march of historical progress. I invite scholars to instead 
historicize the strategies that reformers used to elaborate a specific kind of 
government apparatus, and to examine how those choices foreclosed other possible 
future horizons.  
A Materialist Approach to Discourse 
My analysis focuses on the discourse of eugenics while emphasizing the 
connection between discourse and materiality. By discourse I mean not simply 
language or conversation, but a set of hegemonic concepts and statements that have 
been articulated in patterns over time, such that what people say, feel, or even think, 
works collectively to uphold structures of power and hierarchy.35 Counter to some 
versions of Marxist theory, I do not reduce discourse to an effect of relations of 
production. I insist that discourses materialize This emphasis on materiality includes 
attending to the materialization of the body, the body politic, and to political 
economy. 
Considering discourse as a practice of materialization situates my discussion 
of eugenics within the crucible of agreement and disagreement between Foucauldian 
discourse analysis and feminist materialisms, particularly black feminist thought. 
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However, my approach keeps discourse and materiality in productive tension, even as 
the theoretical fields of discourse analysis and materialism are often seemingly 
incompatible. I argue that what links discourse analysis and materialist feminism 
together is a critique of liberalism and liberal governance that explodes liberal 
assumptions of progress, inclusion, and freedom. Together scholarship in each of 
these traditions constitutes a critical genealogy of liberalism.  
My theorization draws from Michel Foucault’s placement of eugenics as a 
technology of modern governance -- part of a series of “state racisms” that buttressed 
liberal state power by creating distinctions between normal bodies and abnormal 
bodies.36 Foucault proposes that in the seventeenth century sovereign power 
transformed from the arbitrary power of the king to sentence subjects to death, to a 
more diffuse and pervasive biopower that has the “function of administering life.”37 
Foucault calls one of the twin techniques of power that developed from this 
transformation “discipline.” Discipline as an “anatomo-politics of the body,” is a 
micro-power investing “the body as a machine, its disciplining, the optimization of its 
capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its 
docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls.”38 This 
disciplinary power operates through what Foucault names as psy discourses, 
including the discourses that circulate in and between the institutions of education, 
medicine, and the prison. The second technique Foucault describes is the “bio-politics 
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of population”; this macro-intervention focuses on the “species body,” or the body 
politic, and the regulation of health, reproduction and longevity that operates through 
the governing scientific discourses of population including demography and 
economics. The concept of biopower allows Foucault to link together the population 
rhetoric of cleric Thomas Malthus, the rise of degeneracy discourse in the late 
nineteenth century, and the early twentieth century medico-psychology of sexual 
perversion – together constituting what he calls “perversion-heredity-
degenerescence.”39 Eugenics in this schema is a sister-discourse to other biopowerful 
discourses of pathologization that emerged in the modern period including 
homosexuality, criminality, and insanity. 
 However, Foucault has been criticized by black, post-colonial and socialist 
feminist scholars for lack of attention to two integrated forms of materiality: one, the 
imperialist formations of race and gender; and two, the extraction of value and 
exploitation of labor through capitalism.40 Regarding the first critique, scholars of 
gender and race have meticulously traced violence on bodies excluded from 
categorization as human (and from history) through racialization and other forms of 
colonial signification. Critical social theory argues that modern liberal power requires 
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some kind of “other” in order to produce the self, the subject, the citizen, and the 
human. According to Judith Butler, the intelligibility of subjects under the law 
requires a “founding repudiation” of “the abject.” For Butler, abjection entails the 
exclusion and illegibility of ghost-like bodies “who do not enjoy the status of the 
subject” and who “haunt the boundaries” of the power that produced them, “who’s 
living under the sign of the unlivable is required to circumscribe the domain of the 
subject.”41 Butler argues that the abjected body is denied subjectivity in order to 
produce the very conceptualization of a “subject” – or “human” -- for power. 
Understanding anti-blackness as a foundational form of abjection in the U.S., 
Angela Davis re-writes Foucault’s genealogy of the modern prison system by tracing 
it not to the penitentiary, but to the convict lease system that developed in the U.S. 
during Reconstruction.42 Davis writes: 
If, as Foucault insists, the locus of the new European mode of punishment 
shifted from the body to the soul, black slaves in the US were largely 
perceived as lacking the soul that might be shaped and transformed by 
punishment. Within the institution of slavery, itself a form of incarceration, 
racialized forms of punishment developed alongside the emergence of the 
prison system within and as a negative affirmation of the ‘free world’ from 
which slavery was twice removed. Thus, the deprivation of the white freedom 
tended to affirm the whiteness of democratic rights and liberties. As white 
men acquired the privilege to be punished in ways that acknowledged their 
equality and the racialized universality of liberty, the punishment of black 
slaves was corporal, concrete and particular.43 
 
Davis insists that Foucault’s focus on how disciplinary power acts through discourse, 
obscures the force applied directly to racialized bodies that were not perceived as 
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possessing a soul that could be reformed or rehabilitated. As a result of Foucault’s 
lapse wherein he assumed that the prisoner was perceived to possess a soul, Davis 
calls for multiple genealogies of the prison that attend to the way incarceration acts on 
the bodies of those excluded from the category of human. Davis’ scholarship has 
helped to inaugurate a re-reading of the prison in the U.S. through the lens of racial 
capitalism. In this theorization, the prison is primarily a site for extracting labor and 
capital from racialized bodies, rather than a technology invested in disciplining those 
bodies for normative citizenship and employment outside of the prison.  
Shifting perspective from the soul (in a Foucauldian analytic) back to the body 
has been generative for a generation of critical prison studies scholars who are 
analyzing how the prison acts on other bodies historically excluded from subjectivity, 
including gender deviant bodies, as well as how the prison regulates deviant 
sexuality.44 Sarah Haley insists “gender and sexuality are categories of analysis that 
reshape questions” about “the work of imprisonment, its power to shape social and 
political relations, to build economies, and to impose violence.”45 I agree with Dean 
Spade’s assessment that the significance of such materialist accounts, like that of 
Davis’, is in how they re-center the violence of normalization on the body when it 
seems to fall out in Foucauldian analysis.46  
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 However, this emphasis on bodily materiality has led some scholars to 
misconstrue Foucault’s specific pairing of disciplinary and regulatory power. For 
example, Achille Mbembe argues for understanding modern power as spatially 
organized, so that separate and distinct “life-worlds” (governed by the technology of 
biopolitics) and “death-worlds” (governed by what Mbembe calls “necropolitics”) are 
created.47 Those spaces populated by bodies excluded from the status of the human, 
become death-worlds were the abjected are killed outright or condemned to the 
“status of living dead.” Racism structures this spatial “distribution of death” and 
determines those targeted by necropolitics. Jasbir Puar describes an “oscillation 
between the disciplining of subjects and the control of populations” that brings some 
(white, gay and lesbian) individuals to life while regulating (racialized and queer) 
other populations to death.48 For Puar, the lifeliness of the queer Western liberal 
subject depends on the necropolitical regulation of racialized, sexually deviant 
constitutive others. 
My concern with this lines of thinking is when it draws a boundary between 
bodies that disciplinary power targets for normalization, and completely separate 
bodies that are biopolitically relegated to death. This theorization of liberal power 
implies that white European and Euro-descendent bodies are targeted only by 
disciplinary power, and that this limited targeting is almost equivalent to white 
privilege. The flip side of this assumption is that non-white colonized and racialized 
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bodies are exclusively the targets of violence conflated with regulatory, or 
necropolitical power, with the implication that to be an “other” means that one does 
not receive the gift of biopolitical investment in life, even if it is disciplinary. 
I agree that it is important to hold on to the materiality of the body -- some 
bodies have the capacity to assimilate, or perform within the boundaries of 
conventional expectations, while others are denied that possibility because the nature 
of their bodily difference is such that assimilation is impossible. I also agree that it is 
important to attend to the spatial organization of divestment and dispossession versus 
investment and empowerment. However, I have three concerns about this line of 
thinking, because of the way that it splits disciplinary and regulatory power. First, the 
liberal project of difference is creative, adaptive, and sometimes surprising in its 
localized and temporary forms. “White” is a racial category in the U.S. that has 
expanded and contracted over time. Localized practices of racialization have 
periodically enfolded those who are legally construed as “white,” so that some whites 
have been, and can be, part of an emerging or entrenched “other” that is not invested 
with life. This was the case with eugenics institutionalization as I will show in this 
dissertation, and it also explains why some whites are the subjects of mass 
incarceration today.  
Second, disciplinary power is also a kind of violence, even if it is, to use 
Fanon’s term, a “peaceful violence.”49 A report by the California Board of Prison 
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Directors dated 1910 determined:  
The discipline which saves a man imposes upon him a greater amount of 
suffering than that which is purely retaliatory. It is easier for a prisoner to 
adapt himself to the ordinary rules and regulations of a prison, and perform a 
certain amount of labor, than to submit to the discipline of institutions which 
[sic] make a constant draft upon his mental, moral, and physical powers; and 
prisoners who have served time in both classes of institutions almost 
invariably so testify. The old system said to the prisoner, ‘Be good’ in merely 
asked him to be submissive. The new system says ‘be good’ but also ‘be good 
for something.’ 
 
Because the process of rehabilitation causes mental, moral, and physical suffering 
through the process of assimilation, the passage echoes Foucault’s description of the 
prison as a site where disciplinary power is enacted so that the soul becomes “the 
prison of the body.”50 To live in a body that is categorized as having the capacity to 
achieve normality dramatically increases one’s likelihood of not dying prematurely, 
of having access to health care, of being able to access the rights of citizenship, and of 
earning a living wage. However, we are remiss if we obscure the material, epistemic, 
and psychic violence of disciplinary power in order to make tangible the violence of 
regulatory power or necropolitics.  
Third, relatedly, and perhaps most crucially, it is faulty to suggest that 
abjected bodies excluded from the human are not subjected to disciplinary power at 
the same time as they are targeted by regulatory power. Portraying disciplinary power 
as a kind of privilege granted only to white subjects, or only acting on bodies that 
have the potential to achieve normality, confuses our ability to see how abjected 
bodies are also subjected to discipline, especially by the state. Disciplinary power 
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targets even those “others” existing in the realm of social death. This tension between 
social death and disciplinary power results in what Gayatri Spivak named as a violent 
shuttling between a subject and object status.51 The other is at some moments 
responsible for assimilating themselves into the needs of state and capital, and other 
moments denied any kind of futurity outside of the void of the institution. I explore 
this point further at the end of chapter 1. 
My analysis of eugenics demands a theory of liberal power that can attend to 
the materiality of the body, while still holding on to Foucauldian insights about the 
discourses of biopower. Seeking a historical method that can do such work, I draw 
from Saidiya Hartman’s attention to the violence of inclusion in the Reconstruction 
era. Hartman traces:  
The role of rights in facilitating relations of domination, the new forms of 
bondage enabled by proprietal notions of the self, and the pedagogical and 
legislative efforts aimed at transforming the formerly enslaved into rational, 
acquisitive, and responsible individuals.52  
 
In this way, Hartman considers how disciplinary power might be deployed 
selectively, or at selective times, so that the recognition of humanity and individuality 
is extended to black subjects at moments in order to “tether, bind, and oppress.”53 
Hartman opens up the possibility to attend to the ways that bodies are selectively 
affirmed and neglected for different amounts of time for strategic state purposes. 
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Bodies might be selectively affirmed even piece-by-piece, organ-by-organ, as Kalindi 
Vora shows in her analysis of the surrogacy industry in India, illustrating a 
complicated and calculating biopolitical economy of difference under liberal power.54 
Both Hartman’s and Vora’s work provides a template for the present study of 
eugenics, one that seeks to apprehend the peaceful violence of liberalism precisely by 
what is materialized by eugenics discourses. 
 Given their critique of Foucault’s race and gender politics, materialist 
feminisms have rejected Foucault in favor of returning to a Marxist analysis of 
political economy. Scholars such as Angela Davis and Joy James have developed a 
theory of state violence that emphasizes the role of the state in supporting racial 
capitalism.55 I agree that an investigation of the political economy of eugenics is 
warranted. However, as I explore in chapter 3, conventional Marxist analysis of the 
relationship between capital and the state is insufficient to explain the building of 
semi-independent liberal state with the power to enact biopolitical projects that 
exceed strictly capitalist concerns. Eugenics discourse demands a theory of political 
economy that can account for the moments when liberal power -- separate from the 
role that state discipline might play in crafting better workers or extracting surplus 
value from non-laboring bodies – exceeds the drives of capitalist extraction. In 
crafting this, I have tentatively returned to Foucault’s project of theorizing liberal 
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power as a force by itself, while still continuing to address the areas of complicity 
with racial capitalism. 
Eugenics and the Enclosing Queer and Crip Futures 
Feminist scholarship has argued that the afterlives of eugenics extend into the 
twenty-first century.56 The dissertation does not track the precise routes through 
which eugenics came to live in present technologies of liberal governance. Rather, I 
employ a genealogical methodology concerned with what the study of eugenics past 
can reveal about liberalism’s enclosure of future horizons. Specifically, I argue that 
the logic of eugenics is one technology through which the liberal state -- in 
California, but potentially also in other states where eugenics operated -- enclosed 
queer and crip futures.  
I describe in chapter 1 how the concept of the “defective,” and related notions 
of insanity, feeble-mindedness, and juvenile dependency/delinquency, targeted people 
assigned to the category of women and girls for forms of bodily deviance. People 
assigned the category of woman or girl, who would not, or could not, conform to 
able-bodied, heteronormative, gender norms, risked being referred to the adult or 
emerging juvenile legal system, or indefinite commitment to a state hospital or state 
home. Throughout the historical archives I examined, these gendered, racialized, and 
able-normative state eugenics policies were depicted as necessary because of the 
threats that the so-called “defective class” posed to society.  
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In particular, the defective class was imagined by state actors and reformers as 
a threat to the future. For example, the California State Board of Charities and 
Corrections argued in a 1917 report to the state legislature: 
While insanity itself is probably not hereditary, the offspring of insane persons 
are almost sure to be weak in some regard…This being true, preventing the 
insane from becoming parents is society’s duty. For those with the inheritance 
and the future to which children of the insane are liable, it is better not to be 
born.57  
 
As I have already discussed, defectiveness was determined by being born to a “weak” 
person, according to the theory of inheritance at the core of eugenics. As a result, 
eugenics policies called for the prevention of the reproduction of defectives who 
threatened the futurity of the body politic. To put this in temporal terms, eugenics 
programs intended to create a world where defectives were no longer born. As the 
superintendent of the School for Girls insisted in 1920: 
As for vision beyond that entertained for the individual pupils of the School, 
may we not cherish the vision of a society in which heredity will be so 
controlled that children will not be born with handicaps that can not be 
overcome and in which home, school, amusements, church, courts—all 
factors of environment, in short—will so function that segregation of young 
girls in schools like the California School for Girls will be unnecessary.58 
 
In rationalizing killing off the defective class, the State Commission in Lunacy 
reasoned:  
Sterilization may possibly prevent the development of a future genius once in 
a while, but so many who are defective or psychopathic come into the world 
for lack of sterilization that it is hardly profitable to discuss the question. The 
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genius is a remote possibility, the defective is a distinct probability.59 
 
State eugenicists intended to create a future of health and well-being for the body 
politic precisely through the elimination of future defective life. While it is possible to 
consider this as an almost genocidal project, I conceive of this discourse and practice 
of one of enclosure in order to draw attention to the forms of social life that were 
prematurely curtailed. 
Feminist activists and scholars tend to refer to eugenics intervention as a form 
of “reproductive injustice.” Loretta Ross describes reproductive justice as “the ability 
of any woman to determine her own reproductive destiny,” including “(1) the right to 
have a child; (2) the right not to have a child; and (3) the right to parent the children 
we have, as well as to control our birthing options.”60 Reproductive injustice 
subsequently refers to both legal structures that prevent reproductive self-
determination, and to any social structures that diminish the resources at hand to 
pursue one’s reproductive rights. Reproductive justice advocates have identified state 
containment programs as important sites for reproductive injustice in the United 
States. For example, advocates with the California-based legal clinic Justice Now 
describe the incarceration of poor women and women of color as reproductive 
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oppression and a denial of the human right to family.61  
While affirming the importance that the opportunity to have and raise children 
has to those individuals and communities denied it, the concept of reproductive 
justice is also entangled in what queer theorists call “repo-futurity.”62 Under repo-
futurity, assumed heterosexual citizens orient themselves toward the singular goal of 
reproducing children who can perpetuate the nation into the future. When a national 
discourse invests children with the possibility of saving the future, a reproductively 
oriented sexuality is compelled from citizens as their civic duty to reproduce the 
nation.63  In the assessment of queer theorists, the expectation of repo-futurity 
excludes from state citizenship those who fail to embody cultural expectations of 
reproductive time lines.  
M. Jacqui Alexander, however, complicates the notion of a singular, universal 
demand for repo-futurity. Alexander argues that racial capitalism makes complicated 
calculations that vary among racialized and classed groups based on “on-time” needs 
for labor and citizenship.64 Such calculations might require present, past, or future 
orientation from laborers, owning classes, slaves, or disposable people, enforced 
through legal regimes. Those bodies that cannot or will not orient themselves to this 
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national time line are then criminalized and excluded from citizenship in innumerable 
other ways.  
Building on this queer theorization of liberal temporality, I offer a reading of 
eugenics that includes, but also exceeds, the ways eugenics practices constitute 
reproductive injustice. This reading is especially relevant because the present study of 
eugenics prioritizes eugenics containment programs rather than non-consensual 
sterilization programs. Eugenics institutionalization diminished the horizons of future 
life in ways that exceeded the limits placed on the physical and cultural reproduction 
of children by potential birth parents. Defectives were committed indefinitely to state 
institutions where they experienced social death as well as premature physical death. 
Through eugenics detention, people who embodied other ways of thinking and being 
in the world were disciplined and sometimes terrorized into assimilation, and if they 
could not or would not assimilate, they were removed permanently from the space 
and time of normal society. 
I adopt the term “temporal penitentiary” from Ruha Benjamin to describe this 
withdrawal of gendered and racialized “defectives” from the temporality of the then 
present, a project undertaken to eliminate defectiveness from the horizon of the 
future.65 R. Benjamin writes “Black people routinely are either degraded in popular 
representations of progress or completely written out of futuristic visions (Nelson 
2002), a kind of temporal penitentiary in which oppressed people are locked in to a 
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dystopic present.”66 R. Benjamin uses the temporal penitentiary to describe the 
discursive strategies of excluding black people from imaginaries of the future, but she 
also points to the material effects of discourse, including social death and premature 
death.  
Similarly, and possibly corollary to this operation of anti-blackness, eugenics 
institutionalization materially practiced denying people the possibility of participating 
in social and cultural reproduction precisely in order to bring out a future without 
defectiveness. By social and cultural reproduction I mean the creation of art, music, 
writing, clothing, and other expressive artifacts; the construction of queer spaces, 
including temporary autonomous zones, or other unsettled and ephemeral places for 
intimacy; and the cultivation of chosen family that could offer alternate lineages for 
variety of inheritances that exceed blood inheritance. These queer and crip material 
and temporal creations exceeded, challenged, and could have potentially transformed 
dominant social relations and culture. By social and cultural reproduction, I also mean 
the kinds of alternative embodiments and occupations of time, and practices for 
disrupting progressive time lines, that institutionalized people might have created and 
passed on. Ultimately, eugenics was a form of containment against what critical 
disability scholars have identified as the creation of possible crip futures.67  
I refer to these alternative possible temporalities and time lines as “queer” and 
“crip” because in the early twentieth century texts I surveyed, “queer” signified a 
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peculiar or strange person, someone who deviated from the norm. As I will explore in 
chapter 1, in this sense queer operated as a proxy for “defective.” In the mid-twentieth 
century, queer would come to signify homosexuality, and it is in this specific sense 
that queer was reclaimed in the late twentieth century by those who refused 
assimilation into heterosexual and heteropatriarchal norms.68 My use of the term 
queer references all of these varied meanings, but most specifically I use it to enact a 
kind of reclamation of all of the kinds of strangeness and weirdness that “queer” 
referenced in the early twentieth century, whether they were sexual deviations from 
the norm or other kinds of deviations of body, mind, and practice.  Crip, deriving 
from the term crippled, has a similar trajectory as a derogatory word that has been 
reclaimed by some of those it targeted. Some self-proclaimed crip scholars and 
activists have argued for reclaiming crip as an anti-assimilationist praxis, one that 
rejects efforts to cure, treat, or fix the disabled body.69 Since a central goal of this 
dissertation to show how several identity political formations have roots in eugenics 
discourse, I use queer and crip together.70  
By queer and crip futures I do not mean to limit the impact of eugenics to 
those bodies that might be labeled – or might choose to reclaim – the identity terms 
“queer” and “crip” today. Rather, setting the stakes for why eugenics in the early 
twentieth century matters today, I argue that eugenics institutionalization not only 
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foreclosed on the futures of those who were constituted as defective, but eugenics 
also delimited the possible futures for us all. The very existence of eugenics 
institutions encouraged, incentivized, or even terrorized non-institutionalized 
individuals into investing themselves properly in the kind of time-telling, time-
keeping, and future planning required to be liberal workers and citizens. If those 
individuals did not or could not embody liberal time properly, then they ran the risk 
of being categorized as defective and put in an institution. As I discuss in chapter 1, 
those who could not learn to embody liberal time and progressive time lines and 
expectations, included gender non-conforming, sexually deviant, disabled, 
neurodivergent, and mad people assigned to the category of women and girls. It is in 
using eugenics-based detention to terrorize the population experimenting with other 
ways of being and being in relation in the world that eugenics programs worked 
towards determining a white, gender conforming, heteronormative, and able-
normative future for the entire body politic.  
Critical theorists have argued that standardized time and universal progressive 
time lines are central to the function of liberal power and the modernization of the 
nation-state.71 I argue that efforts to contain defectiveness were an instantiation of a 
broader project of liberal state power enforcing the occupation of time and the 
temporal regimes necessary to the modernization of the nation and the functioning of 
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capitalism. Normative regimes of time and temporality were consolidated by 
Progressive reformers precisely through eugenicist enclosures of queer and crip 
experiments in ways of being and sociality, that might have generated alternative 
future horizons. Through eugenics institutionalization, the liberal state in California 
claimed jurisdiction over which possible futures could be allowed to unfold. Thus, the 
carceral logic of eugenics has never been safely contained in the past but has always 
been reaching through time to adjust and structure both our present and our future.  
Genealogy and a Queer Desire to Touch the Other Across Time 
The liberal state invests its own progress narrative with vitality through the 
foreclosure of alternate future horizons. This is evident in both the cyclical emergence 
of eugenics programs. Relatedly, the liberal state builds a progress narrative through 
the denial of the persistence of the logic of eugenics in the present, and this is evident 
in the limited capacity of state actors to apologize and provide reparations for 
eugenics. To challenge the logic of eugenics-based liberal temporality, I indulge in 
what I call a queer desire to touch the other across time through the methodology of 
genealogy. My project is to mark the moment of foreclosure on these possible 
alternative horizons.  
This queer methodology draws inspiration from the theories of Walter 
Benjamin, Michel Foucault, and M. Jacqui Alexander, as well as from popular 
speculative fiction. First, Walter Benjamin insists that avenging the oppressions of the 
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past has been the source of great revolutionary power.72 Speaking of the German 
Social Democrats who positioned the working class as the savior of future 
generations, W. Benjamin writes:  
Social democracy thought fit to assign to the working class the role of the 
redeemer of future generations, in this way cutting the sinews of its greatest 
strength. This training made the working class forget both its hatred and its 
spirit of sacrifice, for both are nourished by the image of enslaved ancestors 
rather than that of liberated grandchildren.73  
 
I see parallels between W. Benjamin’s thesis that anticipating the future without 
slavery saps revolutionary energy, and the demands of repo-futurity discussed above, 
wherein good citizenship is predicated on producing children that can reproduce the 
nation. W. Benjamin’s call for a kind of materialist historical writing that could 
dismantle the liberal rubric of what he called “empty homogenous time,” or 
progressive, linear, and universalist imperial time, counters the demands of repo-
futurity. In this materialist version of history, Benjamin sought to seize “a 
revolutionary chance in the fight for the oppressed past.”74 I conceive of this notion as 
a kind of hope that emerges from the possibility that the way things are now is not 
how they were destined to be. The materialist writing of history strikes me as a way 
of resisting the demands of repo-futurity, by indulging in the desire to touch the queer 
other across the constraints of time.   
I read my archive not for historical facts but on the premise that a study of the 
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past can tell us something about the present – what Michel Foucault, interpreting 
Friedrich Nietzsche, calls a “genealogical” approach to history.75 Foucault is critical 
of historical methods that posit a seamless teleology from the past to the present, in 
order to uphold contemporarily sacred ideas and sentiments. According to Foucault, a 
genealogical method demonstrates the historical contingency of these sacred ideas 
and reveals them as “unstable assemblages.”76 In other words, a genealogy of liberal 
state governance in California that centers eugenics could denaturalize the liberal 
state and highlight it as a structure that could potentially be changed.  
However, Foucauldian genealogy emphasizes the rupture between epistemes 
in order to highlight their historical contingency. My concern is that the notion of 
rupture is also a strategy used by the liberal state to articulate itself as progressively 
overcoming the past in order to move into the future. I argue that eugenics was not a 
unique, one-time error or aberration, but, rather, part of a cyclical process wherein 
earlier colonial discourses and practices re-emerged and were reinscribed. M. Jacqui 
Alexander’s methodology of reading history “palimpsestically” offers a way to trace 
this process of reinscription.77 The palimpsest is in a literary sense the appearance of 
an imperfectly erased text underneath or through a more recent inscription. Alexander 
uses this concept to illuminate the ways that despite the desire of the state to be 
moving toward the future, what bleeds through is “the imperfect erasure, hence 
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visibility, of a ‘past’.”78 Alexander proposes a reading methodology that “hold[s] on 
to the historical specificity through which those various social relations are 
constituted at the same time that we examine the continuity and disjunctures of 
practices within and among various state formations.”79 Alexander observes “nodes 
of anxiety” around sexuality that she suggests appear palimpsestically, over and over 
again across time, even if, and especially if, these concerns have supposedly been 
resolved via some legal fix.  
As I explore, there are elements in the discourse of eugenics that draw from 
the racialized Enlightenment discourse of universal time and the practice of temporal 
distancing that Johannes Fabian says authorized colonialism, and that Siobhan 
Somerville says were cited first in the racial science of the nineteenth century and 
later in the science of sexuality.80 In this sense eugenics is neither completely modern 
nor a mere iteration of something past, just as the state of California is neither 
completely modern, nor merely reiterating the past development of states that came 
before. A palimpsestic approach to eugenics is equipped to hold the tension between 
epistemic rupture and colonial reinscription. In Ann Stoler’s view, the importance of 
holding this tension is that it allows us to address the ways that state racisms appear to 
be both new, biopolitical, and yet familiar, medieval, at the same time.81 The political 
stakes of holding this tension is in disrupting the notions of universal progressive 
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linear time and binary incommensurability between the past and the present that are at 
the heart of liberal power.82 
My queer desire to touch the other across time is optimistic in that it is 
oriented toward changing the organization of social, political and economic life. I 
draw on popular speculative fiction, particularly a Marvel Comic’s The Uncanny X-
Men storyline called “Days of Futures Past.”83 In the storyline, X-Men characters in a 
dark, dystopic future develop the technology to send a member of their party into the 
past, to intervene in an act that they believe has determined their particular future. 
Readers of the comic have been exposed to multiple storylines, so they are aware of 
multiple possible futures for the X-men. Readers know precisely what other kind of 
alternative futures may be salvaged in this return to the past. As I reinterpret this idea, 
I create a genealogical, palimpsestic, materialist, and speculative method of history 
that can apprehend the technologies through which queer and crip futures were 
foreclosed, and through which our particular trajectory of existence was determined.  
Opening up this plane or dimension of existence as historically contingent and 
therefore changeable, the California eugenics case study on the foreclosure of queer 
and crip futurity offers a template for marking other “days of futures past” that 
gesture toward other possible ways of living and being in the world, other modes of 
social reproduction, and other ways of organizing human value. Resisting both the 
logic of eugenics and the liberal state’s orientation toward white supremacist and 
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able-bodied repo-futurity, I have mined the archive for evidence of queer, gender 
non-conforming, crip, and neurodivergent futures past. I argue that we cannot, and 
should not, pretend to know the truth of those others who lived those possibilities. Yet 
in the moments the state expressed anxiety about containing these others, the archive 
inadvertently reveals that alternative ways of being in the world existed. The political 
stakes of reaching across time is to split the future wide open from determination 
under the rubric of eugenics and to create the space and time for queer, crip, and 
feminist possibilities to emerge.   
California’s Eugenics Archives 
My archive is a collection of documents stored in the California State Archive 
and by the non-profit California Historical Society, composed between the years of 
1890 and 1940, and regarding several types of state operated institutions and the 
inmates held there. These eugenics institutions included state hospitals, state homes 
for the feeble-minded, state schools for delinquent and dependent youth, adult 
reformatories, and state prisons. Documents discussing these institutions at the 
California State Archive included reports to the legislature written by oversight 
boards and institutional administrators; hundreds of brief records of individual 
inmates in state hospitals, state homes for the feeble-minded, and juvenile and adult 
state reformatories called “case books” or “intake logs”; and correspondence between 
institutional administrators and inmates, inmate family members, and state actors. I 
also read articles written by institutional heads and published in state sponsored 
research journals, and newspaper articles written about state institutions. Documents 
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stored at the California Historical Society relating to the reformist group the 
California League of Women Voters, which was instrumental in establishing 
correction programs for women and girls throughout the state, included meeting and 
conference notes; correspondence between members and correspondence between 
members and state officials; copies of proposed legislation; newspaper clippings; 
reports compiled by members about the status of jail conditions for women; and other 
reports from members.  
I engaged with this archive as a site within which to trace how the discourse 
of eugenics was articulated and elaborated in the early twentieth century California. I 
also used this archive to connect eugenics discourse to emergent state practices for 
committing, caring for, and rehabilitating inmates, as well as for building, expanding, 
and funding state institutions. In the chapters that follow, I describe some of the 
routes by which the discourse of eugenics materialized liberal state power over 
racialized and gendered bodies, knowledges, affect, desire, profit/capital, space, time, 
and future horizons.  
In chapter one, “Knowing, Making, and Disciplining the Defective Body,” I 
examine how eugenics discourse elaborated state power over unruly bodies through 
official schemas of difference. Specifically, I track the category of “defective” as it 
was circulated between reformers, administrators, and institutional staff, including 
physicians, between approximately 1900 and 1925. I discuss the concept of the 
“defective” person as the object of eugenics intervention and describe how the 
defective was discursively constituted in terms of a relationship to time, or a deviance 
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from normative temporal regimes. I describe the state’s methods for constituting a 
body as defective, through a series of practices that took place during the intake 
process for new inmates at state institutions, and also through disciplinary practices 
inside the institutions. I argue that this regime of knowledge about difference 
operated specifically through gendered and sexed ideologies of normality and 
abnormality, exerting intimate forms of state power over bodies designated as women 
and girls. This gendering and sexing, I show, was made possible through extremely 
narrow expectations of feminine sexual morality, able-bodiedness, and neuro-
conformity. Chapter one also insists that the gendered and sexed category of defective 
was racialized, even though evidence suggests that the majority of defective women 
and girls were legally categorized as white. Even if we cannot prove 
disproportionality in terms of current-day racial categories among those targeted for 
eugenics, the concept of defectiveness was constituted in terms of a colonialist, 
racialized practice of temporal distancing that upheld the white supremacist social, 
political, and economic order.  
By analyzing the process of attaching defectiveness to bodies, I show how 
discourse is not just “in the air” or “in our minds,” but is a physical process of 
invading the body and materializing it in specific ways. Further, this discourse of 
difference was paradoxical in that it rendered the body deviant precisely through the 
intensification of power over the body. Theorizing the category of the “defective” in 
early twentieth century California gestures toward this paradox existing at the heart of 
liberal power, wherein violence is enacted not just through the exclusion from the 
  46 
promises of liberalism, but also through the forms of inclusion that accompany 
abjection. 
In chapter two, “Eugenics Institutions: Carceral Infrastructures and Logics,” I 
argue that the discourse of eugenics helped to expand and develop the state’s carceral 
infrastructure and logic of containment. I examine the operations of the state’s early 
twentieth century farm “colony” style institutions -- state hospitals, state homes, and 
adult and juvenile reformatories – where tens of thousands of people were detained 
indefinitely on the basis of eugenics reasoning. These institutions were ostensibly 
built to provide care and treatment to those that we would today categorize as 
mentally ill, developmentally/intellectually disabled, and delinquent. Yet, I explore 
the ways in which these facilities of care were physically, temporally, legally, and 
logically almost indistinguishable from the state’s houses of punishment. In addition 
to the state prisons, then, these eugenics institutions spatially organized the settler 
colonial state and expanded the carceral state’s physical and legal footprint on the 
landscape. 
 
In addition to the argument about physical similarity between eugenics 
institutions and state prisons, eugenics theory also helped to develop the logical 
justification of state confinement, the precept that some people deserve and require 
permanent, internal segregation away from the normal, healthy body politic. The 
temporality of eugenics insisted that some people deserve social death in order to 
secure the future. I argue that as a logic of containment, eugenics pathologization 
operated as a contiguous carceral logic to the logic of criminality. In particular, 
  47 
eugenics institutionalization emphasized the necessity of indefinitely detaining 
women and girls from the body politic. Consequently, eugenics institutionalization is 
a case study in how carceral regimes are naturalized through affective and libidinal 
economies that cathect danger onto bodies assigned to the category of women and 
girls. 
In this chapter, I gesture toward the ways that eugenics institutionalization 
served as a template for the massive expansion of California’s prison system in the 
second half of the twentieth century. Tying together the physical infrastructure and 
logics of institutionalization with the modern prison industrial complex thus has 
urgent political stakes. Specifically, it raises questions about current efforts to 
decriminalize state prisoners in favor of expanding state treatment and rehabilitation 
programs. I insist that calls for state care and state treatment are not alternatives to the 
carceral regime of governance, but rather fantasies that obscure the history of 
eugenics institutionalization.  
In chapter three, “The Biopolitical Economy of Eugenics,” I argue that the 
discourse of eugenics played a key role in asserting new forms of liberal state power 
over profit and capital in the early twentieth century. During the Progressive Era in 
the United States, a new administrative and social welfare state was developed, 
intended to intervene in the effects of the extraction processes of industrial capitalism 
by regulating corporations and providing a social safety net for citizens.84 I position 
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eugenics as a key discourse in the Progressive establishment of this scientific state. 
Specifically, the chapter tracks the discursive shifts that moved from laissez-faire 
governance to biopolitical state spending by following a debate in the California 
legislature over the cost of eugenics programs. Reformers articulated a version of the 
liberal state that was capable of taking action to intervene in threats to the health and 
futurity of the body politic, even if that intervention countered the immediate 
demands of capitalists, and required a state investment in resources for which there 
was to be no direct capital return. This inaugurated a different kind of relationship 
between the state and capital, a post-laissez-faire biopolitical economy wherein the 
state could legitimately exert some forms of control over capital, and consequently 
establish itself as a competing source of social control over bodies of labor. 
The biopolitical state required a new conceptualization of freedom, one that 
challenged the specifically American desires for freedom practiced by capitalists that 
centered on unrestricted profit, and also enclosed on the practices of freedom being 
developed by the underclass centered on unrestricted movement and relationships.85 
Reformers crafted a eugenicist conceptualization of freedom that hinged instead on 
the practice of self-government and deference to authority. Parallel to the project of 
exerting power over capital, progressive reformers worked to channel and temper the 
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radical imaginaries of working-class, vagrant, “queer,” and otherwise defective 
subjects.  
The modernization project that was early twentieth century eugenics in 
California elaborated a schema of knowledge of bodily difference, an infrastructure 
and logic of spatial containment, and an affective orientation away from profit and 
toward the state. These technologies of governance were available for administrators 
in California long after the Nazi regime was defeated, and eugenics was publicly 
denounced. Through the deployment of these technologies of governance, eugenics 
delimited the possible future horizons for us all. The political stakes of revisiting the 
conception of these technologies of liberal governance are nothing less than a matter 
of denaturalizing the conceptualization of liberal state power as a form of freedom. 
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Chapter 1 
Knowing, Making, and Disciplining the Defective Body 
 
It may designate a vast class of nervous and mental conditions embracing 
insanity, epilepsy, and feeblemindedness on the one hand; alcoholic tendencies, vice, 
eccentricities, absence of the moral sense, undue excitability and various anomalies of 
conduct and disposition on the other.86 
 
In a 1912 annual report to the California legislature, the State Commission in 
Lunacy described the inmates confined in institutions for the insane and the feeble-
minded. According to the commission, this “neuropathic class” included people who 
had been legally declared insane; people diagnosed with a range of disorders, 
including epilepsy, “feeble-mindedness,” and alcoholism; people engaged in vice or 
demonstrating immorality; eccentric and excitable people; and, finally, those whose 
behavior and disposition were otherwise anomalous. In the next biennial report, the 
commission would re-name this group the “defective class.” The adjacent State Board 
of Charities and Corrections expressed concerned about the growing presence of this 
defective class in state prisons, reformatories, and county level institutions, including 
almshouses, county hospitals, and maternity homes. Of concern for the board was the 
likelihood that many defectives had not yet been institutionalized, and therefore 
continued to menace non-defective society. Although the category of “defective” 
faded out in legislative reports after 1923, the term remained in use by state 
psychologists and juvenile justice experts well into the twentieth century. Some 
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federal and state laws, including federal gun control laws, still refer to defective 
persons.87 
In the present, the category of “defective” is troubling because it conflates 
physical disability, mental illness, intellectual disability, and socially stigmatized 
behavior that does not require medical or psychological treatment. One way of 
reading this apparent heterogeneity is to write off the category of defectiveness as 
absurd, some kind of historical weirdness, a mistake. If such an arbitrary category 
existed in state policy, people would have been unfairly targeted for eugenics 
programs at random.  
However, I interpret the seeming absurdity of the category of defective as a 
problem of trying to make sense of a historical category of difference through 
present-day frames of reference about legitimate state power. “Defective” operated as 
a discourse of difference that drew on existing hierarchies and repackaged them in 
adaptive, creative, and occasionally surprising ways, resulting in hierarchies of bodily 
difference that may be non-sensical to readers outside of that space and time. This 
non-sense does not mean that the category of defective was randomly deployed, but, 
rather, that it constituted a contingent form of bodily difference that materialized a 
specific gendered, disabled, and racialized subject of state power.  
This chapter explores how the state of California constituted a discourse of 
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official truth/knowledge about the defective body in California between 1900 and 
1923. I track state actors’ methods for constituting a feminized body as defective, 
through a series of practices that took place during the intake process for new inmates 
at state institutions, and later through disciplinary practices inside the state 
institutions. The chapter examines the ways that this regime of knowledge about 
difference exerted intimate forms of state power over bodies designated as women 
and girls, and consequently materialized these bodies on the gender and sex binary. 
This gendering, as I show, was fundamentally entangled in a rather narrow 
expectation of sexual conformity, as well as other forms of body and mind conformity 
that we might address as forms of disability and madness today.  
This chapter also examines how the category of defective was racialized, and 
worked to uphold a white supremacist social, political, and economic order, even 
though the majority of people labeled defective were categorized as white. 
Specifically, I analyze how the concept of defectiveness was constituted in terms of a 
colonialist, racialized temporality that upheld the white supremacist political order. I 
borrow from Johannes Fabian’s theorization of “temporal distancing” that enables 
two political bodies to occupy one space, in order to theorize racialized temporal 
deviance as an element of the discourse of defectiveness. 
Analyzing the process of attaching defectiveness to bodies, I show how 
discourse is not just “in the air” or “in our minds,” but is a physical process of 
invading the body and materializing it in specific ways. This is a disciplinary power 
that paradoxically also renders the body deviant. Analyzing the category of the 
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“defective” in early twentieth century California gestures toward a paradox at the 
heart of liberal power, wherein liberalism constructs an abject “other” precisely 
through the intimate intensification of power over the body. 
Locating Truth on the Body  
This section analyzes the strategies the state used to determine whether a body 
was defective, through a discussion of some of the most disturbing material that I 
encountered in the state archives. These strategies were deployed on bodies that were 
already under state control, as in, they had already been institutionalized. Through the 
medical examination, compilation of the family history, determination of IQ, and the 
diagnosis, institutionalized bodies were ex post facto articulated as defective.  
Intake for new inmates at the state hospitals, state homes for the feeble-
minded, and reform schools in early twentieth century California started with an 
intensive medical exam. As the sample form below demonstrates, the exam 
demanded blood and urine samples, and a visual and physical inspection of the body, 
including breasts, external genitalia, and the vagina. Reading the individual casebook 
records for Sonoma State Home between the years of 1913-1920 reveals the kind of 
bodily markers of those assigned female that intake exam doctors considered deviant. 
Doctors noted a variety of anomalies, including recognized medical conditions 
involving “enlarged goiter,” or evidence of a “congenital thyroid disorder.” Some 
notes point to bodily difference existing in a grey area between medical condition and 
social judgment such as “very obese, short stocky figure.” Other aberrations are more 
opaque as to their medical import, including repeated concerns with “pendulous 
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breasts” and “abundant hair.”  
 
Figure 1: Sample medical examination form collected from the New Jersey 
Reformatory, and included in a report of the “State Board of Prison Directors of the 
State of California Upon a Proposed Reformatory for Adult Offenders.”88  
 
                                                      
88 “Report of the Board of Prison Directors, 1909-10” (Appendix to the Journals of the Senate and 
Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California: Sacramento, California: California State 
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Of particular interest for intake exam doctors were the genitals and the 
internal reproductive organs. The “enlarged clitoris,” or “enlarged labia minora,” 
served as evidence of sexual deviance, such as in the note: “clitoris prominent 
(masturbation?).” Doctors deployed racial stereotypes to describe their observations: 
“Genitals: Normal, not clean” on the record of an “Indian” child, or “Hottentot 
suggest” on the record of a “white, German descent” child. In addition to the visual 
inspection, doctors inserted their fingers and instruments into the vaginas of patients, 
so that they could note: “hymen ruptured,” “vulva very red,” or “Uterus child’s size. 
Vagina admits one finger.” During this portion of the exam, doctors were able to 
build evidence of whether a patient was sexually pure -- a “virgin” – or sexually 
immoral.  
Claims about the hymen and the normality of the internal reproductive organs 
signified sexual deviance alongside the Wasserman’s test for syphilis and a gram-
staining test for gonorrhea. Following a positive test for syphilis or gonorrhea, 
patients were often subjected to a prolonged period of quarantine within the 
institution. Whenever space would allow, “All entrants are isolated until after 
thorough medical examination and clinical tests…  There is segregation and treatment 
of inmates with communicable diseases” including STI’s.89 At the girls’ reform 
school, “Not until pronounced free from disease are they allowed to go into a home 
cottage,” and inmates were excluded from taking on chores in the kitchen and dining 
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areas until they tested negative.90 
Meanwhile, institutional staff and psychologists from the state’s private and 
public universities searched for evidence of defectiveness within the body, invisible 
to the eye, through two other examinations of new inmates: the family history and the 
IQ test. Both the family history and the IQ test were used inconsistently, although 
there were short periods at different institutions where they were used religiously. 
The family history was a technology developed by eugenic science and a key 
practice in both the field of medicine and the newly emerging field of social work.91 
The family history was an effort to identify weakness in the vitality of the family, 
evident through the insanity, alcoholism, epilepsy, or criminality of family members. 
As the Board of Charities and Corrections described it:  
What is transmitted to the child is a weak physical organization endowed with 
only a moderate amount of vital force, and a lessened resistance to the 
encroachment of disease…What was the cause of this abnormal heredity? In 
order to get at the real facts we must ascertain the history of the patient’s 
ancestors in each case.92  
 
In the same passage, the authors made a slightly different point about inherited 
weakness: “Original weakness of nervous make-up is commonly the predisposing 
factor that makes habit, stress or overwork, environment, modes of life, joy and 
sorrow, with the high pressure of modern business life, active in the productions of 
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insanity.”93 Here they suggested that it was a combination of weakness in vitality 
along with environmental factors that colluded to bring on defectiveness in the 
inmate. 
In both the case of direct transmission of weakness and exposure to an 
environment of vice, the premise of the family history was that “brutality and 
immorality in parents” left traces in the body of the child. This imprint was gendered 
such that sexual deviance of the mother and sexual violence of the father were central 
plots in overdetermining the defectiveness of the child or adult assigned female. First, 
mothers marked their daughters through their own sexual deviance or immorality, or 
through their experience of sexual violation:  
Mother immoral and alcoholic.  
Mother waitress in a house of ill repute.  
Cause of deficiency: Defective immoral Mexican mother.  
Cause of deficiency: mother attempted abortion. 
This girl is an illegitimate. Was in the Whittier State School 2 ½ years, no 
improvement.  
 
Mother was an inmate of Cass Co Georgia Institute for Mutes…was on 
vacation and came back pregnant – probably raped. 
 
The father left a mark either by using alcohol intemperately, or through his sexual 
abuse of the child or her mother:  
Patient addicted to masturbation – sexual intercourse with old men and boys. 
Supposed to have had intercourse with father (syphilitic).  
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Child abandoned raised by Negroes – man said to have [indecipherable] 
sexually [indecipherable] with her from 9 y.o.  
 
Father of child is father of child’s mother. Cause of deficiency: Consanguinity 
and depravity. 
 
Father supposed to have had sexual relations with this girl.  
In these examples, the sexual immorality of the mother, or her experience of sexual 
violation, and the sexually abusive behavior of the mother were construed as 
transmitting weakness to the assigned female child, so that her future of defectiveness 
was overdetermined. 
Traces of defectiveness were also left on the inmate through proximity to non-
normative, peculiar family members:  
Father queer.  
Her brother paralyzed and queer.  
Mother’s brother was a little queer.  
Maternal grandfather queer.  
5 brothers on father’s side queer. 
The term “queer” in early twentieth century American English connoted an eccentric 
or unconventional person. Proximity to a “queer” person, especially to an assigned 
male person, was used to build evidence of the defectiveness of the inmate. This 
usage of the term “queer” gestures toward the eventual transformation of the term in 
the mid-twentieth century to signify a homosexual or sexual pervert. What is 
interesting about the use in the family history is that like the term “defective,” 
“queer” historically had a capaciousness that signified all kinds of ways of failing to 
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embody the norm, prefiguring the interventions of queer theory against the use of 
queer as a binary identity category.94  
Another exam that searched for evidence of defectiveness inside the body was 
the newly developed IQ test. In the early 1900’s, California institutions started to 
measure the “mental age” of inmates using the Binet-Simon test, and later the 
Stanford-Binet modification published by Stanford psychologist Lewis Terman in 
1916. The IQ test purported to determine mental defect scientifically, by measuring 
the “mental age” of a person in relation to their “physical age.” The tests delineated 
three gradations of defect: idiots had a mental age up to 2 years and were incapable of 
protecting themselves from physical danger; imbeciles had a mental age between 3-7 
and were incapable of earning a living; and morons had a mental age 8-12 and were 
incapable of competing with normal others and “managing himself and his affairs 
with ordinary prudence.” 95 So-called borderline cases marked those whose test 
results fell between “moron” and “normal.”  
As others have reported, this IQ test was designed to ferret out those who had 
not been interpellated properly into racist and sexist modes of normativity.96 For 
example, one iteration of the IQ test used in California institutions explicitly 
measured whether someone had internalized dominant standards of female beauty. 
                                                      
94 By limiting our current use of the term “queer” to mean self-identified homosexual, we are missing 
out on possibilities for radical political solidarity. 
95 “Report of the State Board of Charities and Corrections, 1912-1914” (Appendix to the Journals of 
the Senate and Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California: Sacramento, California: 
California State Printing, 1915). 
96 Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton, 1981); Kline, Building a Better 
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“When shown the outline drawing of the heads of six women in three pairs, one of 
each pair pretty and the other ugly or deformed, and asked to indicate the prettier, he 
chose two of the uglier. All normal children of 6 choose correctly.”97 Those who 
could not demonstrate that they had internalized these heterosexist and racist 
standards failed this portion of the exam and were more likely to be diagnosed 
through the IQ test as some level of defective.  
The search for markers on and in the body that signaled defectiveness 
culminated in a diagnosis written on the inmate’s intake form. Both because of the 
emphasis on morality and because it was present not just in hospital or clinic settings, 
but in all types of state institutions including juvenile reform schools and adult 
reformatories for criminal offenders, the practice of diagnosis illustrates the creativity 
and adaptability of discourses of difference in constituting new subjects. The 
diagnosis occurred at the conclusion of the intake process of the inmate. This means 
that the diagnosis ex post facto legitimated the institutionalization of the inmate, 
because the inmate had already been legally locked up. The diagnosis marks the 
moment where a body becomes officially conscripted as a defective subject of 
eugenics. In that sense, this medico-legal utterance materialized a body as a defective 
other and brought her into being as a defective. 
Through the intake process of the inmate at state institutions, including the 
medical exam, the family history, the IQ test, and the diagnosis, institutional staff 
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worked to establish the truth of the body as defective. The concept of defectiveness 
emerges in this archive as exemplary of how liberal conceptions of difference are not 
just a set of concepts and ideas that “float in the air.” Attaching difference is an 
intensive project that involves materially invading and prodding the body, measuring 
the vitality of lineage and chosen family, and, ultimately, rendering state judgments 
on the soul. 
Sexual Normativity and Gendering Defective Bodies 
Rather than an arbitrary or non-sensical category, I argue that the discourse of 
the defective was a particular technology for stabilizing the sexually normative 
gendered order in early twentieth century California. This was a discourse that 
enforced gender conformity through the policing of the sexual expression of people 
assigned women and girls.  
Calls for the state to intervene in the threat posed by the defective class were 
highly gendered, supporting feminist scholars claim that eugenics programs acted 
uniquely on girls and women versus men and boys.98 In a report to the legislature 
covering the biennial period of 1912-1914, the State Board of Charities and 
Corrections demanded that the state make available “Additional Provision for Care of 
Defectives.” Specifically, the Board insisted that the state needed to build additional 
facilities to segregate defective girls and women from the rest of society:  
It is recommended that the present facilities for caring for defectives be 
increased so as to meet the most pressing needs of this state…(a) There is a 
very large number of feeble-minded and epileptics in the state for whom there 
is no room at the Sonoma State Home. (b) Many of these are girls and women 
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of child-bearing age who constitute a serious menace to the future...99  
 
The State Commission in Lunacy also described the problem of defectiveness in 
similar gendered terms:  
This condition is bad enough among the boys, but in the girls the misery and 
anxiety are increased a hundredfold in the families. Again, we have a class 
that are failures in life, who can not, as the age of self-support approaches, 
maintain themselves…From this class many of our drunkards, our drug users, 
our sexual offenders, and our repeating offenders come…The foundation of 
their troubles is to be found usually in a true lack of development of brain or 
mind engrafted upon them by their ancestors, which greatly limits their 
capacities to benefit by study or to properly exercise their will power. The 
problem is particularly difficult among high grade feeble-minded girls.100  
  
By “high grade” the commission referenced girls who were categorized as feeble-
minded but at the end of the scale that was closer to normal, and whom an average 
person encountering such a girl might not be able to immediately detect her 
defectiveness. According to these state appointed oversight boards, high grade 
defective girls “of child-bearing age” posed a serious menace, because they were 
more likely to go undetected by both the state and potential sexual partners, thus 
reproducing and passing on their weakness to offspring. 
Another example of the gendered articulation of eugenics comes from the 
discussion around the 1913 revision to the Asexualization Law, representing a 
decisively gendered shift in describing the problem of defectiveness. Oversight 
boards had early on described sterilization for men in therapeutic terms, a hold-over 
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from the nineteenth century belief that men could restore their vitality by avoiding 
ejaculation and thus reabsorbing their semen. Women, however, were never really 
viewed as directly benefiting therapeutically from the salpingectomy. Dr. Clark, the 
superintendent at Stockton State Hospital, weighed in on the debate indicating that 
there was only indirect benefit for women and girls for sterilization, because 
sterilization reduced “the nervous strain incidental to child-bearing.” For Clark:  
The most important feature in these cases is that the state will not have their 
children, their grandchildren or their great-grandchildren to care for…If the 
insane who are capable of reproducing are not sterilized before leaving the 
hospital, it naturally follows that we will have an ever increasing, endless 
chain of insane and defective wards to care for.101  
 
In these and other instances, state actors insisted that it was defective women and 
girls specifically, not just defectives in general, who constituted the great menace to 
the health of the normal body politic. 
According to feminist theorizing, girls and women were targeted by eugenics 
interventions across the world because they are viewed as the source of reproduction. 
As a result, eugenics policed the sexual expression of girls and women.102 A survey of 
diagnoses listed on inmate intake forms shows that those assigned girls and women 
were committed to institutions primarily for sexual impropriety rather than the 
commission of a non-sexual crime or non-sexual disorder.  
Diagnosis: no moral sense.  
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Girl has no moral sense. Supposed to be married has had two children…Was 
arrested in Sac for illicit relations with man.  
 
Moral imbecile. Mental age 11^4. Sexually irresponsible.  
Is addicted to masturbation. No moral sense.  
No moral sense; lazy; filthy in care of person.  
Moron. Vicious immoral type.  
Middle grade moron – immoral.  
As a California School for Girls administrator observed, “Among girl delinquents sex 
offenses predominate. Many offenses listed for boys do not occur at all among the 
girls…Sex offenses appear in 63 per cent of commitments, while offenses against 
property rights include only 6 per cent.”103  
Rather than assume what constituted a sex offense, I insist on paying close 
attention to what exactly constituted a diagnosis of sexual immorality in female 
inmates. Consider the following survey of inmates in the state girls’ reform school 
found in a 1918 report:  
Ninety-five per cent of the girls committed to this school are sexually 
immoral. 
Seventy-five per cent of the girls received at the school have had sex relations 
with boys or men, or both, before they were 14 years of age. 
Fifty per cent had such relations before they were 12 years of age. 
Fifty-four per cent are known to be victims of deplorable sex practices, and 
another 10 per cent might safely be added to this number. 
In these two years 180 of 233 girls (71 per cent) have been treated for 
gonorrhea. 
At this time 72 per cent are so afflicted. 
Fourteen per cent are or have been married. 
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Twelve and a half per cent of those married have bourn children (most of 
them were forced marriages and the girls continued their delinquency). 
Seven per cent of the 283 have given birth to illegitimate children. None of 
them have married. 
Eight and a half per cent have produced abortions before coming here. 
Two per cent are mothers of two or more children. 
Six per cent have been victims of the lusts of their own fathers or brothers, or 
both. 
One 20-year-old feeble-minded girl has borne two children by her own father. 
Her mother is dead. 
Another feeble-minded girl, with the knowledge of her parents, had one child 
by a white man and a second one by a Chinaman. 
Semisexualism is not uncommon.104 
 
The effect of starting this list with the claim that virtually all of the inmates at the 
girls’ school are “sexually immoral,” is that the wide range of sexual behavior that 
follows, including masturbation, same-sex sex (“semi-sexualism”), sex outside of 
heterosexual marriage, incest, and being a victim of non-consensual incest or rape, 
becomes articulated as sexual immorality. Near the end of the list, the superintendent 
links together incestuous child sexual abuse, interracial sexual relationships, and what 
we would today call same-sex sex. Putting these together in close proximity broadens 
the categorization of what is “wrong” with the inmates of the reform school far 
beyond the assumption that “sexual immorality” was a euphemism for female sex 
outside of hetero-marriage.  
Particularly troubling is that in this list there is no distinction made between 
assigned girls and women who were victims of sexualized violence, versus assigned 
girls and women who engaged in consensual sex. The superintendent points to the 
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experience of at least half the inmates with “deplorable sex practices,” and by 
describing the inmates as “victims” of such practices, the superintendent indicates 
that she wants to cultivate more concern for the girls than condemnation. However, 
according to the legal logics of heteronormativity and patriarchy, no girl could 
lawfully consent to sex outside of marriage. We do not actually know whether 
“deplorable” means things that modern readers would condemn today, such as rape or 
sexual trafficking, or whether it includes things that are within today’s legal limits 
such as what would be called kink or BDSM. Similarly, the superintendent includes 
sex that leads to venereal disease as “immoral,” whether it was a result of sex that 
would today be considered consensual or not.  
In scientific eugenics discourse, girls and women subjected to coercive sex 
and those engaged in non-coercive sex were both constituted as “sex offenders” who 
could reasonably be targeted for institutionalization and sterilization. Eugenicist 
scientists E.S. Gosney and Paul Popenoe conducted two comprehensive surveys of 
California’s sterilization program in 1925 and 1937, funded by a eugenics promoting 
organization called the Human Betterment Foundation (HBF), whose board included 
state leaders such as the Chancellor of Stanford University and Charles Goethe, a 
Sacramento-based philanthropist who founded California State University 
Sacramento.105 Although the study was funded privately by HBF, according to 
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Gosney and Popenoe “state authorities co-operated unreservedly in this undertaking,” 
including giving the researchers unrestricted access to patient files at state 
hospitals.106 Gosney and Popenoe described those girls “of the lowest level of 
intelligence” whose “parents are well able to assume the burden of their care, and 
prefer to keep them at home. To prevent pregnancy in case some man should take 
advantage of the girl at an unguarded moment, they desire to have her sterilized.”107 
Popenoe and Gosney reported that, “A number of striking cases of this sort have been 
sent to Sonoma, including two idiots. It is worth mentioning, in passing, that the 
mother of the lower of these (IQ 16) noted on the application blank that the patient is 
‘fond of men.’” In the next sentence, they referred to the case of a girl whose parents 
thought she was so physically “deformed” that no man would want her, yet she was 
“raped by a delivery man, and gave birth to a child, whereupon she was sent to 
Sonoma to be sterilized.”108 Gosney and Popenoe used both examples to argue that 
“mentally deficient” girls were “oversexed.”109  The implication was that girls labeled 
mentally defective were at least partially responsible for the sexual violence they 
faced, including any extramarital pregnancy that resulted from an attack. The solution 
to sexualized violence that Gosney and Popenoe offered was institutionalization, 
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sterilization, and on-going state supervision through parole. State actors invested in 
eugenics shared these conclusions. 
These examples provide evidence that the discourse of defectiveness was 
concerned about the sexualized female body in ways that exceeded anxiety about 
heterosexual promiscuity outside of wedlock. To say that eugenics was gendered 
should not be reduced to the assumption that the women and girls targeted by 
eugenics were heterosexual, nor that “women” is a coherent and stable category that 
depends solely on the ability to have children. Eugenics was about controlling 
reproduction, and it did target people capable of birthing children who were engaged 
in promiscuous heterosexual and able-bodied sex. However, eugenics also targeted 
sexual deviance and gender non-conformity more broadly than just policing the 
wrong kind of heteronormatively-bodied females having children outside of wedlock. 
By expanding the view of the concerns that eugenics had about the sexualized body, I 
insist that eugenics was involved in gendering the body as female. Eugenics targeted 
both those who, through their sexual expression, refused to be gender normative, and 
those could not attain gender conformity because of racialized status, sexual vitality, 
and/or because they had been subject to sexual violation. In this sense, the theory of 
eugenics buttressed heteronormativity that provides the scaffolding for feminine 
gender norms and ultimately the gender binary itself.  
Nicole Hahn Rafter argues that the early twentieth century incarceration of 
women and girls disciplined people into narrow heteropatriarchal gender roles.110 
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Rafter argues that “prisons function to control gender as well as crime.”111 Further, 
the “social control” functions of reformatories  
Extended government control over working-class women not previously 
vulnerable to state punishment…[and] feminized prison discipline, 
introducing into state prisons for women a program of rehabilitation 
predicated on middle-class definitions of ladylike behavior.112 
 
This program of gender conformity is evident in the superintendent’s description 
(above) of the girls locked in the California School for Girls. By delimiting the 
“facts” of the type of girl locked up in the girls’ reform school, the superintendent 
helped to constitute a girl who deserved to be locked away from normal society. The 
articulation of who belongs in a reform school helped to, in turn, consolidate a 
dominant understanding of the type of girl -- the normal girl -- who did not belong in 
an institution. This normal “girl” presumably had internalized a sense of sexual 
propriety, so that she did not engage in sex outside of marriage, she did not allow 
herself to be sexually victimized by her male family members, she did not masturbate 
or have same-sex sex, she did not have interracial sexual relationships, she did not 
contract venereal disease, she did not have sex too young, and, most importantly of 
all, she was not feeble-minded or mentally defective. The normal girl was both of 
good genetic stock and asexual, until the point at which she became sexual within the 
confines of able-bodied, white, heteropatriarchal marriage. Thus, the normal girl 
performed her gender in ways that buttressed heterosexuality.  
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By constituting a class of “unnormal” people, state-sponsored eugenics 
discourse helped to consolidate and buttress this class of “normal” people who 
embodied gendered, sexual, racial, intellectual, and other bodily ideals. The practice 
of marking a body as “unnormal,” in this case defective, had consequences that 
extended beyond the eugenics institutions. The possibility of being locked up for non-
normative sexual behavior or other forms of gender non-conformity likely had a 
chilling effect on the entire society, subduing people assigned to the category of girl 
or woman into submission to the normative regime. As Rafter argued about women’s 
reformatories:  
The reformatory probably influenced the values not only of those sentenced to 
it but also of women in the broader community...Through such connections, 
[the reformatory] would have come to play a role in the consciousness of 
working-class women in its area. Women who never set foot inside it would 
have been aware, through word of mouth, that there existed a state institution 
prepared to punish them for deviations from middle-class definitions of 
womanliness.113 
 
Similarly, the discursive regime of defectiveness and the practice of eugenics 
institutionalization likely created a norm that disciplined people into heterosexual 
gender conformity.  
Pushing the existing feminist treatment of women’s imprisonment and 
eugenics institutionalization in a new direction, I draw on the insight of queer theories 
of social construction. Queer theorists have argued that there is no prediscursively 
sexed or gendered body.114 Eric Stanley has provocatively argued that incarceration is 
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productive of the sex and gender binary itself.115 Could eugenics institutionalization 
have worked this way as well? By this I mean to interrogate the presumption that 
eugenics practices were about imposing gender roles on prediscursive male and 
female sexed bodies. Rather, the ideology of gender within the discourse of eugenics 
naturalized the assumption there are two discrete and oppositional sexes onto which 
corresponding gender roles are mapped. Eugenics institutions (and other eugenics 
policies) did this by intervening in the behavior and expression of people who 
exceeded, ruptured, or challenged their assignment in the gendered categories of girl 
or woman. Containing the heterogeneity of gendered expression fundamentally 
enforced the ideology of natural binary sexed bodies.  
Through California’s eugenics discourse a heteronormative regime of binary 
sex and gender was reasserted, one that queer theorists argue is central to liberal 
power.116 Eugenics discourse was, of course, not the first time that the 
heteronormative two sex, two gender regime had been imposed in the place we call 
California. Rather, early twentieth century eugenics is one of what M. Jacqui 
Alexander names as a “node of instability” in the heteropatriarchal liberal order.117 
Alexander argues that the liberal state responds to cyclical change that threatens the 
social, political, and economic order by re-articulating and reinforcing sexualized 
hegemony. She also argues that this can be mapped palimpsestically over time, 
making visible the cyclical pattern of crisis, response, and the staging of future crisis. 
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Using Alexander’s methodology, I identify early twentieth century eugenics practices 
as one node of instability that aids us in identifying the patterns and trajectories of the 
heteronormative western discourse of sex and gender. This eugenics science 
reassertion of heteronormativity is one layer of the globalized ideology of binary sex 
and gender that persists into the present.  
Disabling Defectives 
The gendered category of defective existed in what Regina Kunzel describes 
as a “circular logic: feeblemindedness both caused illegitimacy and could be deduced 
from the fact of out-of-wedlock pregnancy.”118 Tracing this circular logic demands 
attention not just to the co-constitution of normative gender and normative sexuality, 
but also to the construction of disability and madness. This means rejecting 
assumptions that the discourse of defectiveness was instrumental to the “real” project 
of intervening on sexually deviant women and girls, insofar as such assumptions 
presume an able-bodied and sane subject. Critical disability studies theorizes 
disability as a social construction that divides bodies into valuable and worthless, 
useful and disposable, worthwhile and waste, based on the identification of some kind 
of physical difference or mental divergence.119 In line with this theory, “defective” 
can be understood as a constructed disability because it corralled heterogeneous ways 
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of being and forms of embodiment under a devalued category, and conscripted bodies 
into that category.  
Evidence to support this approach to disability as a discourse comes through 
in the ways that defectiveness was conceived of as a fluid possibility for all bodies. 
The Board of Charities and Corrections warned that the “normal,” those who were 
“able to care for themselves or be[] cared for by their families, relatives, or friends" 
could easily slip into the category of the “unnormal” those “dependents, defectives, 
delinquents, and the aged” destined to “ultimately fall into the hands of the state.”120 
The board went on to note: “The individuals, however, may fall out of what we have 
called their normal status. This may happen for various causes, physical, mental or 
moral,” meaning that either accident or personal weakness could relegate one to the 
status of the unnormal. This line between the normal and the unnormal, where a body 
could care for itself and where the state had to state in, is the line of disability. The 
attempt to grapple with this line is part of the active construction of defectiveness. 
Under early twentieth century eugenics, the sexual disciplining of those 
assigned to the category of women was imbricated with the elaboration of the 
category of disability. Consider again the description of the inmates at the girls’ 
school in the section above. There, both physical and mental defectiveness were 
conceived of as a kind of sexual deviance. That is, the possibility of disabled bodies 
having sex posed a queer threat to the health of the normative body politic, creating 
the need for state intervention. By noting that fourteen percent of inmates had been 
                                                      
120 “Report of the State Board of Charities and Corrections, 1918-20.” 
  74 
married, and that a portion of those had children, the superintendent curiously 
suggests that sex inside heterosexual marriage could also produce “defective” 
children. This indicates that once an assigned girl or woman was labeled by the state 
as “delinquent” or “defective” even having sex inside of a heterosexual marriage was 
constituted as deviant. Even more curiously, the label of defective could come after 
the fact of sex within marriage, rendering the sex ex post facto deviant.  
 The circular logic also worked inside of marriage for women and girls 
conscripted as defective. For a woman or girl to be labeled mentally defective 
revealed her sexual deviance, despite cases of conformity to heteropatriarchal law. In 
the case of disabled girls and women, being unable to embody and perform normality 
means that all of one’s sex is potentially illegal and open for state intervention. This is 
a moment of constituting disability as gendered sexual deviance. In this way, 
defectiveness offers another example (along with the medicalization of 
homosexuality) of how sexual deviance has been historically pathologized as a 
disability of the body-mind. 
The Racialized Temporality of Defectiveness  
The category of defective was also racialized in early twentieth century 
California, upholding the settler colonialist system of white supremacy. However, I 
argue that this racialization exceeds proof that the label of “defective” was 
disproportionately applied to previously racialized groups. This claim is not to 
discount existing efforts, such as that by Natalie Lira and Alexandra Stern, to redress 
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the lack of consistent racial and ethnic statistics by the state.121 Lira and Stern use a 
creative methodology of counting Spanish sounding last names to provide evidence 
that at least some California institutions did disproportionately target institutionalized 
Mexican Americans for sterilization.122 However, I insist that tracking racialization 
and white supremacy need not be the same as arguing that the state only or even 
primarily targeted already racialized populations.  
In fact, due in no small part to practices of deportation, it is likely that the 
majority of victims of California eugenics policies, at least until the 1930’s, were 
legally categorized as white – especially in institutions in the northern part of the 
state. The practice of deporting aliens directly from state institutions challenges the 
presumption that racialized populations were overrepresented in institutions for the 
defective. Continuing the work of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the state 
deported Chinese and Japanese nationals, and most likely Chinese and Japanese 
descended nationals born in the U.S., directly from state institutions beginning in 
1891. As I explore further in chapter 3, California’s institutional deportation agent 
argued repeatedly that it saved the state money in the long term to deport people who 
were not “native” to California.123 During the Mexican War of Independence, 
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deportation efforts shifting to targeting Mexicans and Mexican-Americans who had 
sought work, safety from political persecution, and a more healthful climate in 
California.124  
Swirling around the deportation effort was a racialized anxiety about who 
really deserved the care of the state – the white “natives” of California against the 
“foreigners” attempting to access citizenship. One of the State Commissioners in 
Lunacy lamented in 1919:  
Plans are now being formulated, and I have every reason to believe have 
already been put into effect, to permit the Mexican peon to enter the United 
States in order to relieve the shortage of common labor. California is sure to 
receive her share of this influx and her public institutions are bound to be 
called upon to care for those who fall by the way. The Mexican does not make 
a good eleemosynary charge. He will not work and is sullen and surly.125 
  
Perversely, this passage argues that the Mexican was not worthy of the charity of the 
state, even if that charity was in the form of institutionalization. The implication is 
that the state should only spend money to internally segregate through 
institutionalization those non-Mexican (and non-Asian bodies) constructed as 
“native” to California who could not be excised through other means such as 
deportation. The practice of deportation means that institutions for defectives were 
primarily occupied by whites, or, at the very least, some institutions were primarily 
occupied by whites, albeit ethnically marginalized whites, at some times.  
Yet the targeting of legally white subjects for eugenics intervention, does not 
mean that eugenics is not racialized. On the contrary, the discourse of eugenics 
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actively participated in racialization by drawing on colonial discourses of temporal 
deviance. By temporal deviance I am drawing on Johannes Fabian’s 
conceptualization of temporal distancing and the denial of coevalness in colonial 
knowledge regimes.126 Fabian argues that Western European Enlightenment 
philosophy marked a modern and secular epistemic break with a medieval Christian 
“vision of [sacred] Time.” One feature of this epistemic break in time was a 
transformation in racialized and imperial temporal relations -- the imaginary of the 
time and space relationship between “us” and “them.” Even as all bodies and peoples 
in the modern are presumed to be sharing universal progressive time, modernity 
requires the exclusion of the temporal “other” – conceptualized, according to Fabian, 
in terms of savages and primitives. Fabian speculates that it is through the colonial 
relegation of the other to a different time – a process he calls a “denial of coevalness” 
-- that two distinct bodies (or bodies politic) can occupy the same geographic 
space.127 This can be depicted graphically wherein civilization, geographically 
located in the West, is plotted in the “here and now,” while savage society which is 
plotted in the “then and there.”  
The category of defective was constituted through similar practices of 
temporal distancing and the denial of coevalness that ultimately reproduced white 
supremacy. Take, for example, descriptions of inmates at the girls’ reform school:  
No. 1. This girl is affectionate, and in a way ambitious; seems to realize in a 
way that something is amiss… She works hard, comprehends slowly, retains 
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little. For example: An arithmetic lesson learned two weeks ago would be a 
new lesson today… She can laboriously add, multiply, etc. even to 
understanding fractions and adding, subtracting and multiplying them, but 
when it comes to reasoning out a problem she can not do it. She is easily 
controlled and eager for commendation. Physically, very slow. 
 
No. 2. This girl works mechanically… She has knowledge of a few set 
phrases, some slang, which she uses consecutively, that is, never uses one and 
on some other occasion another, but all of them each time. She reads very 
slowly, seems to read ahead to herself, and then aloud. Very dull in arithmetic, 
especially reasoning…Asks very few questions. 
 
No. 3. Not so dull as she pretends, but is mentally lazy. Good in spelling, fair 
in English composition, and has progressed somewhat in arithmetic; can work 
long division using two figures, also fractions and billing. She is occasionally 
ambitious, interest is awakened and good resolutions made, but is easily 
disturbed. She finds it too difficult to reason out a problem in arithmetic, but 
can work with figures to get an answer; is fond of repetition in her work. 
Some progress has been made, as she is proud.128  
 
There are at least three temporal problems with these girls. First, the three inmates 
were slow -- slow to read, slow to comprehend, willfully mentally slow (“lazy”), and 
physically slow. The conceptualization of slowness both relies on the assumption of a 
normal speed at which minds and bodies can or should occupy time, and attaches to 
the bodies of the inmates the incapacity to match this normal speed. In this way 
defectiveness was articulated as slow-moving bodies anachronistic to the ever-
escalating tempo of modernity. Second, the three inmates are depicted as temporally 
disjointed bodies unable to embody the linear progressive mode; or, in other words, 
bodies that are incapable of linearity. Rather than spacing out words evenly, girl No. 
2 uses all her words all at once. Rather than read in an orderly fashion, girl No. 2 
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reads ahead and then reverses back to read aloud. Girl No. 3 is “fond of repetition” 
refusing to remain in the present and orient toward the future, she perpetually repeats 
the past. This last example suggests a third point -- that the inmates are not quite able 
to embody a future orientation. One girl is “in a way ambitious” and another 
“occasionally ambitious” but neither is quite capable of the progressive accumulation 
of knowledge required to create a redemptive future.  
The heterogeneous temporality and time lines of the defective mind disrupted 
attempts to discipline inmates into a future orientation. Regarding the defective girl: 
“She is not competent mentally to meet the complex problems of modern life, to look 
after herself in a time-telling, money-counting, reason-demanding universe.”129 The 
defective girl in this scene was incapable of embodying the time-telling demanded by 
modern life. As I explore further in chapter 3, the mission of the state institution for 
the girl was to civilize ungoverned instinct. In diagnosing the defective girl or woman 
as suffering from ungoverned instinct, she was denied the promise of temporal 
reconstruction, and the opportunity to occupy the present, modernity, and civilization. 
She subsequently appears in the archive as an anachronism because she was capable 
of suppressing her instincts through embodied – habitual – cognitive control. The 
defective was temporally distanced from the present through a discursive move that 
placed her backwards on the evolutionary line of man – she was an animal who acted 
on instinct rather than reason.  
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Here becomes evident how the racialized logic of recapitulation was at work 
in constructing temporal defectiveness. Under the logic of recapitulation, the brain of 
an adult defective person was like the brain of an infant, so that the defective person 
was perpetually civilizationally backwards – in the “then” -- to the here and now of 
normality. As Siobhan Somerville recounts, in late nineteenth century racial science, 
evolutionary theory worked to rank and order bodies:  
According to the stages of evolutionary 'progress'…the children of 'superior' 
groups embodied phases equivalent to the mature adult phases of 'inferior' 
groups...adult African Americans and white women were at the same stage as 
white male children and therefore represented an ancestral stage in the 
evolution of adult white males.130  
 
Somerville argues that this logic of capitulation, and by extension the practice of 
creating temporal distance between normal and abnormal bodies, was borrowed by 
sexual science in the early twentieth century. The diagnosis of an abnormally sexual 
individual was also placed on a developmental scale and conceived of as a kind of 
temporal backwardness or an anachronism. The abnormally sexual individual (in 
Somerville’s case study, the homosexual) was viewed as having stalled in his 
development and had not progressed into normal heterosexuality.  
This racial and sexual logic of capitulation is evident when the superintendent 
of the California School for Girls argued:  
It is now possible, by reason of recent comparative researches, to predict, 
within reasonable limits, the probable intellectual development of individuals 
whose present status we learn through psychological tests. Mental 
development, like every other natural process, follows an orderly procedure. 
The laws of mental growth are now sufficiently well understood that we can 
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safely rely upon the psychological laboratory for predictions of intellectual 
achievement.131 
 
Here the superintendent posits that all mental processes follow a similar pattern of 
universal, linear development. There is no coevalness, only the normal civilized 
intellect that exists in the modern here and now, and the defective mind/body that is 
plotted further back in the trajectory. 
In a biennial report published in 1909, the same year that the state’s first 
Asexualization Law went into effect, the Commission in Lunacy quoted a report from 
the Superintendent of Mendocino State Hospital: 
Here we find the real cause of much of the crime and insanity that is the bane 
of civilization. The predisposing causes are deeply rooted in our civilization, 
in many cases reaching back to the second or third generation. They were the 
same then as now. Every healthy, normal man who from any cause, either 
from serious disease, alcohol, or sexual excesses, or through a life of 
debauchery, lowers the tone of his vital forces and afterwards propagates the 
species, is preparing the soil which will surely bring forth a class of 
degenerates, many of whom will be insane or criminals, and many of whose 
children will be feeble-minded, or perhaps idiotic. 
 
Dr. F. W. Hatch has said in an able paper published in the fifth biennial report 
of the State Commission in Lunacy, 'The ideally normally constructed man is 
not likely to become insane.' Experience teaches that this is strictly true; it 
also teaches that the child of the weakling will necessarily be a weakling, and 
from this class of humanity are recruited a large class of our criminals and our 
insane. In order to correct this condition of affairs we must strike at the causes 
which produce so much vicious heredity, and allow the race to return to a 
normal, healthy condition.132 
 
The usage of the term “civilization” in this passage is at first glance a synonym for 
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social group or society. Yet it is impossible to escape the racialized valence of 
“civilization” as connoting something teleologically desirable and superior. It is 
embedded in a binary opposition where those at a “normal” stage of development 
have advanced beyond, but constantly threaten to revert to, an inferior, lower, and 
less desirable state of existence, namely “the degenerate class.” The threat to 
civilization comes from within it, implying a group of people who can perhaps pass 
undetected as normal without investment from the state to identify and dispose of 
these degenerates. The reference to “the race” at the end of the passage has two 
valences, one the generic “human race” or human species, and the second referencing 
the unstated norms of whiteness embedded in the notion of humanity and civilization. 
In other words, the threat that is described here is of people who can pass for white, 
but whose embodied degeneracy threatens the purity and health of white civilization. 
This point references Walter Mignolo’s theorization that the colonial idea of 
the human necessarily relied on the exclusion of others that I referenced in the 
introduction.133 According to Mignolo, wherever Western juridical regimes have 
spread, the logic at the heart of Western discourse works to constitute others as 
racialized through discourses that depict them as uncivilized and abnormal. This 
means that references to “civilization” and “humanity” work to reinforce racialized 
hierarchies of human value, even if they are launched against what appear to us as 
white bodies. However, while the “ideally normal” man constantly threatens to 
degenerate in eugenics discourse, the slippage between the binary categories only 
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goes one way – the normal man is an achievement that can only be made by those 
who can embody whiteness, able-bodiedness, heterosexuality, and cis-maleness. The 
result is that defectiveness could be, and was, attached to white bodies as well as 
bodies of color, but it always buttressed white supremacy.  
Despite the lack of readily available quantitative evidence that eugenics 
institutionalization targeted previously racialized groups for containment, this 
interpretive reading of the racialized temporality of eugenics shows that the discourse 
worked to uphold the white supremacist settler colonial social order. Eugenics 
interjected the racialized logic of time and temporality into eugenics discourse in 
order establish “white” as central to the ideal of civilization and justified the 
treatment of the so-called defective class through this discursive association with 
racialized others. 
Disciplining the Defective Body 
Under the discourse of eugenics, once a body was determined to be defective, 
the development of an individual was permanently stunted: 
Mental defectiveness is not a disease that can be medically treated. It is due to 
hereditary defect that results in a defect of development. We find a brain 
development very much like that of an infant. Feeble-mindedness in the 
parents brings about the same condition in the progeny. The untrained mental 
defectives are incapable of self-support and must be pensioners on their more 
intelligent fellows. A cure cannot be expected.134 
 
Denied a cure, defectives were seemingly excluded from the possibility of temporal 
reconstruction and thus the opportunity to “catch up” with their temporally normal 
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peers. Defectiveness was temporally determined because the defective class was 
defined by their heredity, incapable of cutting themselves off from their pasts. 
However, efforts to rehabilitate the defective were also persistent and 
unrelenting. Institutional administrators in early twentieth century California referred 
to this practice of disciplining inmates into civility as “making good.” 
Institutionalized women and girls were expected to “make good,” by demonstrating 
their successful disciplining back into the range of normal, in order to be released on 
parole from institutions. Making good was demonstrated both by the “stability and 
industry of the girl” and by “her appreciation of the justice and fair play of the school 
in directing her conduct.”135 The girl who made good was also to expected to be 
grateful for being institutionalized and disciplined in the first place.  
The process of making good was also practiced on the physical body, even 
after reformers outlawed or dramatically reduced the use of physical restraints inside 
of institutions. Recall the case of Elise from the introduction, diagnosed as a “moral 
imbecile” upon being committed to Sonoma State Home. A note on Elise’s sheet 
explains that she underwent a “double partial salpingectomy for sterilization” under 
the state’s Asexualization Law, and, for good measure, a preventative appendectomy. 
According to the state Commission on Lunacy, “Sterilization of chosen cases 
(particularly the moral delinquent feeble-minded type) has been started and we expect 
to continue this work. We find sterilization makes the patient more amenable to 
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discipline and less restless.”136 Sterilization was believed by administrators to operate 
both as a mode of disciplining the body, by making her “more amenable” to future 
discipline. It also simultaneously physically rendered the body deviant, by removing 
an assigned female person’s “natural” capacity to reproduce. In another example of 
the circular logic of defectiveness, sterilization disciplined the patient for her failure 
to embody normality, yet sterilization also made her feminized body freakish and 
monstrous; or, in other words, disabled her gendered body.  
Here becomes evident that under the disciplinary practices of “making good,” 
out of defectives became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The discourse of defectiveness 
claimed to be able to locate the truth of the defective body, to discipline the body into 
normality, and at the same time continuously rendered the body defective, different, 
and an “other.” This dynamic of eugenics is paradoxical, as it seems to indicate a 
simultaneous disciplining the body, and reification of the body’s status as “other” 
who cannot hope to achieve normality.  
This paradox can be understood as essential to the practice of temporal 
distancing, under which the “other” is permanently deferred from the promise of 
liberalism yet subjected to unrelenting demands that the “other” continue to strive for 
inclusion. Here I draw from Mimi Thi Nguyen’s work, which follows how the 
diagnosis of trauma temporally distances the Southeast Asian refugee.137 As Nguyen 
                                                      
136 “Report of the State Commission in Lunacy, 1916-18” (Appendix to the Journals of the Senate and 
Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California: Sacramento, California: California State 
Printing, 1919), 77. 
137 Mimi Thi Nguyen, The Gift of Freedom: War, Debt, and Other Refugee Passages (Durham, N.C: 
Duke University Press, 2012). 
  86 
argues, the traumatized body experiencing symptoms of dislocations in time is 
incapable of claiming the rational individuality assumed in liberal political theorizing. 
The temporally wandering, split, emotional body does not perform in the ways that 
the liberal state and neoliberal capital need. For Nguyen, the diagnosis of trauma 
works to reposition the refugee as an incoherent subject incapable of self-possession, 
and instead invites biomedical interventions and criminalization. It is through such a 
process that those who have been placed at a temporal distance from the center of 
empire and the pinnacle of human achievement are never able to progress fast enough 
to catch up. The temporal “other” can be relegated to a perpetual state of transition, to 
a time-space of “never not quite here and now.” This perpetual state of transitology 
keeps in place the illusion that through state intervention and discipline the 
temporally defective body can be made to catch up to the normal present, yet the 
moment of achieving temporal normality is endlessly deferred. 
Analyzing the practice of temporal distancing within eugenics discourse adds 
another layer of violence to the articulation of difference; eugenics enacted not just 
physical through practices such as the medical intake exam, and not just the epistemic 
and psychic of categorization. Eugenics also enacted a violence of foreclosing on the 
possibility that defectives could occupy the present or evolve into the future.  
Locally Grounded Genealogies of Difference: The Stakes 
In this chapter I employ a localized, textured approach to tracking the 
establishment of liberal knowledge regimes of bodily difference. This genealogy of 
bodily difference has political and theoretical implications for us in the present. First, 
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the category of “defective” was attached to the body through an invasive medical 
practice of prodding the body, measuring the vitality of lineage, and rendering state 
judgments on the soul. This unraveling of the eugenics presumption that 
defectiveness was inherent to the body, contributes to the project of queer theory and 
crip theory to denaturalize modes of bodily difference that are enforced through 
ideologies of biological essentialism. Taking the discourse of defectiveness on its 
own terms provides an opportunity for illuminating anew the liberal practice of 
conscripting bodies into fluid and emerging categories of difference. Defectiveness 
offers a critical perspective on the ways discourses constitute bodies as “different,” 
and materialize bodies as “other” to the norm. If “defective” is so apparently socially 
constructed, then should we not also question other conceptions of difference that 
seem biologically inherent, including gender, sex, disability, and race?  
Second, because defectiveness is part of the genealogy of multiple identity 
formations – women, racialized people, queers, and crips138 -- revisiting this discourse 
creates an opportunity for understanding again how different modes of bodily 
difference are historically imbricated with each other. Analyzing defectiveness as a 
shared genealogy of gender, sexuality, race and disability creates possibilities for new 
political coalitions who have roots in shared histories of state violence and are 
targeted for related logics of dispossession and state violence. In particular, 
                                                      
138 As I elaborate in the introduction, I use the terms “queers” and “crips” to reference movements to 
reclaim these terms from their derogatory meanings, and to re-articulate them as political collectivities. 
Crip and queer are specifically movements against assimilationist, rights- and recognition-based 
approaches to identity politics. 
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recognizing shared genealogies creates opportunities for political coalitions to form 
between disability activists, queers and other sexual minorities, feminists, and people 
of color. 
Third, the discourse of eugenics upheld white supremacy even if ethnically 
marginalized white bodies were the primary targets. The political stakes of this 
additional method for tracking racism is in creating a template for critiquing the ways 
that present-day forms of containment uphold the racial order, without relying 
exclusively on demonstrating racial disproportionality. A locally grounded and 
textured genealogy of difference is one that can combat the liberal repackaging of 
racialized economies of human value as soon as counter-narratives are successful at 
articulating a moral imperative for social justice for a particular group targeted by 
state violence. Being able to step out of one single framework for identifying 
oppression and analyze the local conditions for constituting an other to liberal power, 
can support vigilance against state appropriations of languages of justice that work to 
repackage and reinforce white supremacy. Can we use this method to continue to 
critique liberal state power even as it continuously redraws the boundaries of 
legitimate and illegitimate targets of state violence? 
 Finally, this case study of the discourse of defectiveness indicates that 
abjection and subjection to disciplinary power are not mutually exclusive processes, 
but rather are applied simultaneously, and in something like a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
This is my attempt to grapple with the seeming paradox of the peaceful violence of 
liberal power. As others have observed, liberalism appears to construct an abject 
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“other” not necessarily through outright physical violence or extreme neglect, but 
precisely through the intimate intensification of power over the body.139 I explore this 
further in the next chapter on eugenics institutions, because it has immediate 
implications for addressing current efforts to reform the prison industrial complex 
through the establishment of ever more intimate forms of power on the body. 
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America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Kalindi Vora, Life Support: Biocapital and the 
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Chapter 2 
Eugenics Institutions: Expanding Carceral Infrastructures and Logics 
 
Those defectives whose tendencies are such as to make them undesirable 
members of the community should be permanently segregated in the 
institution.140 
 
According to eugenics theory, organized interventions were necessary to 
prevent the defective class from spreading insanity, poverty, criminality, disease, and 
deformity through unchecked reproduction. As this theory was adopted by state 
administrators and political reformers in early twentieth century California, a variety 
of protection methods were proposed and implemented. In 1914, the California State 
Board of Charities and Corrections called on the legislature to pass public laws 
supporting:  
(a) more definitive and stringent laws for the commitment of feeble-minded 
persons, (b) establishment of farm colonies for feeble-minded, (c) segregation 
of the sexes, (d) sterilization when necessary, (e) laws preventing the marriage 
of feeble-minded, (f) immigration laws to exclude the defective classes, (g) 
special schools for the backward child.141  
 
All designed to reduce the number of defective people in the overall stock of 
humanity, the list illustrates the wide range of state policies undergirded by eugenicist 
theory.  
In this chapter, I explore the implementation of proposals (a) and (b), or, the 
eugenics institutionalization of the defective class in California between the 1897 
                                                      
140 “Report of the Department of Institutions, 1921-22” (Appendix to the Journals of the Senate and 
Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California: Sacramento, California: California State 
Printing, 1923), 80. 
141 “Report of the State Board of Charities and Corrections, 1912-1914” (Appendix to the Journals of 
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passage of the Insanity Law and into the 1930’s.  My argument is that eugenics 
institutionalization was a key technology for elaborating the carceral legal regime, 
temporality, infrastructure, and logic of containment for the state of California. 
Developing the practice of eugenics institutionalization played a consequential role in 
elaborating the legal process of containment, building the physical infrastructure of 
containment, and legitimating the logics of human value governing the modern 
carceral state in California.  
In the state’s current story about state hospitals, state homes for the feeble-
minded, and juvenile reformatories, these facilities were ostensibly built to provide 
custodial care and treatment to those that we would today categorize as mentally ill, 
developmentally/intellectually disabled, and delinquent.142 Yet, as I describe, the 
facilities were physically, temporally, legally, and logically almost indistinguishable 
from the state’s houses of punishment. While initially the state had resisted 
responsibility for building and expanding a prison system,143 reformers had success in 
convincing the state to build and expand other types of institutions of confinement, 
including the state hospitals, state homes for the feeble-minded, and youth 
reformatories. In addition to the state prisons, then, these eugenics institutions of state 
care spatially organized the settler colonial state and expanded the state’s physical 
and legal footprint on the landscape.  
                                                      
142 Department of Developmental Services, “History of Sonoma Developmental Center” (State of 
California, July 29, 2015), http://www.dds.ca.gov/Sonoma/History.cfm; California Department of 
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Eugenics theory also helped to develop the logical justification of state 
confinement, or, the precept that some people deserve and require permanent, internal 
segregation away from the normal, healthy body politic, permanently if possible. The 
temporality of eugenics insisted that some people deserve social death and must be 
denied a future in order to secure the future of the body politic. As a logic of 
containment, eugenics pathologization operated (and continues to operate) as a 
carceral logic contiguous to the logic of criminality. Eugenics institutionalization 
illustrates that the logic of containment can be conducted through rubrics of 
“treatment” and “care” just as easily as rubrics of punishment. I join critical disability 
studies scholars in arguing that carcerality includes not just what the state names as 
punishment, but the variety of methods the state uses to contain internal threats to the 
health, stability, coherence, and futurity of the body politic.144  
Attending to eugenics institutionalization historicizes in a new way the 
gendered state confinement of people assigned to the category of women and girls.145 
In California at the turn of the twentieth century, as in the rest of the United States, 
policy-makers were initially reluctant to invest in the incarceration of white women 
and girls owing to myth of the “fallen woman.”146 Consequently, I argue, eugenics 
institutionalization became the route by which the state confined ethnically 
marginalized, working-class and poor white women and girls. Later, eugenics 
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pathologization became an additional technology – working alongside and in 
collaboration with criminalization -- available for the state confinement of racialized 
women and girls, including Mexican-American women and girls, and the growing 
population of black women and girls. A gendered examination of eugenics 
institutionalization supports recent feminist prison studies scholarship that 
emphasizes how carceral regimes become naturalized through affective and libidinal 
economies that cathect danger onto racialized girls and women, even if this 
population is incarcerated at numerically smaller rates than assigned male 
populations.147 
By exploring the state containment of defectives under the system of mass 
pathologization, I make the case that eugenics institutions helped to elaborate the 
infrastructural and logical conditions for the rise of the systems of mass 
criminalization and mass incarceration later in the twentieth century. By introducing 
the role of eugenics as a technology for elaborating the carceral state, I gesture toward 
the on-going entanglement of state care of disability and madness with state 
punishment of criminality. However, in the current moment of prison reform, this 
entanglement is obscured by a reformist fantasy of state care and treatment, which 
presents rehabilitation as the centerpiece of a modern more humane (but still carceral) 
future. Re-examining eugenics institutionalization undermines the current fantasy of 
state care and treatment, because this history reveals state care and treatment as 
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practices of containment. The reformist cycle from state care to state punishment and 
back to state care, ultimately undermines the liberal state’s narration of itself as 
perpetually progressing into an ever more modern and humane future. 
Institutionalization as Eugenics Policy 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the state of California officially linked 
together the state prisons, juvenile reform schools, state hospitals for the insane, and 
state homes for the feeble-minded, by placing them under the shared oversight of the 
State Board of Charities and Corrections. The stated mission of these institutions was 
to offer various combinations of treatment, care, and reformation to the insane, 
epileptics, the feeble-minded, delinquents, dependents, and other defectives. 
However, each of these institutions also played a role, to varying degrees, in 
segregating “undesirable members of the community” away from the body politic. In 
addition to their shared oversight, these state institutions were also linked through 
their participation in the eugenicist project. 
At the time of its formation in 1903, the State Board of Charities and 
Corrections oversaw operations at five hospitals for the insane, one institution for the 
feeble-minded, two state prisons, and two juvenile reform schools:  
• Stockton State Hospital (established 1851)  
• San Quentin State Prison (1852) 
• Napa State Hospital (1875) 
• Folsom State Prison (1881) 
• Sonoma State Home (1883, as the California Home for the Care and Training 
of Feeble-Minded Children)  
• Agnews State Hospital (1888) 
• Whittier State School (1891) 
• Preston School of Industry (1892)  
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• Patton State Hospital (1893, as Southern California State Hospital)  
• Mendocino State Hospital (1893)  
 
Due to population growth in the southern part of the state, two new facilities were 
built after the turn of the century: Norwalk State Hospital opened in 1915, and, after a 
failed attempt to open at a different location in 1921, the Pacific Colony opened in 
1927 as an institution for the feeble-minded and epileptics. Juvenile dependents and 
delinquents assigned to the category of girl were transferred to a third reform school 
that opened in 1913 -- the School for Girls in Ventura. Expanding the reformatory 
experiment to adults, the Industrial Farm for Women briefly opened in 1922. 
However, the newly reorganized State Board of Institutions had little interest in 
operating this facility, and the farm closed after a fire destroyed the main building 
after just a few months of operation. Finally, the California Institute for Women -- the 
state’s third prison -- opened in 1933. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the total population of the state hospitals 
and the state home was 5,276, with 37% of inmates classified as female. Twenty 
years later, in 1920, the population of state hospitals would almost double to 10,119 
inmates, with an additional increase in the percentage classified as female – up to 
42%. Occasionally, the California Board of Charities and Corrections calculated the 
commitment rate in comparison to the overall population of California. It did so in 
1916, observing that the commitment rate to the state hospitals was, at that time, 1 to 
285. In the year 1916, 10,331 people were committed at some point to a state 
hospital, compared to an overall population in California of just under 3 million 
people.  
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The population and commitment rate of state hospital inmates far exceeded 
the population of the state’s prisons. Until 1933 when California Institute for Women 
opened, the state operated just two prisons, one across the bay from San Francisco at 
San Quentin, and another in the Sierra mountain foothills called Folsom. Together 
these two prisons held a total of 2,131 inmates in 1900, and 2,911 in 1920. Like the 
state hospitals, the prisons might have seen a double increase had it not been for a 
decline in new admissions due to enlistment during World War I. As it is, the 
difference between the prison population and hospital population is striking, and even 
more so for women. Compared to the thousands of women in state hospitals, less than 
75 prison inmates were held in the women’s quarters at San Quentin in 1920. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: New cottage for single women working days, Sonoma State Home.148 
                                                      
148 “Report of the Department of Institutions, 1925-26” (Appendix to the Journals of the Senate and 
Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California: Sacramento, California: California State 
Printing, 1927). 
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With some exceptions, the thousands of people occupying state hospitals, state 
homes, and reformatories lived not in imposing stone buildings, but in village like 
settings on large farms. The Sonoma State Home, for example, was much larger than 
its name suggests, occupying a total of 1640 acres, or approximately 2.5 square miles. 
The site was chosen for “ample water supply, drainage, and two railroad lines that 
passed through the property,” ensuring that the facility could supply its own water, 
deal with its own waste, and receive shipments of goods by train.149 Hosting a small  
population of less than 200, the California School for Girls occupied 125 acres that 
contained a hospital, four cottages (each housing about 30 inmates), a manor house  
for the superintendent, a commissary building, farm buildings, and a garage. In 1916, 
the superintendent requested appropriations to purchase an additional 57 acres 
containing a functioning apricot orchard, in order to increase the buffer between the 
school and seasonal fruit pickers, who apparently distracted the inmates at the school 
from their reformation.150 
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Figure 3: California School for Girls. Aerial view, circa 1920. 151 
 
 
The desirability of this farm style state institution was described by Dr. 
Leonard Stocking, medical director at Agnews State Hospital, in a 1912 annual report 
to the state legislature: 
I think this hospital, as it is, should be for the acute and treatable cases, with 
an outlying colony for those who need care rather than treatment…Better to 
colonize them on a large tract of land within a few miles of the parent 
institution under the same administration…I believe a colony on a sufficient 
quantity of good land in this valley could be made nearly, if not quite, self-
supporting by horticulture and agriculture, if properly organized and 
conducted. I think that at as early a date as possible we should acquire a tract 
of land for this purpose, and begin our colonization.152  
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Stocking requested that the legislature expand Agnews through the “colonization” of 
nearby land, where chronic cases could be isolated away from healthy society on a 
self-sufficient farm. The model of institution that Stocking calls the “colony” was 
especially appealing for those who needed long-term custodial care rather than short-
term acute treatment. Stocking’s reference to “care” rather than “treatment” gestures 
toward the use of the farm colony style institution for the purpose of permanently 
containing the defective class.  
 The justification of the farm colony style institution for Stocking was that 
such a facility could be made self-supporting. Institutional staff could live 
comfortably on site. Colonies could drill wells for their own water, and as much as 
possible, the food consumed by the residents at the institution could be produced on 
site through the raising of livestock, dairies, fruit orchards, and vegetable gardens. 
Inmate labor could be used to run the laundries, kitchens, cleaning, as well as provide 
basic care for other inmates.  
It is in this possibility of self-sufficiency that the farm colony model reveals 
its eugenicist underpinnings. As the State Board of Charities and Corrections 
imagined in a 1916 report: 
[A]gain recommending the establishment of a colony for the care and custody 
of the high grade feeble-minded…The moron is capable of earning his own 
living under favorable circumstances, but is not able to compete on equal 
terms with his normal fellows or to manage himself and his affairs with 
ordinary prudence. The farm colony means the creation of a new world for 
him where he will be largely or entirely self-supporting under proper 
supervision…The case for the feeble-minded girl or woman of child-bearing 
age is even more urgent. The colony would afford her protection, work and 
recreation, thus securing for her a happy and profitable life, at the same time 
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relieving society of one of the greatest menaces that now confront it.153 
 
The institution as self-sufficient farm colony would exist as a parallel world to normal 
society, a “new world” removed from liberal time, albeit still within the spatial and 
geographic boundaries of the settler nation. This new world of the farm colony was 
imagined in highly gendered terms that underscores the eugenics purposes. For 
defective men and boys, the colony was imagined as a safe haven (albeit one 
requiring sex segregation) from the demands of competition under modern capitalism. 
While the segregation of men and boys was construed as a humanitarian gesture of 
protection from the crushing pressures of modernity, for women and girls the colony 
was imagined in eugenicist terms. Women and girls needed “protection” from society 
(and specifically from sex) through institutionalization, but at the same time, and 
perhaps even more importantly, society could be protected from the menace of 
defective women’s and girls’ unchecked reproduction and sexual immorality. The 
farm colony was to warehouse dangerous defective women and girls that threatened 
the health and futurity of the body politic. Whether it was to be a home for 
untreatable insane women, sexual delinquents and dependents, women in need of 
reform, or feeble-minded women, the farm colonies operated under eugenics 
demands; namely, to save the human race by preventing unchecked reproduction 
through the segregation of undesirable women and girls from the rest of the body 
politic.  
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Rather than explore the use of institutionalization as a form of eugenics, 
scholarship on eugenics policies in the United States and U.S. colonies has focused 
instead on the eugenics coercive sterilization laws, in some cases going so far as to 
argue that segregation programs were abandoned in favor of mass sterilization 
programs in the 1910’s.154 The shift from segregation to sterilization is marked by the 
growing influence of eugenicists like Ezra Gosney and Paul Popenoe, who argued 
that the most humane eugenics strategy was for the state to conduct mass sterilization 
on defective women, because then defective girls could be allowed the freedom to 
live and marry outside of institutions.155  
However, California’s Asexualization Law required that an individual be 
institutionalized in a state home, state hospital, or state prison prior to undergoing 
sterilization. Consequently, whether a person was institutionalized for one day or 
indefinitely, eugenics institutionalization was the foundation of coercive sterilization 
throughout the life of the Asexualization Law. Eugenics institutionalization also 
facilitated other eugenics programs, most notably migrant deportation, a project I 
discuss in more detail in chapter 3. The study of institutionalization as a eugenics 
program is necessary both because it served its own eugenics purpose by preventing 
marriage, sex, reproduction, and social reproduction of the defective class, and also 
because the state’s hospitals, homes, and reformatories directly facilitated the state’s 
other eugenics programs. 
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Eugenics Institutions as Carceral Infrastructure 
Accepting that state institutions served a eugenics function does not inherently 
mean that institutional life for inmates and staff was terrible. Indeed, the archive 
registers ambivalence about life in state institutions. On the one side of this 
ambivalence there are texts depicting institutions as peaceful places offering the 
restorative properties of farm life. On the other side, there is evidence that the legal 
practices, temporality, and infrastructure of eugenics institutions drew on existing 
technologies of carcerality. Exploring evidence of the latter, I re-conceive of 
California’s eugenics institutions as “caring” elaborations of the state’s carceral 
infrastructure. 
 
Figure 4: Berry Picking – Sonoma State Home. Inmates at Sonoma State Home in 
white dresses and hats stand among large berry bushes. Hills can be seen faintly in the 
background.156 
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On the restorative side of the ambivalence about eugenics institutions are 
pictures of state institutions that depict inmates engaged in recreational activities and 
occupational therapy. In one photograph, inmates at Sonoma State Home wearing full 
sleeved white dresses and wide brimmed hats stand in clusters among shoulder high 
bushes in front of scenic hills. Although they are too distant to make out their faces, 
the inmates are presumably chatting and leisurely picking berries. However, the one 
person whose face is somewhat discernible stands at the center of the picture, neither 
chatting nor picking. Instead, this person stars hauntingly at something to the right of 
the viewer.  
The image of the berry pickers conveys some of the potentially appealing 
attributes of institutional farm life. Institutionalization removed the inmate from the 
demands of modern life, including the capitalist demand of making a living off of 
one’s labor. For assigned women and girls whose money-making activities were 
constrained and stigmatized, and especially for disabled women and girls, removal 
might have been a relief. As the image hints, sex segregation on the farms also 
introduced a homosociality that some may have found queerly pleasant. According to 
the state Board of Charities and Corrections in 1914, some former inmates took so 
much comfort in farm life that they attempted to return to institution after being 
discharged:  
Very frequently one of the discharged patients, who is unable to get along on 
the outside, voluntarily comes back and says he wants to stay. Paroled men 
are allowed to go out to look for work, and, if after three or four days they 
have been unsuccessful, they are allowed to return to the hospital.157  
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Institutional life in this description is a kind of refuge for deviantly bodied people 
understood as having difficulty surviving in modern society outside of the institution. 
Further, the implication here is that inmates at the state hospital were free to come 
and go as they pleased.  
  However, the person haunting the center of the berry-picking image at 
Sonoma Home must also be reckoned with, a reckoning that starts with unraveling the 
ways that eugenics institutions drew on and developed carceral technologies. To 
begin with, while a small percent of inmates at eugenics institutions arrived there 
voluntarily, the vast majority were forcibly committed. The legal process of 
commitment to the state hospitals treated conditions like insanity and juvenile 
dependency congruently to criminality.  
Under the strictures of the “Insanity Law,” passed by the California legislature 
on March 31, 1897, anybody could file an “application for commitment” on another 
person they suspected to be insane, causing a warrant to be ordered for the 
incarceration of the accused person in a county jail pending a court hearing. At the 
turn of the twentieth century, county jails in California were not limited to the 
detention of those convicted of crimes, but also contained accused insane persons, 
witnesses subpoenaed for court, and those accused of public order infractions 
including vagrancy and commercial sex work. Prior to the strict enforcement of state 
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segregation rules, all were detained together in cells regardless of age or gender.158 If 
the judge agreed with the application of commitment, and no friend or family member 
of the accused came forward to insist on a hearing, then the accused was declared 
“insane” by the judge and committed to a state hospital. The insane person’s next of 
kin could appeal the decision and ask for a jury trial, but they had to pay for the court 
proceedings, a policy that precluded the poor from seeking appeals.  
The medical opinion obtained in the commitment process was a “certificate of 
lunacy” attached to the application, which was to be signed by two physicians who 
had examined the allegedly insane person and affirmed the person’s insanity. 
However, both the Insanity Law and the practice of “mental medicine” relied on 
shifting and emergent understandings of sanity and insanity. Consequently, hospital 
staff appear to have been playing catch up to establish diagnoses for those who had 
already been determined socially and legally insane. A chart dated from 1900, for 
example, shows the range of diagnoses at the five state hospitals. Approximately 90% 
of patients were sorted in variations of three broad categories: “mania,” 
“melancholia,” and “dementia.”159 However, slightly more than 10% of inmates in 
state hospitals were considered “unclassified” – meaning that at the turn of the 
century, for one in ten inmates there was a legal commitment but no official medical 
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reason for their institutionalization in a state hospital.160  
Administrators lamented that the legal process of commitment to a state 
hospital mimicked a criminal conviction, including the pre-trial detention of accused 
insane people in jails, and the transport of committed people to the state hospital by 
the sheriff which frequently took place in restraints. For example, the Superintendent 
of Agnews State Hospital called on the state legislature in 1904 to change “the 
present method of committing the insane, the method of their care, and the manner of 
their transportation to the Hospital,” because: 
[R]ulings of the courts and legislative amendments have so changed the 
manner of committing that it now partakes too much of a criminal proceeding, 
and it is often difficult to convince a patient, who does not recognize his own 
confusion of mind, that he has not been tried and committed for some criminal 
offense…The law now provides for the handling of the insane by the Sheriff's 
office…Too much the method of handling the criminal, and not the sick, 
prevails.  By far too much restraint is used. Frequently patients are humiliated, 
irritated, and made much worse by the use of restraint in transit.161 
 
Although the superintendent expressed regret that inmates arrived at the state 
hospitals convinced that they convicted of a crime, he did not go so far as to question 
the forcible commitment practice itself. 
The 1909 Juvenile Court Law allowed for locking up of juveniles through a 
legal process that, similar to the treatment of insanity as a version of criminality, 
conflated dependency and delinquency. Juvenile delinquency was determined by the 
commission of a crime, while dependency was signaled by parental abuse, neglect, or 
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abandonment. The treatment of delinquency and dependency through a single legal 
process meant that youth who were attempting to meet their basic needs by begging, 
searching for work, engaging in sex work, or creating support networks among other 
homeless and destitute youth and young adults, were treated the same as youth who 
had committed crimes. Youth crime and the survival of defective youth were, in other 
words, not distinguishable by the legal regime in California.  
Similar to the Insanity Law, the Juvenile Court Law allowed any person to file 
a petition with referring a dependent or delinquent youth to the authorities, a move 
that initiated a citation to the youth’s parent or guardian that required their appearance 
along with the child in court. A judicial finding of either delinquency or dependency 
gave the judge authority to commit the youth to custody and to place the youth with a 
“reputable citizen with good moral character,” a charitable organization, the care of a 
probation officer, or in a juvenile reformatory. This means that dependent youth could 
be remanded to the juvenile reform schools just as well as a delinquent youth. 
Once forcibly institutionalized – whether in a state hospital, juvenile reform 
school, or state home for the feeble-minded – inmates were not free to leave of their 
own volition. In some cases, this included being housed in facilities that were on lock 
down. The superintendent of the Southern California State Hospital, for example, 
argued in 1904 that some housing should be locked-down, such as a: 
[N]ew wing for male patients…This ward should be constructed with special 
reference to security. The locks, doors, windows, and window guards should 
be made especially strong and secure…I would not have you think that we 
desire a miniature penitentiary in connection with a hospital, but nothing short 
of the safeguards offered by a penal institution would meet the requirements 
in some cases that we are obliged to receive and care for. Therefore, separate 
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provision should be made so that the wards of a hospital for the mentally sick 
should not assume the appearance of an institution for the care of criminals.162  
 
The superintendent recognized that these measures could make a facility feel like a 
“miniature penitentiary.” His solution was to offset this situation through aesthetic 
measures that reasserted the visual boundaries – if not the actual infrastructure –
between a hospital and a prison. 
One of the few pieces of writing by an institutional inmate stored at the 
California State Archives references the prison-like experience of being in a state 
hospital. A letter dated April 26, 1937 addressed to a hospital superintendent reads,  
Any more of this ‘prison’ existence will stifle me – I thought I could take it – 
But now I want to get out…I hold the highest regard for you and doctor Paine 
and most of your staff – I think you have a wonderful hospital (but many 
things needed) but I beg of you to please release me.  
 
What to make of the curious juxtaposition between first calling the hospital a “prison” 
and later describing it as “wonderful”? Is it a rhetorical strategy the woman letter 
writer employed, couching her plea for freedom in a compliment that demonstrated 
her normal status that required esteem for medical professionals and state supported 
treatment? This could explain why the letter writer deftly places the blame for 
needing to leave on herself – noting that she thought she “could take it.” In any case, 
the letter writer confirms that the experience of a state hospital was not therapeutic, or 
at least not solely therapeutic. Confirming the fears of the superintendents, the letter 
establishes that state institutions felt like prisons to at least some inmates. 
Unlike a prison sentence, however, once forcibly committed to a state home or 
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state hospital, an inmate’s stay was indefinite. Under the 1897 Insanity Law, the 
superintendent of each state hospital retained sole authority to release:  
1. A patient who, in his judgment, is recovered; 2. Any patient who is not 
recovered, but whose discharge, in the judgment of the superintendent, will 
not be detrimental to the public welfare, or injurious to the patient; provided, 
however, that before making such certificate, the superintendent shall satisfy 
himself, by sufficient proof, that the friends or relatives of the patient are 
willing and financially able to receive and properly care for such patient.  
 
While these guidelines were ostensibly designed to support the medical judgment of 
the men who knew each inmate best, those superintendents who adopted eugenics 
were then allowed used the theory to guide their determination of recovery. Outlining 
his eugenics theory of recovery, the superintendent of Sonoma State Home for almost 
26 years, Dr. FO Butler wrote: 
Some cases only need to come for a short time--as it has been fairly well 
demonstrated that the average moron, without natural vicious tendencies, who 
has been properly trained in habits of obedience and industry, and who is 
protected from temptation and evil associations during childhood can, in the 
majority of instances, be safely returned to the community after having passed 
adolescence providing their families or trained workers can give them the 
proper supervision… 
 
The defectives who are capable of propagating, especially the hereditary class, 
and we know this class predominates, should first be asexualized before 
leaving the institution as we are now doing. We receive a great many each 
year just for sterilization alone and return them to their respective 
communities without training, some being discharged, others remaining on 
parole… 
 
Those defectives whose tendencies are such as to make them undesirable 
members of the community should be permanently segregated in the 
institution.163  
 
Butler initiated a program whereby defectives were briefly institutionalized solely for 
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the purpose of sterilization. Butler could then determine them to be recovered and 
release them. However, even Butler continued to insist that detention – what he called 
“permanent segregation” -- was necessary for those who showed “vicious 
tendencies,” those who were disobedient or lazy, and those who were part of 
extended defective families that were incapable of properly caring for their defective 
member. This indefinite detention was based on the determination that the defective 
class were destined to live lives of poverty, insanity, and crime.  
The practice of indefinite detention in some eugenics institutions prefigured 
the use of indeterminate sentence in state prisons. The indefinite sentence that 
organized the eugenics institutions was eventually incorporated into the state’s penal 
code in 1917. Describing the desirability of the so-called indeterminate sentence, the 
State Board of Charities and Corrections declared: 
The [criminal] sentences pronounced are for definite periods supposedly 
determined upon the ‘criminality of the act’ as a basis. There is no legal 
recognition of the fact that some persons who never have committed serious 
crimes should be permanently segregated, while others whose overt acts are 
rated as felonies may early be restored to good citizenship. With the principle 
of the indeterminate sentence as a starting point, the legislature should 
consider a revision of the entire Penal Code. Instead of punishment there 
should be corrective treatment which [sic] should be based on the character of 
the offender instead of on the nature of the particular act for which he was 
arrested…It would provide for all offenders’ treatment until cured or 
permanent restraint.164 
 
The language used by the board to advocate for the indeterminate sentence in prison 
settings, borrows heavily from the principle of recovery already established in the 
state hospital system. Extending the authority of medical superintendents to 
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determine when an inmate was healed, the board advocated for giving prison 
administrators the authority to determine when a prison inmate was “cured” of their 
incorrigibility or criminal tendencies.  
The indeterminate sentence meant that state prisoners sentenced between 1917 
and 1978 served wildly varying amounts of time for the same crime. A famous 
example is George Jackson, one of the Soledad Brothers, whose original 1961 
sentence was one-year to life imprisonment for participation in an armed robbery at 
the age of 19, in which he and a comrade stole $70 from a gas station at gunpoint.165 
For Jackson, the indeterminate sentence was ultimately a death sentence, although not 
because he died of old age, as increasing numbers of prisoners in California have 
become prone to in the Three-Strikes Era. After a long battle to defend himself from 
accusations that he had killed a guard during a prison riot, Jackson was shot and 
killed by another prison guard. Under the indeterminate sentence, the possibility of 
“permanent restraint” from the normal world was a likely horizon, especially for 
those who could not embody the norms of white, gender binary conforming, able-
bodiedness. 
Insofar as indefinite detention narrowed the future horizons of the defective 
class, eugenics institutionalization established a temporality that drew on and 
expanded the temporality of incarceration. That the temporality of modern 
incarceration is outside of normal time is captured by the ways that a prison or jail 
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sentence is often referred to in the United States as “serving time,” “doing time,” or 
“doing hard time.” Ruth Wilson Gilmore asserts that jails and prisons extract time, 
and Regina Kunzel describes the prison as one a place that is “out of time.”166 
Eugenics institutions also established a temporality out of sync with the occupation of 
“normal” time and participation in progressive time lines. This removal from normal 
time was necessary for both the reform, rehabilitation, and disciplining of those who 
occupied modern liberal time inappropriately, and to protect normatively timed 
citizens from the menace posed by the anachronistic and the untimely.   
The “free time” of the eugenics institution inmate, forcibly committed and 
indefinitely detained, was likely experienced similarly to what Neferti Tadiar names 
as “excessive remaindered life-time.”167 Once some labor was extracted from inmates 
to keep the institution going –work in the laundry, or picking vegetables in the garden 
-- the rest of time inside the colony was likely experienced as a kind of interminable 
useless time. This time was neither extractable for capitalist production (either as 
labor or another form of speculation), nor able to be “spent” in the way that the 
inmate desired.  
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Figure 5: Laundry Room – Sonoma State Home. A mixed gender and possibly mixed-
race group of inmates standing in rows press linen with irons.168 
 
 
A 1903 newspaper reporter’s description of Southern California State Hospital 
conveys the resulting ghostly existence of the farm colony inmates: 
The half windows that look out upon the pretty hospital grounds from the 
basement board room were haunted by the harmless patients, who are 
permitted freedom of the grounds, and almost constantly some distorted face 
was pressed close to the heavy woven wire screen that protected the window 
or the shrubbery was agitated by a patient who, with stealthy steps, was 
stealing to the windows. The institution was never quiet. Throughout the 
twenty-four hours some unfortunate was either reciting his woes, howling and 
screaming in fear or singing. The hospital was never at rest.169 
 
Subjected to forcible commitment, not free to leave the grounds, and indefinitely 
detained, inmates were nevertheless full of free time and some had the freedom of the 
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grounds.  Suspended in interminable time outside of the normative temporalities and 
horizons of capitalism and citizenship, the inmates of the institution appeared to this 
reporter to be haunting the legal proceedings taking place on hospital grounds.  
In addition to this haunting social death, the future horizon of permanent 
exclusion from normal society was physical death, whether through natural causes or 
accelerated illness. Patients were not necessarily committed with the understanding 
that they would be treated and returned home, but some anticipated dying while at the 
institution. Many inmates entered eugenics institutions with pre-existing illnesses, 
including conditions like dementia, syphilis, and tuberculosis. For example, Napa 
State Hospitals reported in 1920, that the rate of syphilis infection among incoming 
admissions was as high as 23%, with almost 12% of new admissions showing 
“syphilitic invasion of the nervous system.”170 In Stockton State Hospital, 154 
patients died in the year 1900, while the daily total was around 1593 patients in the 
facility (as measured on a single day at year end), making a death rate of about 10%. 
One third of those deaths were due to tuberculosis. Twenty years later, the death rate 
at Stockton remained about the same, 273 patients died out of an average daily total 
of 2310 patients (measured on a single day at year end).  
The overcrowded and understaffed conditions exacerbated existing illness and 
injury and exposed inmates to new illnesses and injuries, especially communicable 
diseases. In 1920, the State Commission in Lunacy reported an outbreak of influenza 
that hit the Southern California and Mendocino State Hospitals, as well as the 
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Sonoma State Home, causing 518 cases of the flu and resulting in 192 deaths.171  
Despite the potential idyll of farm life, California’s eugenics institutions drew 
on technologies designed for criminal imprisonment, and served as a medium through 
which the legal, temporal, and physical infrastructure of carcerality was – wittingly or 
unwittingly -- expanded. The eugenics institutions carved out temporary spaces of 
internal containment for defectives to occupy, suspended in social death, until their 
kind could be eradicated completely through physical death.  
That this eugenicist organization of bodies, time, and space took place within 
a settler nation makes Stocking’s description of state institutions as a form of 
“colonization” unequivocal. It means that eugenics institutions of California operated 
something like the penal colonies of Britain, where poor and criminalized people 
were forcibly deported in order to become settlers in territories that Britain had 
claimed without regard for the wishes of the indigenous people who had lived there 
since time immemorial. However, instead of loading undesirables onto the “ship of 
fools” that would take them outside of the spatial bounds of the mother nation and the 
temporal bounds of history, California used forcibly committed defective people to 
internally occupy the landscape claimed by the United States. The fantasy of the self-
contained eugenic farm as a “new world” for the defective was colonialist in that it 
was foundationally premised on settler claims to indigenous land and resources. I say 
the institutions were temporary spaces of containment because in the eugenicist 
imaginary, once the defectives died off and were prevented from reproducing, the 
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land they had occupied would be available for other uses. The colonized land would 
not be returned to indigenous people but would be available for future (carceral) uses 
by the settler state. The construction of eugenics institutions in California 
consequently expanded the infrastructural footprint of the settler state. Insofar as that 
eugenicist imaginary legitimated the establishment of carceral state infrastructure on 
lands that indigenous people had lived on since time immemorial, it was also a settler 
colonial project of modernization. 
Treatment as Punishment in Eugenics Institutions 
Once committed to eugenics institutions, inmates were subjected to practices 
that combined medical treatment with punishment. Under the rubric of state care and 
state treatment at eugenics institutions, medicalized carceral technologies were 
developed. These technologies became quickly available for use on criminalized 
populations, and increasingly so in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
One, inmates of state institutions were subjected to medical experimentation. 
While there was likely scientific value of such experiments, they remain bioethically 
questionable, because there were no protocols for requesting the consent of the 
inmates. At best, some of the experiments resulted in no measurable benefit to 
inmates, and at worst risked harming inmates who had not consented. An ambitious 
medical practitioner at Napa State Hospital, for example, authorized several 
experiments on inmates. In 1920, 400 inmates at Napa State Hospital were subjected 
to an experimental influenza vaccine administered by an assistant of Dr. McCoy of 
the Hygienic Laboratory in Washington, DC. Three weeks after administering the 
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vaccine, a serious case of influenza swept through the hospital, affecting at least 400 
people. Following the outbreak, administrators concluded that the vaccine had had no 
preventative effect. Even more troubling is another experiment at Napa that required 
regular invasive extraction of bodily fluids, all for a study of epilepsy that was never 
concluded. In that case, the medical superintendent reported that:   
[A] Bio-chemical study was begun by C. G. Mc Arthur, Ph.D., the late acting 
pathologist, at the temporary laboratory rooms under the kitchen of the Acute 
Quiet Hospital. About thirty of our patients, male and female, who were 
suffering from epilepsy, were singled out for the study of their blood, urine 
and spinal fluid. The specimens of these body fluids were secured at certain 
fixed times, bearing on the relationship to the epileptic seizures (i.e. before, 
during and after attacks). Dr. McArthur did an enormous amount of chemical 
analysis in this connection, but had not brought matters to a satisfactory 
conclusion when he left the institution August 1, 1920.172 
 
Of note here is that patients were subjected to blood withdrawals, urine sampling and 
painful spinal fluid extractions, all for a study that was never completed and 
consequently did not offer any scientific value. 
Two, some medical treatments were used for the express purpose of 
disciplining unruly patients. In one example, a grand jury investigation into reports of 
abuse of inmates at the Southern California State Hospital in 1903 discussed the use 
of apomorphia, a homeopathic drug that induces severe vomiting. According to 
newspaper reporters who attended the hearing, “The use of apomorphia in 
disciplining patients in lieu of mechanical restraint was admitted by the physicians in 
certain cases.”173 The grand jury concluded that this use of a medication to make 
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patients vomit as a form of punishment was done “in accordance … with the 
authorities cited” as experts on the use of the drug.174   
In another example of medical treatment as discipline, a practice called 
hydrotherapy was used in state hospitals, state homes, and reformatories during the 
first half of the twentieth century, for nervous conditions and incorrigibility alike. 
Hydrotherapy included being plunged into ice-cold water bath, or being tied into a 
“continuous bath” that lasted hours or days.175 In 1912, an inmate was killed at Napa 
State Hospital following an aggressive use of hydrotherapy, where the man was 
plunged into a tub of scalding hot water. 176 The commission convened to investigate 
determined that the death was accidental, but also justified the death by insisting that 
the patient was already near death due to the medical condition of paresis 
(weakness/lack of voluntary movement). The commission also determined that the 
attendants who scalded the man were not at fault because Napa, like all other state 
institutions, suffered from severe overcrowding and staff shortages. (When the 
scalding occurred 2 attendants were responsible for 44 inmates on the ward.)  
The Board of Charities and Corrections reported in 1920, “California School 
for Girls has installed a hydrotherapy equipment which is of distinct value in 
treatment for the prevention of hysteria and in quieting girls with psychopathic 
tendencies,” demonstrating that these practices were not limited to hospitals but 
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extended to reformatories.177 Hydrotherapy was also adopted as explicit punishment 
in the state prisons, where the “continuous shower,” involved an inmate being tied 
naked to a cross and sprayed with a high-pressure water hose as a form of 
discipline.178 
Former inmates and family members registered their concerns about such 
treatment through repeated allegations that the state’s institutions were sites of abuse. 
In a 1903 grand jury investigation of Southern California State Hospital, one former 
inmate reported that he had seen a man named Rev. E.E. Plannette “choked, jumped 
upon and abused.”179 Unfortunately, however, during the hearing the abused man’s 
wife did not substantiate the former inmate’s claims of abuse, reporting that she was 
convinced that staff had reacted with appropriateness to Rev. Plannette’s tendencies 
toward “excitability and violence.” Current inmates also failed to support the reports; 
it is likely, however, that because they were still committed at the hospital, the 
opportunities for staff retaliation against them may have kept them from speaking out. 
The Grand Jury wrote off testimonies of insane people about abuse, anyway, arguing:  
Many of these rumors of ill-treatment were traced to patients and to former 
employees, who, in most cases, were discharged for cause. In these cases, as 
in all such cases, evidence for obvious reasons must be viewed with more or 
less allowance. The testimony of patients was taken in several cases and given 
such credence as seemed warranted by the mental condition and the 
corroborative circumstances in the case under consideration.180  
 
In later cases, investigators determined that those who reported abuse were merely 
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seeking the fame that comes from being involved in scandal.181 Regardless of the 
state’s official findings in each of these cases, the accusations of abuse indicate 
mistreatment and violence were not rare inside of state institutions. 
Three, reproductive sterilization surgery served a disciplinary purpose and had 
disciplinary effects. The state Commission in Lunacy argued, “Sterilization of chosen 
cases (particularly the moral delinquent feeble-minded type) has been started and we 
expect to continue this work. We find sterilization makes the patient more amenable 
to discipline and less restless.”182 This indicates that while sterilization may not have 
been intended as a punishment, at the very least it was believed to make the inmates 
more able to be disciplined. The sterilization surgery, in short, became a way for the 
practice of eugenics institutionalization to intensify its power over the defective body.  
The third and final 1917 version of California’s Asexualization Law provided 
three paths to sterilization, the first being: 
Before any person who has been lawfully committed to any state hospital for 
the insane, or who has been an inmate of the Sonoma State Home, and who is 
afflicted with mental disease which may have been inherited and is likely to 
be transmitted to descendants, the various grades of feeble-mindedness, those 
suffering from perversion or marked departures from normal mentality or 
from disease of a syphilitic nature, shall be released or discharged therefrom, 
the state commission in lunacy may in its discretion…cause such person to be 
asexualized. 
 
While the law explicitly stated that consent from the inmate or their family was not 
needed, the use of sterilization surgery as a gate between the inmate and release from 
the institution further muddied the possibility that an inmate, or their family, could 
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willfully consent to the elective procedure. The use of sterilization as an incentive for 
release, and conversely as a barrier to release, weaponized surgery as a kind of state 
punishment. The 1909 version of the Asexualization Law, however, had stated that 
the purpose of sterilization was for instances where it was found to be “beneficial and 
conducive to the physical, mental, and moral condition of the inmate,” wordage that 
was preserved in the later versions of the law only for inmates of state prisons. While 
the original law purported to offer treatment to defectiveness, by 1917 this was 
dispensed with in order to emphasize the protection of society form the inmate.  
As these examples of non-consensual experimentation, disciplinary uses of 
medical treatment, and weaponized forms of surgery show, eugenics institutions 
developed new carceral technologies under the rubric of state care and state 
treatment. This role of eugenics institutionalization as a site for developing new forms 
of disciplining, is in addition to the role that eugenics institutionalization played in 
elaborating the general carceral infrastructure of the state. 
Eugenics Institutions and the Logic of Containment 
By physically and legally extending the settler state’s carceral infrastructure, 
and by developing specific carceral technologies under the rubric of treatment, 
eugenics institutions elaborated the logic of containment. By logic of containment, I 
refer to the presumption that the state is justified in confining some people 
permanently away from the body politic. Articulating carcerality as the logic of 
containment – rather than limiting this logic to the practice of imprisonment in places 
the state names as jails and prison – I draw together the variety of methods the state 
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uses to contain internal threats to health, stability, coherence, and futurity. All of the 
state’s modes of containment – whether conducted under rubrics of state punishment 
or state care – collaborate in constructing an unfair and unjust political economy of 
human value that operates as form of liberal governance.  
My conceptualization of carcerality as the logic of containment draws on the 
interventions of critical criminology. Western criminology and penology operate 
through the presumption that criminals exist prior to discourse or knowledge 
production, and subsequently, these fields of knowledge theorize the causes of crime 
and developing the best methods for social response. However, political prisoners and 
prison abolitionists articulated a radical critique of western criminology and penology 
beginning in the late 1960’s.183 Emblematic of this critique, Bettina Aptheker asks in 
a 1971 essay: 
What then is the political function of the criminal and the prisoner as they are 
created and described by the bourgeois penologists and criminologists? 
Consider penology as one aspect of the theory and practice of containment on 
the domestic front; that is, consider penology as the confinement and 
treatment of people who are actually or potentially disruptive of the social 
system.184 
 
Aptheker argues that the criminal and prisoner are discursively created by 
criminologists and penologists. Through scientific knowledge that elaborates on what 
and who a criminal is, society comes to view as natural the existence of a type of 
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person called a “criminal.” “The criminal” comes to signify a subject who is 
deserving of punishment and distinct from the normal law-abiding citizen.185 
According to this theory prisons and jails do not contain a naturally existing criminal 
class, but rather the processes of criminalization and imprisonment constructs bodies 
as souls worthy of punishment, souls that can then legitimately be incarcerated. 
Aptheker shifts the question from “Why do we have criminals?” to the question 
“How are some people constructed as so different and threatening that they need to be 
separated from the rest of society?” According to Aptheker, people who are 
potentially disruptive of the capitalist social order are those who are targeted for 
“containment on the domestic front.” In short, the practice of criminalization serves 
the purposes of political and economic control.  
Critical scholars like Aptheker are especially concerned about the racialized 
aspects of the process of criminalization. Lisa Marie Cacho treats criminalization as a 
mode of racialization because it attaches illegal statuses onto bodies and relegates 
those bodies to a realm of abjection that Cacho calls “social death.”186 Under social 
death, so-called criminals are neither eligible for legal recognition of civil and 
political rights, for public empathy for their dispossession of these rights, nor is it 
possible to value their lives or any form of resistance against this dispossession. 
Criminalization processes adapt the colonial racial projects that came before, making 
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the disparate treatment of racialized subjects -- now labeled with the race-neutral term 
“criminal” -- legal under the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and 
palatable under the regime of liberal multiculturalism. Cacho argues that the ways 
that social death is racialized are obscured by colorblind laws that developed in the 
second half of the twentieth century when they use apparently race-neutral categories 
of “crime” and “punishment.”  
This theory of criminalization has been central to my approach to eugenics 
institutionalization. In chapter 1, I tracked how the category of “defective” did not 
exist prior to discourse but, rather, was applied to legitimate the containment of 
gender non-conforming, sexually deviant, and disabled women and girls, who 
threatened the white supremacist settler order. As with Cacho’s theorization of 
racialized criminalization, the pathologization of defectives also worked to relegate 
potentially disruptive bodies to social death, denying them social and political rights, 
cutting them off from public recognition of their dispossession, devaluing their lives 
from rights-bearing subject to an object of pity, and thus delegitimizing any form of 
resistance the defective class may have taken up.  
In making this connection between criminalization and pathologization, I have 
also been influenced by critical disability scholars. Specifically, Allison Carey, Chris 
Chapman, and Liat Ben-Moshe, recall that Michel Foucault’s concept of the “carceral 
archipelago,” linked together diverse institutions in “what Foucault called a 
‘protective continuum,’ ranging from the medical to the penal...Differentiated 
institutions were created to classify, to control and treat danger, and to safeguard the 
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rest of the population from the dangerous individual.”187 Foucault was insistent that 
jails, prisons, and more “benevolent” institutions like state hospitals or state homes 
operate under shared rationalizations and practices. Carey, Chapman, and Ben-Moshe 
argue that the concept of the protective continuum logically connects the prison to 
sites usually thought of in more humanitarian terms, including sites of care and 
treatment for people labeled mad and disabled. Carey, Chapman, and Ben-Moshe 
point out that this argument is not the same as arguing that the experience of being in 
a hospital is the same as being in a prison. I have, however, suggested that similarities 
between prisons and institutions were greater than the fantasy of state care would like 
to admit.  
Instead, Carey, Chapman, and Ben-Moshe argue that the logic of 
criminalization and the logic of pathologization – the turning of bodily difference into 
a disease, threat, and something that either needs to be cured or excised – are 
congruent and contiguous. Both pathologization and criminalization discourses claim 
to detect a fundamental difference between normal people and abnormal people, and 
inaugurate practices of partitioning people into binary and essentialized categories of 
reformable/unreformable, citizen/inmate, normal/defective. The operational 
discourses of diverse sites of state containment all work to turn their “inmates” into 
others from whom the body politic needs to be protected. The “inmate” that is 
constituted in each discourse takes on bodily difference that distinguishes them from 
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normal human life, whether that bodily difference is labeled “criminal” or 
“defective.” It is through this bodily difference, that the other in each discourse is 
relegated to social death and legitimately denied the rights of citizenship and the 
recognition of full humanity.  
Both imprisonment and institutionalization thus collaborate in constructing an 
unjust economy of unequal human value. In chapter 1, I described how the defective 
class was articulated at the locus of multiple overlapping theories of value, including 
gender, race, class, queerness, mental difference, and physical ability. The 
devaluation of the other in both eugenics discourse and the discourse of criminality 
together participate in articulating what a valuable, and thus normal, body looks 
like/does, as well as devalues bodies that deviate from this norm of embodiment. Jodi 
Melamed conceptualizes this kind of economy of human value as “proto-
racializing.”188  Rather than require proof that practices of eugenics 
institutionalization or criminalization historically targeted already racialized 
populations (I argued this was not necessarily the case), “proto-racializing” describes 
the active and adaptive creation of binary distinctions between some lives that are 
understood as valuable or worthy, and other lives that have no value and are 
unworthy. Both criminalization and eugenics institutionalization are examples of what 
Melamed describes as a “process that constitutes differential relations of human value 
and valuelessness.”189 In this sense the political economy -- or perhaps biopolitical 
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economy -- of carcerality interlocks with other racialized, gendered, and able-
normative patterns of valuation and devaluation such as the settler colonial logic of 
elimination, the anti-black logic of surplus accumulation, and the orientalist logic of 
exclusion and endless war. 
Under the biopolitical economy of carcerality, the construction of binary 
divisions and practices of valuation and devaluation construct some bodies as 
deserving of, or requiring, separation from normal -- law-abiding and non-defective -- 
people in order to protect the health, order, and futurity of society. Abnormal others 
are targeted for assimilation and rehabilitation programs, expulsion programs, or 
outright death. Unassimilable and undeportable others must of a necessity be 
quarantined and contained in some other way. This is the logic of containment, that, 
when integrated into the state, inaugurates carceral governance which operates 
through the logics of: dessert, that someone has done something to deserve their 
treatment; disposability, the treatment of some as if their lives are worth less than 
another; and social protection, that some acts that violate the individual are acceptable 
if done in the name of protecting the social as a whole. Once a liberal state adopts the 
logics of carceral governance, it will develop and adapt creative strategies to 
internally segregate – permanently if necessary -- the threatening other.  
Gendered Containment 
I have argued that eugenics was a gendered discourse and calls for permanent 
segregation on the state’s farm colonies were similarly gendered. Demands for the 
custodial care of defective women and girls responded to the need to protect the body 
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politic from the menace of defectiveness. Joining other feminist critical prison studies 
texts, my analysis of eugenics institutionalization provides another illustration of how 
carcerality is operationalized through discourses about the threat of the female body. 
The history of eugenics institutionalization draws attention to the ways that carceral 
regimes have been expanded or become naturalized through affective and libidinal 
economies that cathect danger onto assigned female bodies, even if these bodies 
constitute a numerical minority of contained population. State containment was, at 
least in the early twentieth century in California, expanded through the articulation 
that deviant women and girls posed a specific threat to the health of the body politic. 
Attending to eugenics institutionalization reveals the central role of misogyny and 
heteropatriarchy in elaborating the physical, legal, and logical regime of carceral 
containment in California. 
Eugenics segregation was a response to the “girl problem” is, for example, 
depicted by the Board of Charities and Corrections in a discussion of private and 
county rescue homes for unmarried pregnant girls, young prostitutes, and girls with 
venereal disease:   
The serious problem of the rescue home, as touched by this board, is as much 
a child problem as a girl problem. The girl is usually the victim of a bad home 
environment. She has already demonstrated her inability to protect herself. 
The type of unfortunate girl who seeks refuge in the rescue home is frequently 
of low mentality and unable to care properly for her child. She needs most 
careful guidance after her return to the community and only too often should 
have permanent custodial care.190 
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This passage demonstrates was not defective children in general that called for the 
construction of facilities that could provide permanent custodial care, but specifically 
children assigned to the category of girls. Defective girls and women “of child-
bearing age,” even if they were officially non-delinquent, were portrayed as a 
“menace” to society and to the very future itself, worthy of permanent segregation, 
because they had (a) sex. Defective girls required permanent placement in one of the 
state’s farm colonies in order to protect normal and healthy society from the spread of 
the menace of defectiveness. 
The Superintendent of the State School for Girls argued that defective girls 
held at institutions with time limitations -- the girls reform school was limited to 
detaining girls and women until they reached the age of 21 (or in some cases the age 
of 23) -- should be transferred to facilities with indefinite detention:  
One out of every three girls admitted to the school is definitely feebleminded. 
These girls should never be permitted to return to society, nor should they be 
associated with dependent defectives. In our opinion, provision should be 
made at this institution for the care of all defective delinquent girls…We 
believe there should be established in the southern part of the state a colony 
for the permanent custodial care of such defectives as would be a menace to 
society and whom no amount of training or education would ever fit to take a 
normal place in the community.191 
 
Wendy Kline argues, and evidence in the archive bears, that defective inmates 
regularly circulated between these colonies; those convicted of crimes and later 
deemed insane were transferred to state hospitals, and those when who failed to be 
adjudicated as insane were transferred to the state homes which had broader 
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commitment criteria. The story of Elise from the introduction is one such example. 
Elise was an assigned female person labeled defective who was circulated from farm 
colony to farm colony until placed at one where there was the possibility of lifetime 
wardship.  
 Unfortunately, the legal containment of people assigned to the category of 
women and girls has not been a central concern for prison studies because 
comparatively, women have constituted a numerical minority compared to men’s jails 
and prisons. When women and girl criminals appear within the fields of criminology 
and penology, they have been fetishized. Feminist scholarship has attempted to 
rectify this lack of attention to the unique circumstances of imprisonment of people 
assigned to the category of female, without resorting to fetishization and the 
reification of binary gender norms.192 However, this work still tends to maintain a 
distinction between jails and prisons on the one hand, and on the other hand, sites of 
state care and state treatment. Even worse is when histories of women’s 
imprisonment in the U.S. treat the extension of state care and treatment to women as a 
sign of feminist progress; a move that recent scholars name as an example of carceral 
feminism.  
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For example, Estelle Freedman tells the story about how late nineteenth 
century clubwomen and social workers intervened in the nineteenth century “fallen 
woman” discourse that insisted that a woman who had committed a crime was 
irredeemable and should be permanently cast out. The reformers, according to 
Freedman, “claimed that, if given a chance to bring their feminine influence to bear, 
the fallen could be redeemed and made into true women.”193 Freedman argues that 
this belief in female reformation was based on:  
A deeply ingrained environmentalism that continued to hold out hope for the 
regeneration of the criminal, the insane, and the poor. The rise of a medical 
profession with a vested interest in 'curing' not only disease but also deviancy 
tempered biological determinism, as did the emergence of a social service 
profession committed to eliminating poverty and vice.194  
 
For Freedman the project to build women’s and girl’s reformatories was ultimately an 
empowering counter to pure punishment, because it rejected determinism and offered 
women the opportunity to reintegrate into society through women-run rehabilitation 
programs.  
Nicole Hahn Rafter takes a more nuanced approach, concluding that despite 
overcoming the fallen woman discourse, the early twentieth century women’s 
reformatory movement offered only “partial justice” because women ultimately did 
not receive the same amount and kind of state resources for rehabilitative 
programming that men did.195 Rafter is attentive to the social control functions of 
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women’s prisons, and the gendered discipline that reformatories enacted, yet her 
insights are ultimately undercut by the overall frame that women received less state 
care than men.196 The concept of “partial justice” subtly re-asserts a fantasy of state 
rehabilitation by clinging to a desire for an increase in state care for women and girls.  
Shifting the historical accounting of the state confinement of women and girls 
is one way to reject the fantasy of state care. Understanding eugenics 
institutionalization as one technology of carcerality significantly increases the number 
of women and girls that can be understood as under state confinement in the early 
twentieth century. I was unable to find an official year by year account of 
incarcerated women in California, but the numbers I did find show some overall 
trends. At year-end in 1904, 28 people assigned to the category female were 
incarcerated in the women’s ward at San Quentin State Prison (and no females were 
incarcerated at the state’s other prison at Folsom). This figure represents slightly over 
1% percent of the state’s total prison population of 2,384 recorded at year-end in 
1904. Similarly, in the mid-year count, 96 assigned females were recorded in the 
state-wide county jail population, out of a total 1,253 jail inmates. However, as I have 
already mentioned, assigned females made up 2,192 (or 38%) of inmates in the state 
hospitals, and 238 (or 44%) of inmates in the state home for the feeble-minded in the 
year 1904.  
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A chart showing the populations in state reformatories, hospitals, Sonoma 
Home, and state prisons between the years 1915-1918 tells a similar story. Once 
again, while assigned females made up less than 1% of the state prison population in 
1918, assigned females made up anywhere from 38-46% of inmates in state hospitals 
and state homes. Further, the assigned female population in state hospitals and state 
homes was roughly equivalent to the total population of people in state prisons. 
Figure 6: Table No. 1—State Institutions. Comparative Population, 1915-1918. 
Compares the assigned male and assigned female populations across state institutions 
for years listed.197 
 
 
These numbers hold true through the 1930’s. In 1937 there were 172 women 
incarcerated at the state’s new prison for women in Tehachapi, representing a tiny 
fraction of the state’s total 8,108 prisoners. However, in 1928 (the nearest year I 
could find to compare), assigned females made up 5,741 (43%) of state hospital 
inmates, and 1,082 (48%) of inmates at Sonoma State Home.  
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As I have already stated, thousands more people were locked up in the state’s 
eugenics institutions than in state prisons during at least the first three decades of the 
1900’s. Because assigned females made up 40% to 50% of inmates in state hospitals 
and state homes, the population of assigned females in state confinement was almost 
equal to the total prison population of the state for all compared years. Consequently, 
expanding analysis of the forms of state confinement to include more than just what 
the state names as prison, also shifts understanding of carcerality as a technology of 
state violence that primarily affects male assigned people. 
The gendered terrain of containment in the early twentieth century also 
disrupts the conceptualization of women’s lives under liberal power in terms of the 
public/private binary. By the gendered public/private binary, I mean the ideal of the 
gendered division of labor that historically confined women and girls to labor in the 
domestic or private sphere, where they worked to socially reproduce the home and 
family as haven for male breadwinners to recover from their productive labor and 
political engagements in the public sphere. The early twentieth century is sometimes 
construed as a time when women and girls were primarily disciplined in the private 
sphere by family members and religious leaders, while men were targeted for 
discipline in the public sphere through criminal sentencing to jail and prison.198  
However, intersectional feminist prison studies scholars have argued that this 
assumption of women’s private punishment was never true for black women or 
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indigenous women in the U.S., because these women were historically constituted as 
property or as disposable (respectively), and denied the right to privacy of home and 
family, including private punishment.199 Angela Davis argues that the disciplining of 
women instead exists on a punishment continuum, where modes of “gendered 
punishment” were and are delivered in both private realms, through domestic 
violence, and in public realms, through convict leasing of black women in the U.S. 
south during Reconstruction.200 In Davis’ framework, these modes of gendered 
punishment reinforce each other, so that women were historically (and are presently) 
disciplined at a greater magnitude and across a wider diversity of sites than men for 
deviance. Davis also argues that racialized and poor women are disproportionately 
punished publicly for deviance from racialized gendered norms.  
Additionally, gender non-conforming and sexually deviant women, even those 
who were not black or indigenous, began to be subjected to public punishment at least 
as early as the late nineteenth century, through what Rafter calls the “social control” 
function of prisons in the form of women’s reformatories.201 Rafter shows that 
women and girls began to be imprisoned in women’s reformatories for a variety of 
gendered offenses that were not considered crimes when committed by people 
assigned to the categories of boys and men, especially sexual delinquencies such as 
sex outside of heterosexual and able-bodied marriage.  
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By arguing that eugenics institutionalization constituted one form of 
carcerality, I expand understanding of the kinds of women and girls disciplined in the 
public sphere in the early twentieth century. I insist that eugenics institutions formed 
part of what Davis calls the gendered punishment continuum. That is, these farm 
colonies grew into significant sites in early twentieth century California for the public 
regulation and containment of those assigned as girls and women, even if they did not 
operate under the official rubric of state punishment. I argue that this disciplining 
operated through discourses of defectiveness rather than criminality, and in sites of 
care and treatment rather than prisons and reformatories alone. This means that the 
state confinement of people assigned to the category of women was elaborated not 
solely through a theory of criminality, but through the theory of eugenics. Eugenics 
institutionalization, rather than solely criminalization, became a central technology 
for elaborating liberal state jurisdiction over assigned female bodies. Understanding 
the continuum of gendered punishment this way invites future scholarship on the 
genealogy and history of women’s public punishment that takes into account a 
broader view of where and how this gendered punishment has taken place, including 
state hospitals and state homes for the feeble-minded.  
Troubling Treatment as Reform: The Stakes 
In this chapter I have argued that eugenics institutions helped to elaborate the 
legal, physical, and temporal infrastructure of the carceral state, as well as the logic of 
containment. The stakes of historicizing eugenics institutions as one mode of 
carcerality are in buttressing our vigilance against the development of new/old 
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methods for containment in the present.  
Eugenics institutionalization laid some of the logical groundwork for the rise 
of California’s prison industrial complex in the mid-twentieth century. Through the 
discourse of eugenics an internal “other” to the body politic was created, splitting the 
colonial gaze from the racialized Indian that needed to be conquered, and the 
racialized immigrant alien that needed to be expelled. Eugenics induced a practice of 
identifying internal threats to the health of the body politic and intervening to contain 
these threats in order to purify the body politic. Eugenics institutionalization in the 
early twentieth century created a new proto-racializing discursive economy, affective 
economy, and political economy that devalued some, and created value for others. 
This discourse of difference/normality and the structure of feeling that made “others” 
into a threat were then available as resources in the 1960’s to aid California and 
political elites sought to, according to Ruth Wilson Gilmore, deal with problems of 
surplus labor, surplus land, and surplus capital generated by transformations in the 
global political economy through the expansion of the state prison system 202   
The state prison system inherited more than just the logic of containment. In 
addition, the prison industrial complex and system of mass incarceration inherited the 
work of diminishing the opportunity for people to have children and to participate in 
social reproduction. Prison activists like Johanna Hoffman, a former intern attorney 
with the human rights legal clinic Justice Now, understand the current prison system 
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is eugenicist, arguing: 
The [California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] CDCR violates 
this human right to family in many ways, and the prison health care system is 
a significant one. When the CDCR fails to care adequately for people in its 
custody, it limits, harms, or destroys their reproductive health and capacity 
both during and after the period of incarceration…When the prison health care 
system harms or actively destroys the reproductive capacity of those for 
whom it is responsible, it directly violates the right to family (229).  
 
Because of the disproportionate sentencing of women of color and poor women to 
state prisons, Hoffman argues that the prison system systematically works to 
specifically deny people of color and poor people the rights to have and parent 
children, including by exposing prisoners to medical neglect that can lead to 
reproductive problems, and subjecting imprisoned people to torturous conditions 
during childbirth. Clearly, the role that the current prison system plays in controlling 
surplus populations is logically connected to eugenics practices of institutionalization, 
insofar as defectives can also be treated as a kind of surplus population to the social 
and political order being established during the early twentieth century. Historicizing 
mass institutionalization as a carceral formation reveals that mass incarceration in 
state prisons is not a novel population control program, but rather an adaption and 
reinvigoration of the eugenicist function.  
Historicizing the conflation of treatment and punishment in eugenics 
institutions challenges the current binary opposition between state punishment, on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, state provided rehabilitation, treatment, and care. 
The fantasy of building infrastructures of state care that are not entangled in the logics 
of carcerality structures the present discourse of reform, upholding a binary 
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opposition between desirable care and treatment on the one hand, and violent 
punishment on the other hand.  
This turn toward treatment is evident in a variety of places, including public 
policy scholarship, such as that of David Dagan and Steven Teles, who describe the 
turn to federally funded and private treatment programs as a success of the current 
bipartisan commitment to criminal justice reform.203 Dagan and Teles describe how 
state-level reforms to reduce incarceration through so-called justice reinvestment 
programs promise cost-savings accrued not through the clean release of prisoners, but 
rather through “steering money from incarceration into alternative interventions such 
as drug treatment and intensive probation.” 
A second example of the turn toward treatment comes from county jail 
operators. For example, the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office in California has come 
under fire for the deaths of two jail inmates in the summer of 2018. Advocates have 
alleged that both deaths were entirely preventable, and that they were caused by a 
lack of adequate mental health treatment in the county’s jails. The Sheriff’s Office is 
using the opportunity to garner renewed support for an on-going effort to construct of 
a new facility that it says would leverage state funds and be specially designed to 
serve prisoners requiring mental health treatment. This example highlights the trend 
of county jail operators to appease critics of jails by promising to deliver ever more 
modern forms of lock-down. 
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Both public policy scholarship and county governments express a desire for 
an easy solution to the now widely recognized problems with mass incarceration in 
the United States. The proposed solution is to divert individuals who would end up in 
jails and prisons under current conditions to new government run or public-private 
partnership programs that can treat the underlying cause of crime, construed either 
mental illness or drug addiction. One immediate problem with this solution is when 
treatment programs look and feel very similar to jails and prisons, and in some cases 
are jails and prisons in new guises. In this case, state run treatment very obviously 
maintains and expands the carceral infrastructure as a way of dealing with social 
problems.  
However, even more consequentially, I argue, is that these proposals for state 
run treatment maintain in place the eugenicist logics of carcerality. That is, treatment 
programs continue to assume that the social order is threatened by a broken and 
defective class of people. These undesirables need to be contained by the state in 
some way – either through lock down, or through other forms of control such as 
coercive medication -- in order to protect the body politic. The maintenance of the 
carceral system, the upholding of a white supremacist vision of the nation, and the 
perpetuation of racist versions of the human, through practices of pathologization, are 
all at stake in critically interrogating treatment as a proposed alternative to 
incarceration. 
My study of eugenics institutions shows that slippage from state punishment 
to state treatment is not a new phenomenon, but rather part of the continuum of 
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strategies the liberal state has used to contain those bodies that threaten the social 
order, the nation, and the race. There has never been a distinction between 
punishment and treatment as modes of state-distributed justice. My genealogy of 
eugenics institutionalization as one mode of carcerality troubles reformist 
assumptions that prisons are “bad” and that places like psychiatric hospitals are 
“better.” I insist that state confinement in places oriented toward treatment and care 
operates under the same carceral logics and economies of human value that structure 
jails and prisons. Consequently, the fantasy of state rehabilitation or treatment as an 
alternative to custodial punishment obscures the logic of carcerality that is still at 
work in state care and state treatment interventions, and the carceral economies of 
unequal human value structuring both pathologization and criminalization. The 
biopolitical economy of human value which underpins carcerality, and which I have 
argued can be traced back to eugenics science, demands the containment of those who 
threaten the social order. This does not stop with creating new forms of lock-down 
even if they include forms of treatment. Even more troubling, I foresee a future of 
ever more ingenious ways of incapacitating the undesirable. Court ordered 
medications, for example, are just one route by which deviancy and unruliness might 
also be contained. 
The fantasy of state care and treatment includes an assumption that twenty-
first century rehabilitation, treatment, and care programs can be improved from early 
twentieth century programs by doing away with the more egregious infrastructures of 
segregation, practices of physical abuse, and absence of consent. State treatment is 
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presented as our ever more humane future, but as I have shown, state treatment is our 
past and our present. The fantasy of state care obscures the disciplinary violence of 
rehabilitation – the psychic, affective, epistemic, and physical violence I have 
described. Even with ever more modern forms of treatment and care, what remains 
are both the less perceptible violence of disciplinary power, which requires the 
breaking and forced reforming of psychic and affective structures to conform to the 
normative demands of capitalism and liberal citizenship, and the epistemic violence 
of categorization as a defective person. 
Putting into proximity punishment-based confinement and treatment or care-
based confinement makes the violence of containment due to disability apprehendable 
to readers more used to dissecting racialized criminalization. While a broad bipartisan 
consensus has been emerging in the past few years that questions mass incarceration 
in the United States, based in large part on the moral outrage against racially 
disproportionate incarceration rates, conversation about what to do with massively 
over-incarcerated and over-institutionalized disabled population, especially of the 
neurodivergent and those in mental crisis, has been less critical. Perhaps this is 
because, as Regina Kunzel suggests “Disability often serves as the border separating 
reasonable from unjust forms of discrimination.”204 Kunzel quotes Douglas Baynton 
who argues, “disability has functioned for all such groups as a sign of and 
justification for inferiority...tacitly accepts the idea that disability is a legitimate 
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reason for inequality.” In other words, historically, and into the present, mental 
disability has operated as a signifier of legitimate differential treatment by the state. 
For example, in the case of suspected capacity for violence, mental illness has worked 
to legitimately deny the same level of due process or determinate sentencing afforded 
those assumed rational people accused of crime. 
However, disability is also used to obscure racial disparity. In recent discourse 
in the U.S., white men who perpetrate gun violence or mass shootings have been 
more likely to be labeled mentally ill, while people of color are more likely to be 
criminalized and labeled a terrorist. In this example, “mental illness” operates as a 
mechanism for avoiding holding white male users of violence accountable by labeling 
them irrational. However, the historical uses of mental defectiveness to lock people 
up permanently and to expose them to invasive and at times dangerous medical 
treatments, indicates that there is nothing inherently easier about being adjudicated as 
mentally ill and being institutionalized in a state institution other than a jail or prison. 
Despite concerns about white men “getting” to be mentally ill while others are denied 
that recognition of their humanity, my research shows that it is far more likely that 
poor people, gender non-conforming people, and other non-normatively minded or 
bodied people will be locked up in some kind of facility (whether criminal or 
“caring”), locked up for longer periods, and, end up in the worst, most crowded and 
under-resourced institutional conditions. We should not let concern about white men 
being labeled mentally ill, in order to avoid accountability, obscure the fact that 
people of color, queers, and crips are most likely to be targeted for invasive and 
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disciplinary treatment programs. The point here is to draw attention to the ways that 
disability, including mental illness, can work almost in the opposite way that 
“criminal” works but with the same effect of obscuring existing patterns of 
racialization, while at the same time disability is also a kind of proto-racialization that 
devalues the person it is attached to. A shallow critique of labeling white male mass 
shooters as mentally ill rather than as “actual” criminals or terrorists, is a problematic 
move because it obscures the historical and current structural devaluation of 
disabled/crip and mad/neurodivergent lives, by implying that to be labeled “disabled” 
is somehow preferable to criminalization. As I am arguing here, both labels have 
historically (and in some cases currently) justified state confinement and state 
containment.  
I have challenged the racialized separation between regulatory power asserted 
on bodies of color and disciplinary power asserted on white bodies. In order to 
illuminate carceral social death, treatment is often posed as a privilege granted only to 
white bodies, while racialized bodies are denied the reformatory investment of state 
energy and only punished by the state. I insist that illustrating the depths of 
degradation under punishment should not be made at the expense of neglecting the 
ways that disciplinary power is also a kind of violence, especially because, as I have 
argued, disciplinary power also acts on racialized abjected bodies. Further, even as 
the tides turned away from state care and treatment and toward more explicitly 
punitive forms of carcerality in the late twentieth century, these technologies did not 
disappear, rather they were available for corollary usage inside of jails and prisons. 
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Even though these technologies of containment were developed on ethnically 
minoritized white women in the early twentieth century, they were available later in 
the twentieth century for use on racialized women in the state’s prison system. 
Incarcerated people have, since the era of eugenics, been subjected to both punitive 
practices of neglect and pathological investment as objects of treatment. 
My interpretation here is not meant to argue that state rehabilitation was, or is, 
more or equally violent than state punishment. Rather, I am insisting that we not 
obscure the material forms of gendered and racialized violence – physical, 
disciplinary, epistemic -- of state rehabilitation in order to make a case against state 
punishment. Instead, I demand that we ask: if state-run treatment is not necessarily a 
distinct alternative to incarceration, but is an extension of carcerality, then how might 
an abolitionist oriented politic intervene in the current moment of bi-partisan criminal 
justice reform? How might we wrestle back the imaginary away from reformist 
versions of justice reinvestment and towards abolitionist versions of wealth 
redistribution? Finally, how might we reconceive of mental health and disability care 
in excess of and potentially outside the logics of carcerality? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  146 
Chapter 3 
The Biopolitical Economy of Eugenics 
  
What drew these reformers together -- from labor activists to clubwomen -- was the 
desire for state intervention and regulation of social problems.205  
 
 This line from Wendy Kline’s history of eugenics in the United States has 
stayed with me. In an otherwise innocuous recounting of the Progressive Era reforms 
that established new social programs and establishing a seemingly banal point about 
state regulation, Kline gestures toward what is possibly the most radical element of 
eugenicist liberalism. Namely, the desire of Progressive reformers was fixated 
specifically on developing state capacity to intervene on threats to the health and 
futurity of the social order. Responding to the demands of eugenics, Progressives 
dreamed and materialized a specifically political power that would also work to 
enforce the racialized, heteronormatively gendered, and ableist social order.  
 The reformers’ desire for the state challenged the status quo of late nineteenth 
century political economy, establishing the capitalist exploitation of labor as an 
insufficient technology for social control. Up until the end of the nineteenth century 
in the United States, what we today construe as a liberal state apparatus was non-
existent. Stephen Skowronek argues that up until post-Civil War Reconstruction, the 
U.S. government was largely unrecognizable as a state in the European sense, but was 
rather a loose configuration of “courts and parties” that organized political life under 
a laissez-faire legal doctrine.206 Under laissez-faire, the U.S. state was limited to a 
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court system that settled contractual disputes, enforcing the so-called “rules of the 
game” that upheld the free market in the U.S., and ensuring private property rights for 
the white men who could possess them.  
 During the Progressive Era in the U.S., a new administrative and social welfare 
state was developed, intended to intervene in the effects of the brutal extraction 
processes of industrial capitalism by regulating corporations and providing a social 
safety net for citizens.207  However, the regulatory and social welfare state was not 
revolutionary. Instead, the social welfare state offered a “third way” to monopoly 
capitalism on the one hand, and the radical critique of capitalism offered by labor 
unionists, socialists, and anarchists on the other.208 In California, Progressive Era 
reformers took over a state government under the grip the Southern Pacific Railroad 
political machines, intending only to buffer citizens from the externalities of 
capitalism, rather than trying to dismantle capitalism itself.209  
 American political development scholars have raised questions about the 
racialized and gendered effects of the programs implemented by Progressives 
reformers. Welfare programs and strategies of direct democracy were enacted in the 
name of care and public empowerment, but were used throughout the twentieth 
century to increase the surveillance of the intimate lives of marginalized women, and 
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to exclude racialized groups from full citizenship.210 This scholarship challenges the 
story of the Progressive Era as one in which new social welfare programs uplifted 
poor, working class, gendered and racialized citizens by offering new opportunities 
for survival in the face of brutal extraction processes of monopoly capitalism. I 
contribute to this line of thinking by insisting that reform-based eugenics imagined 
and materialized a state that was empowered to permanently segregate deviant bodies 
away from the body politic.  
However, I push this analysis of the nefarious functions of social welfare and 
direct democracy in a slightly different direction – from an emphasis on exclusion 
from the body politic and towards an investigation of the role of eugenics discourse in 
building a governing apparatus over the body politic. Specifically, I critically 
examine the influence of eugenics in elaborating a different kind of political economy 
from the reigning laissez-faire governance. This post-laissez-faire political economy 
legitimated certain forms of state control over capital in the name of protecting the 
body politic. Yet rather than refer to this political economy under the misleading title 
of “social welfare,” I name it as a biopolitical economy that was legitimated by 
turning the war-making powers of the liberal state onto internal populations. 
 In this chapter, I track the subtle discursive shifts that moved from laissez-
faire governance to biopolitical state in California by following a debate over the cost 
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of eugenics programs. Monopoly capitalists resisted state spending on eugenics 
programs and the efforts to collect corporate taxes to pay for such programs. 
Progressive reformers initially responded by attempting to practice “good economy” 
and to establish programs that would result in zero cost to the state. Rather than 
launch a successful challenge to capitalist power, however, Progressivism was in 
stark contrast to early twentieth century critiques of social problems that put the 
blame squarely on industrial capitalism itself. Instead, reformers mobilized a 
eugenicist discourse that diverted attention from capitalism and placed the source of 
the problem on the defective body. The financial demands of protecting the body 
politic from the defective class pulled Progressives into the business of collecting 
some of the profits of major corporations.  
To justify this control over capital, Progressive reformers experimented with 
arguments that exceeded calls for good economy, pushing into the realm of “spiritual 
economy,” a place “beyond calculation.” This strategy inaugurated a different kind of 
relationship between the state and capital, one that established a state power that 
exceeded the requirement to ensure the “rules of the game” for settler capital. In the 
post-laissez-faire biopolitical economy, the state could legitimately exert some forms 
of control over capital, and consequently establish itself as a competing source of 
social control over bodies of labor. 
Parallel to the project of exerting power over capital, progressive reformers 
worked to channel and temper the radical imaginaries of working-class, vagrant, 
gender non-conforming, “queer,” and otherwise defective subjects. The Progressive 
  150 
state required a new conceptualization of freedom, one that challenged the 
specifically American desires for freedom practiced by capitalists -- practices of 
freedom that centered on unrestricted profit -- and enclosed on the practices of 
freedom being developed by the underclass – practices of freedom centered on 
unrestricted movement and relationships.211 Reformers crafted a eugenicist 
conceptualization of freedom that hinged instead on the practice of self-government 
and deference to authority. Through this dual practice of challenging the capitalist 
political machines and cultivating self-government in the underclass, the Progressives 
brought a modern liberal state into being that was at least partially autonomous from 
the demands of capital.  
Good Economy and Defective Containment 
Once they had adopted eugenics theory, California’s political leaders and 
reformers confronted the issue of how to pay for eugenics programs. The first 
response, one that grew out of prior laissez-faire modes of governance, was to find 
ways to build income-producing and cost-limited programs that would ultimately 
register a zero balance to the state. 
Early twentieth century archival sources register ambivalence about state 
implementation of eugenics programs, but the ambivalence is not moral or ethical. 
Instead, the ambivalence centered on the reality that state sponsored eugenics 
programs required money to implement.212  Dr. Asa Clark, the Superintendent of 
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Stockton State Hospital, described the cost of eugenics containment as a burden, but 
one that must be patiently borne: 
Consequent upon a discontinuance of the atrocious cruelties which, to a 
certain extent, eliminated the insane, has appeared perhaps the most appalling 
phenomenon in the history of our race: thousands upon thousands of 
dangerous lunatics are with us, and millions upon millions of money are 
required for the protection of society and for the support of these more than 
useless unfortunates. Bad and deplorable as these conditions seem, civilization 
must and will tolerate but one way of meeting them. The burden is one of the 
penalties of civilization, and civilization will see that it is patiently and 
manfully borne, until humanity, science, and the education of the people 
afford relief.213 
 
Dr. Clark blamed the increase of “dangerous lunatics” in society on a humanitarian 
turn away from the pre-modern practice of either outright killing defective people or 
neglecting them to the point of premature death. The good people who believed in the 
humanitarian treatment of defectives would be rewarded with eventual relief, 
presumably through the slow genocide that would occur through segregation and 
sterilization programs. In the short term, however, the body politic would have to bear 
this new burden of care and treatment. 
A report to the California state legislature by the State Commission in Lunacy 
also examined the contradictory demands that eugenics theory introduced on the body 
politic: 
A charity that continuously creates a demand for its support of, three quarters 
of a million dollars a year, and which promises not only to keep up this 
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expense but to increase it year by year, is certainly one that cannot be looked 
at from any narrow point of view…From a charitable standpoint we might 
wish to maintain it more liberally, to hold people to save them from 
themselves, and to open its doors to more extended classes of defectives…but 
of paramount importance to a community is the ever recurring, ever increasing 
expense of maintenance…We must accept the conclusion that this great 
expense will continue and increase, and we must be prepared to make 
provision for the insane as they are sent to the hospitals, bearing in mind that 
we are maintaining them now as economically as it can safely be done under 
the present conditions.214 
 
Less focused on eugenics as a burden (as in Dr. Clark’s discussion) the commission 
nevertheless perceived eugenics as simultaneously a “charity” that marked the good 
people as humanitarians, and as a “demand” that required ever increasing sums of 
money to be spent. As the commission observed, the cost of eugenics programs 
steadily increased each year, as the per capita cost of maintenance increased, and as 
the population of defectives that required institutionalization increased.  
At the time of the 1900 report, the commission noted, “The cost of 
maintaining one patient one year is $139.94.”215 However, by 1924, the State Board 
of Institutions calculated that the per capita cost for maintenance had doubled, 
writing, “The average per capita cost for maintenance of all the institutions in this 
department…for the seventy-fifth fiscal year (ending June 30, 1924) was $277.10.”216 
In addition to increased per capita cost, population increases led to persistent 
overcrowding in state institutions. In 1900, the Commission on Lunacy had pleaded 
with the state to expand accommodations at Napa State Hospital, which was at almost 
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200% capacity, with inmates sleeping on the floor of hallways and in the tailor 
shop.217 Things had not improved by a 1920 report, when the State Board of Charities 
and Corrections reiterated the need for “increased facilities for the care of the feeble-
minded,” writing to the state legislature: 
This need was stressed in the last biennial report of this board. The situation 
has not been materially improved. The Sonoma State Home has a waiting list 
of over 800 and the Pacific Colony is available for only forty boys having 
institutional training. The situation in California is serious. The counties have 
no adequate outlet for institutional care for the defectives.218 
 
The demand for state appropriations required to build new facilities and expand 
existing sites to accommodate institutionalized people was a consistent theme over 
decades and across a variety of state institutions.  
Speculating that overcrowding was a particular California problem, the 
Commission on Lunacy observed at the turn of the century that the state was 
committing more defective inmates per capita than New York or Iowa.219 According 
to figures provided by the commission, at the turn of the century, California was 
committing 3 more people per 10,000 than Illinois, and 1.75 more peopled per 10,000 
than New York. One cause of overcrowding, then, was that California had one of the 
highest per capita rates of commitments to the state hospitals in the country, making 
the demand for cost-cutting measures all the more acute. 
In the face of these challenges, the Commission on Lunacy committed itself to 
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providing custodial care “at the lowest possible rate to the taxpayers.”220 The Director 
of the Board of Institutions similarly declared: “In conducting this department, I have 
endeavored to do so in an economical manner, but careful that it should be 
constructive economy and not destructive.”221 The director’s concept of “constructive 
economy,” or what others called “good economy,” attempted to hold together the 
eugenics necessity of containing the defective class, while doing so at the least 
financial cost to taxpayers. Administrators deployed multiple tactics to reduce the 
cost of detaining the defective class, including: returning non-California residents and 
deporting foreign inmates; collecting money from inmates and their families with 
means for their custodial care; reducing wages for staff and replacing paid 
employment with free inmate employment; and paroling some inmates directly into 
outside employment.  
One cost-cutting tactic was a racialized population redistribution program, 
described by the Board of Institutions in 1924: 
[T]he percentage of increase [in new admissions] in the hospitals has not been 
so great as during the previous biennium…The lowering of the percentage of 
increase for the biennium just ended is…the result of increased vigilance on 
the part of the hospital authorities and the deportation bureau of this 
department in returning to their respective states and countries nonresidents 
and aliens who have no legal residence in California. The importance of this 
work cannot be too greatly stressed.222 
 
The reduction in population was not accomplished through releasing inmates, or 
turning away new admissions, but rather through a re-alignment of the defective 
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population, achieved through the deportation of inmates directly from the state 
hospitals, state reformatories, and, to a lesser extent, state homes for the feeble-
minded, back to their U.S. state or country of origin. Efforts to deport racialized, 
foreign-born defectives -- initially Chinese and Chinese-American inmates -- directly 
from state institutions began as early as 1891. The practice was codified in the 1897 
Insanity Act, and the state Commission in Lunacy called for the deportation of all 
foreign-born and non-resident inmates in 1900: 
We would suggest…that inasmuch as the work of deporting patients to their 
respective countries has been inaugurated, it be continued, and that the insane 
natives of other countries be returned to their respective governments, as there 
is no reason why the taxpayers of California should support the paupers of 
other countries as well as those from other States of the Union.223 
 
The commission claimed that this practice of deportation directly from institutions 
would save Californian taxpayers thousands of dollars per year, noting in 1900 that: 
“Five Japanese were deported to their own country, at a saving to the State of $1,000 
per year.”224 By 1924, when the Deportation Agent reported that 414 inmates had 
been deported directly from state institutions, he estimated that this practice was 
saving the state almost a half a million dollars a year.225 
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Figure 7: Table No. 5 Showing the Financial Benefits Derived by the State Through 
the Efforts of the Department of Institutions. Chart prepared by the state’s 
Deportation Agent. The chart shows the number of “aliens” deported to foreign 
countries and “non-residents” returned to other states between 1905 and 1924. 
Multiplying by the cost of per capita maintenance, the chart purports to show how 
much money was saved through deportation. 
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The efficacy of deportation as a cost-cutting tactic was buttressed by a 
racialized argument that so-called native Californian’s (those who were born in the 
state) were less inclined to defectiveness than those born in other countries. A 1917 
survey of mental defectives in institutions and schools, for example, argued, “the ratio 
of feeble-minded among foreign born prisoners is twice as high as that of feeble-
minded among American born prisoners.”226 According to a passage from a 1902 
report from the Commission in Lunacy to the legislature titled “The Number of 
Insane in California,” California had a higher per capita ratio of institutionalized 
defective people because there were a higher percent of people born in other countries 
or born in other U.S. states.227 Additionally, a higher percent of foreign born and non-
residents of California were insane. Dr. Clark argued: 
Considering the matter from a practical standpoint, it must be borne in mind 
that California is situated at the terminus of several transcontinental railroads; 
that upon these roads are constantly coming great numbers of people, many of 
them of roving dispositions with unstable nerve organizations and with barely 
sufficient money to land them in California. Necessarily disappointment 
awaits many, and when the crushing influence of poverty overtakes them, the 
mind gives way and they inevitably become wards of the State.228 
 
The Commission in Lunacy interpreted that these foreigners and non-residents 
travelled to California on the promise of getting rich or finding a mild climate. The 
commission concluded that because of the inherited weakness of these migrants, they 
broke down “under the stress of circumstances” and end up in institutions. The 
inherent instability of so-called non-native Californians combined with the geography 
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of California, conspired to make the necessity of containing the defective a costly 
endeavor for the state. Deportation was proffered as a necessary tactic for reducing 
cost.  
 Additional tactics were deployed to reduce the cost of institutionalization for 
those who could not be deported. One was to charge inmates and/or their non-
defective family members for the care of institutionalized kin. The 1897 Insanity Law 
enabled the state to bill and collect monies for full or partial payment of the cost of 
both a court hearing and institutionalization in a state hospital. Any property or 
“money in bank” owned by an inmate, including Civil War pensions owed to an 
inmate, and husbands who were capable of supporting their inmate wives, was fair 
game. By 1930, the Department of Institutions reported that payments from the estate 
of inmates for their care topped $500,000. 
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Figure 8: Monthly Receipts for General Fund at the State Hospitals for the Insane 
from July 1, 1928 to June 30, 1929. A 1930 report from the Department of 
Institutions shows how much money was collected from the estates of inmates – here 
called “pay patients” -- broken down by institution. 
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For the cost of institutionalizing the remaining non-alien, indigent wards of 
the state, further tactics of good economy were initiated. Efficiency practices 
borrowed from corporate managers involved reductions in institutional staff, reducing 
the wages for staff, and increasing the productivity of the institutions. The Board of 
Institutions, formed in 1921 on a platform of improving the economy of the state’s 
institutions, described these efficiency practices:  
[I]t will be seen that the per capita cost of the total maintenance of each 
institution has been materially reduced, the greatest reduction being in the cost 
of salaries and wages. This has been accomplished not at the expense of the 
wards of the state, for they have been better housed, have been given more 
comforts and amusements, have been as well clothed and fed, and have been 
given as good medical care and attention-perhaps better, for much new 
equipment has been purchased. But the lower per capita is due to the 
elimination of many unnecessary positions, better cooperation between 
institutions, better coordination, and above all to the improvement of and 
larger production from the farms, orchards, dairies, hog and poultry plants.229  
 
Using the language of industrial factory management, the board declared that it had 
been able to reduce the per inmate cost of custodial care by simultaneously laying off 
staff and increasing the production of institutional farms, orchards, dairies, and 
livestock. As all good industrial factory managers must, the board was careful to note 
that these efforts at efficiency had not in any way reduced the quality of the product -- 
in this case the quality of custodial care. In fact, the board argued there were 
examples of increased “product” quality due to the purchase of new equipment.  
This seemingly impossible task of reducing the paid workforce while 
simultaneously increasing production and maintaining quality was implemented 
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through the employment of inmate labor. The state put inmates to work on the 
eugenics farm colonies, raising livestock and caring for dairies; growing vegetables 
and harvesting from orchards; producing clothing and furniture for the institution and 
for sale; laundering clothes, cooking and serving meals, and cleaning; creating 
handicrafts for sale; and, at times, constructing new buildings on institutional sites. 
Touted as “occupational therapy,” inmate labor was offered as a treatment for healing 
and reforming insane, feeble-minded, delinquent, and otherwise defective people. The 
Commission on Lunacy argued that idleness produced insanity, and that occupation 
was therefore a therapeutic response:  
Occupational therapy has attained an important position in the treatment of 
mental diseases...Efforts are made to induce every patient who is physically 
able to work, to engage in some occupation. Idleness induces introspection, 
the brooding over troubles, the nursing of delusions…Occupation fits a 
recoverable patient to return to civil life and helps him cope with the 
difficulties that have to be met with in the struggle for existence.230 
 
Occupational therapy marked a radical shift away from nineteenth century asylum 
treatments that forged recovery through relaxation and contemplation. Instead, 
occupational therapy insisted that treatment and recovery would come through 
investments in vocational training. 
 The Board of Institutions was particularly keen on advocating for inmate labor, 
arguing: 
All of these various activities serve to materially reduce the cost of operation, 
and, besides, employment is generally regarded as one of the most valuable 
therapeutic agencies in the treatment of the insane, and should prove to be the 
most valuable reformatory measure in our dealings with the delinquent class. 
In our opinion no reformation is complete without a full knowledge of how to 
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earn an honest living with the hands.231 
 
The board agreed with the by then defunct Commission in Lunacy that occupation 
was a form of therapy. On the other hand, the board notes in the first line that a side 
benefit of occupational therapy is that it could reduce the cost of institutionalization.  
Describing the purpose of the Department of Household Arts at the California 
School for Girls, administrators also observed additional functions of occupation that 
went beyond treatment:  
First, educational. Training in technique and appreciation of such work as 
tends to promote interest and efficiency in home making. Development of 
speed and accuracy in work which [sic] may serve as a basis for a vocation. 
Second, utilitarian. The making of all garments, household linens, rugs and 
baskets used in the institution. Third, commercial value. Adding to contingent 
fund receipts from work of the various branches of the department.232 
 
Putting the inmates of the girls’ school to work as garment makers, basket makers, 
and rug weavers, was depicted as imparting to the inmates a kind of vocation that 
would aid in their reformation as good citizens. Yet administrators demonstrate that 
they were well aware that capitalizing on inmate labor was also a form of good 
economy – inmates produced both items that could be used in the institution and thus 
would not have to be purchased from outside sources, and they produced excessive 
items that could be sold as “crafts.” The proceeds of these crafts, however, were not 
returned to the inmate as a wage, but were deposited directly into the accounts of the 
institution to pay for custodial care.  
In addition to experiments in occupational therapy on the farm colonies, some 
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administrators experimented with leasing and paroling out defective inmates who 
could be employed off site. A 1918 report to the legislature from the State 
Commission in Lunacy included a cost and benefit analysis of paroling inmates from 
the state hospital system written by Dr. M.J. Rowe of the Mendocino State Hospital. 
According to Dr. Rowe: 
The actual saving to the hospital, combined with earlier return to former 
occupations, makes the economic value of the parole system very apparent 
and suggests the advisability for financial reasons, if for no others, of 
extending the parole system to provide for the large number of patients who 
have no one willing or able to assume such responsibility.233 
 
Rather than a clean release from the institution, Dr. Rowe envisioned a system of 
post-release supervision where someone connected to the farm colonies would be 
responsible for each paroled inmate, including paid agents of the state, and private 
employers who could secure employment. As the other tactics I have described in this 
section, this tactic was made in terms of good economy; Dr. Rowe argued that the 
wages of state parole officers were far more economical than complete custodial care 
of inmates. 
Occupational therapy and the parole for work system rehabilitated inmates 
into the prevailing gender and racial social order. Racialized groups and those 
assigned to the category of girls and women were exclusively offered occupational 
therapy and parole release in order to engage them in a narrow range of tasks useful 
for capital exploitation. A two-tiered labor program was implemented that exploited 
inmates based on gender and race. As the administrators of the California School for 
                                                      
233 “Report of the State Commission in Lunacy, 1916-18,” 24. 
  166 
Girls observed, the defective girl was expected to be in custodial care all her life so 
she was better put to work doing things that would save the institution money and 
make money for the institution (occupational therapy), while a normal girl needed 
skills that would allow her to become a wage earner in society and allow for her 
eventual parole.234 
Despite this two-tiered system, all inmates assigned to the categories of 
women and girls were trained at eugenics institutions in narrowly gendered skills, 
primarily sewing and garment making as well as producing household items like 
linens, rugs, and baskets. Occasionally other limited programs were offered such as 
shampooing and other spa-related skills, stenography, or, for the very lucky, nursing. 
Parole was seemingly only offered to women and girls who were employed in 
domestic labor, as administrators at Sonoma State Home in a 1920 report noted: 
“During the past two years we have been allowing selected cases, mostly girls, to go 
out to work in families, where they make from $15 to $30 per month with 
maintenance...We have more calls for girls than we have reliable girls to send out.”235  
Similarly, racialized groups, particularly Mexican Americans, were engaged 
in agricultural versions of occupational therapy, and loaned out to local employers. A 
report from 1920 by the Commission in Lunacy notes that both boys and girls at 
Sonoma State Home were sent to work at a local tomato cannery. Yet, increasingly 
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over the 1920’s agricultural work was primarily considered the destiny of Mexican 
youth, as the Board of Institution noted in 1928 that “The increase in population of 
the School, especially the Mexican population, can be very profitably placed at 
agricultural work...many of them derive valuable training in the kind of work they 
will follow after release from the School.”236  
However, despite this apparent compatibility with the demands of capital 
through the practices of good economy, administrators lamented that permanent 
custodial care continued to extract resources from the state economy that would 
otherwise be corporate profit. The most obvious way to reduce the cost of containing 
the defective class would have been to reduce the overall population in eugenics 
institutions. However, because eugenics theory insisted it was necessary for the state 
to contain defectives, this made unthinkable any kind of mass release of inmates from 
eugenics institutions. The demands of eugenics ultimately pushed the state beyond the 
limitations of good economy under the terms of laissez-faire governance. 
“Spiritual Economy” Beyond Calculation 
Despite diligent efforts to perform good economy, the demands of eugenics 
theory were in perpetual tension with prevailing laissez-faire governance. The 
discourse of eugenics in early twentieth century California is consequently a site 
within which to track the articulation of a different kind of relationship between 
capital, the state, and citizens. This different mode of governance exceeded the 
                                                      
236 “Report of the Department of Institutions, 1926-28” (Appendix to the Journals of the Senate and 
Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California: Sacramento, California: California State 
Printing, 1929), 53. 
  168 
demands of good economy and moved into a realm that was beyond purely financial 
accounting, a realm that women reformers called “spiritual economy.” 
The conversion from good economy to spiritual economy can be seen in a 
1918 passage from the State Board of Charities and Corrections, that argued: “Failure 
to prevent reproduction of defectives is now entailing upon society an economic loss 
amounting to billions of dollars and misery beyond calculation, first, to the 
unfortunates themselves, second, to their families, and, finally, to society at large.”237 
In the first prong of this argument, the board remained within the terms of good 
economy, by insisting that state monies spent on eugenics containment programs 
would, in the long-term, eventually result in reduced costs to the state. This part of the 
argument rested on the core premise of eugenics, namely that defective people passed 
on weakness to their children, a weakness that predisposed those children to poverty, 
delinquency, criminality, insanity, and immorality. If the state could construct 
programs that limited the unchecked reproduction and social reproduction of the 
defective class by investing sums of money in containment programs now, the state 
would save money in the long run by reducing the population of the defective class 
that would require state intervention in the future. In short, investments to contain the 
threat of the defective class in the present would eventually save the state money in 
inevitable future expenditures.  
However, in the second prong of the argument, reformers argued that the 
threat of defectiveness to the order and futurity of the human race was so egregious 
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that the cost of not intervening was “beyond calculation.” The cost of the unchecked 
reproduction of the defective class was incalculable in financial terms, because 
human “misery” could not be weighed against the purely financial costs of 
containment. The Superintendent of the California School for Girls repeated this 
phrase in her report dated the same year: “These feeble-minded girls, before reaching 
twenty-one years of age, have given birth to five children. The ultimate expense to 
society of allowing these girls to reproduce and to spread disease is beyond 
calculation.”238 The term “beyond calculation” in both passages insists that moral, 
racial, and civilizational threats could not be fully accounted for in conventional cost-
benefit analysis. 
The two-pronged argument was used to advocate the establishment of a costly 
reformatory for adult women. Beginning in the 1910’s, progressive women reformers, 
including the California League of Women Voters, lobbied the California legislature 
to authorize and appropriate funds for a reformatory for adult women convicted of 
low-level criminal offenses.239 The California Industrial Farm for Women was built 
and opened in January 1922, housing women convicted of prostitution, alcohol or 
drug use, vagrancy, and spreading venereal disease. After a fire burned down the 
main building in early 1923, women reformers convened to discuss the possibility of 
supplementing or replacing state funds with private funds. However, after the 
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legislature declined to rebuild the farm, reformers pivoted their attention to building 
the state’s first prison for women. 
In the meantime, the Industrial Farm for Women became a target of the state’s 
public utilities and railroad corporations who, according to women reformers:  
[R]ecommended a curtailment of the expenses of state government that an 
increase in their own taxes might be avoided and, as part of this program, that 
the proposed Industrial Farm for Women be abandoned…Mr. Wiggington E. 
Creed, president of the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, told the Senate that 
he ‘did not believe this is a time for embarking on new fads or social 
experiments.’240 
  
Reformers responded to the corporate resistance to tax collection by using eugenicist 
logic, insisting on the necessity for the state legislature and its publics to spend 
money on social control programs. Women reformers countered the corporate call for 
“economy” by proclaiming, “We will not have so many feeble-minded, perhaps in the 
future to take so much money from the state, if we begin at the beginning.”241 This 
phrase draws on eugenicist tropes by demanding the state intervene on feeble-minded 
female bodies presumed to be the source – or the “beginning” -- of social problems. 
 Reformers also derided those who could not see beyond financial cost, 
standing on the side of  “the Federal military authorities, the American Social 
Association and Captain Matheson” whom they argued “are in a position to speak 
more authoritatively on it than the underworld exploiters, corporate lobbyists and 
other agents intent upon reducing their taxes.”242 By putting commercial sex and vice 
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industries in the same category as public utilities, reformers positioned themselves 
against all those who thought in terms of economic calculation only. Reformers 
instead lifted up social welfare groups and domestic and foreign policing 
organizations that demonstrated the ability to conceptualize eugenics programs in 
terms of necessary protection to the body politic.  
 According to the reformers advocating for the IFW, “The cleanliness and 
purity of the human race is vastly important.”243 Similar to the concept of ‘beyond 
calculation,’ ‘vastly’ articulated a sense that the importance of spending to contain the 
defective class exceeded financial accounting. In this instance, reformers went one 
step further, by arguing that building a reformatory for adult women was good 
‘spiritual economy’ in the face of a ‘too expensive’ ‘physical and moral menace.’244 
The concept of spiritual economy, or a balance of moral order, offered a 
counterweight to financial economy. A state guided by spiritual economy could 
consider both the moral imperative to protect the body politic from degradation, as 
much as the capitalist imperative to preserve profits in the marketplace.  
 Thus, eugenics circulated within an economy of desire, one that sometimes 
competed with the principles of good financial economy. With their insistence that 
eugenics intervention was necessary beyond any type of cost benefit analysis, the 
reformers’ imagined a new kind of political economy into being, one where the state 
was in an ambivalent relationship with capitalism. Eugenics facilitated the transition 
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from laissez-faire governance to a modern biopolitical state by justifying social 
control programs that went beyond the protection of property and contracts. Rather 
than solely managing property – whether persons as property or land as property -- 
for the needs of capital, eugenics materialized a modern state that could intervene to 
protect the health of the body politic, even if there was to be an extraction of capital 
from corporate interests to pay for social control. 
The State and Capital Relation Under Eugenics 
Marxist theories are useful for explaining nineteenth century laissez-faire 
governance in the U.S. Under laissez-faire, the state was complicit with the system of 
capitalist exploitation, because the state apparatus either was a direct instrument of 
the capitalist class, or indirectly wedded to bourgeois interests.245 In California in the 
late nineteenth century, capitalist rule operated through political machines that 
controlled all branches of government directly for profit-making purposes.  
However, I have argued that at the turn of the twentieth century, eugenics 
helped to elaborate a state power that, while still invested in supporting capitalism 
and culpable in exploitation because it diverted critique away from capitalism, was 
also capable of taking action that exerted some amount of control over capital in the 
name of protecting the body politic. This biopolitical power was not based a radical 
critique of capitalism as a way of organizing material life, yet it could challenge, 
compete, and even contradict the short-term, immediate interests of capital 
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accumulation.  
What theories of the state can address the ways that state power exceeds the 
practices of good economy? Pluralist theories depict the liberal state as a set of 
neutral institutions and actors who are charged with mediating the concerns of 
different interest groups representing shifting social groupings in society.246 In a 
pluralist theory of the state, the political ground that an interest group gains or loses, 
or the set of rights granted or denied, is not predetermined by the nature of the state, 
but determined by the effectiveness of the interest group’s mobilization.247 Pluralists 
believe that state can become more democratic over time, if only groups only 
organize to represent their collective interests in the public sphere. The Progressive 
Era could be construed as fitting within this pluralist theory of the state, with 
progressives as an “interest group” that successfully constructed a social welfare 
system that gradually incorporated previously excluded people into citizenship.248 
However, pluralist theory tends to assume both that a state apparatus already exists 
through which citizens can make claims, and that claims made on the state primarily 
affect those making the claims. It is inadequate for explaining how the state as a 
unique technology of power is materialized, as well as for understanding how the 
state enacts violence on some bodies and collectivities in the name of health and 
safety for others. 
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Alternatively, some have returned to Marxism to theorize a more nuanced 
state and capital relation. Roderick Ferguson, for example, argues that the need of 
post-industrial capital for a surplus population, produced through proliferating 
discourses of race and gender, is in constant tension with the demand by the liberal 
state for a universal subject.249 According to Ferguson’s analysis, capital multiplies 
social heterogeneity and forms of marginalization in order to produce surplus 
populations, a concept that builds on Marx’s theory of an industrial reserve army used 
to drive labor costs below subsistence levels. Capital uses the law against perversions 
to devalue diverse human life, a practice that makes labor cheaper, creating highly 
exploitable “future laborers for capital,” and also produces what Grace Hong calls the 
“existentially surplus.”250 Elaborating on this concept, Hong writes: 
Ferguson’s formulation that surplus labor is both ‘superfluous and 
indispensable’ is useful for understanding the contemporary production of 
surplus populations as nonlaboring subjects, that is, the populations that are 
surplus not to production but to speculation and circulation. If the fundamental 
characteristic of capitalism is circulation, rather than production, and if 
contemporary capitalism has been increasingly organized around finance 
capital acting in and of itself, rather than anchored by production, today’s 
populations are not only surplus labor but are also merely surplus: 
existentially surplus. In other words, currently, certain populations are not 
necessary to capital as potential sources of labor, but instead are useful for 
their intrinsic lack of value.251 
 
Hong gives the example of U.S. prisoners as an existentially surplus population, 
because their existence is not productive as hyper-exploitable labor (although a small 
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percentage of prisoners are highly exploited laborers), but productive as another kind 
of capital for corporations -- including state-run corporations. These corporations 
profit indirectly from the construction of new prison cells and the filling of those cells 
with existentially surplus populations.  
In Ferguson’s estimation, the proliferation of “polymorphous” racialized and 
gendered “perversions” combined with the laws that devalue “perverts” ultimately 
benefits capital. Yet, this also puts capital in at least short-term tension with the state. 
This is because, according to Ferguson, the liberal state needs to universalize subjects 
in order to make them equivalent parties to contracts; for example, universal subjects 
who can engage in an exchange of property. The state constantly reasserts 
universality in the face of difference. The state is forced to protect the boundaries that 
capital constantly violates, denying citizenship to the very racialized and 
nonheteronormative surplus populations that capital requires.  
Despite Ferguson’s critique of Michel Foucault in favor of “disidentifying” 
with historical materialism, their conclusions about the relations of the state and 
capital are not incompatible. Foucault argued that the mode of modern governance 
that he names biopower is “indispensable” to capitalism, “Because the rudiments of 
anatomo- and bio-politics…acted as factors of segregation and social hierarchization, 
exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these movements, 
guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of hegemony.”252  Like Ferguson, 
Foucault argues that capitalist interests ultimately benefit from biopolitical 
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technologies of governance because they establish a hierarchical social order that 
enables the exploitation of labor.  
Analyzed through this theory of a complicated relationship between the state 
and capital, eugenics could be construed as having an ultimately beneficial economic 
function. This holds insofar as the threat of institutionalization worked to contain the 
growing, largely immigrant, urban working class, and re-asserted a model of the 
nuclear family that could extract the unwaged reproductive labor of the housewife to 
discipline the next generation of workers. Eugenics offered long-term benefits to 
capital in terms of disciplining the potential workforce, and in subjecting racialized 
and gendered surplus populations that could then be exploited by capital. In the long 
term, capital would benefit from the production of the defective as a surplus 
populations, either exploitable as labor or an existentially surplus population to be 
speculated upon.  
However, even if the effects of eugenics programs are in the long-term 
exploited by capital for ends that undermine state interests, it is worth noting the 
moments that state biopolitical power is not necessarily oriented toward making 
decisions to benefit capital. Particularly in the short run, the eugenics project required 
the collection of taxes that conflicted with immediate capitalist interest in extracting 
and hoarding profit. This pit reformers who desired a state against the advocates of 
industry, who consequently appeared to be anti-eugenicist. Those who adopted 
eugenics discourse in the early twentieth century developed an alternative imaginary 
of liberal state power that defied the reigning political economy of laissez-faire. 
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Progressivism launched a different kind of liberal state in California, one that could 
counter the abuses of monopoly capitalism through the gradual building of capacity to 
attend to social welfare.  
The Biopolitical State 
The imperative to theorize liberal state power beyond pluralism and Marxism 
is precisely in order to recognize the ways in which liberal governance is capable of 
deploying technologies of power that are corollary to, but irreducible to, capitalist 
exploitation. To draw attention to these statist technologies of power, I draw on 
theories of liberal governance as war-making. I theorize that the discourse and 
practice of eugenics turned what were already construed as legitimate liberal state 
powers of war making, that exceeded the protection of capitalist interests, onto 
domestic settler populations.  
Although the discourse and practice of eugenics preceded World War I, the 
ways in which reformers capitalized on wartime concerns to advance eugenics 
programs gestures toward the ways that internal war drew on the logics of external 
war. At the height of U.S. involvement in the World War I, labor and resources were 
scarce as the State Commission in Lunacy noted in a 1920 report:  
The past two years have been rather hard ones in the state hospitals, and have 
not been free from trouble. Although we have increased the wages of 
attendants and nurses, our force has been considerably reduced owing to the 
high wages prevailing in factories and shipyards, and business generally, on 
the outside. Too, our expenses have been materially increased, in spite of 
considerable effort at economy. Many of our people enlisted for war service, 
still further crippling us, and within the two fiscal years ending June 30, 1920, 
we were unfortunate in having a very considerable epidemic of influenza in 
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most of the hospitals.253  
 
Despite the lack of staff and the high cost of scarce resources, the Board of Charities 
and Corrections argued that the need for containing (defective) adult women “ha[d] 
been forcibly shown in the last two years of the war when prostitutes have been 
temporarily detained in the counties, released, and floated on to the next community 
with no attempt of any kind of their social, mental, and physical rehabilitation.”254 
The state was asked to appropriate $15,000 (which adjusted for inflation would be the 
equivalent of ~$264,000 today) towards the building of a special cottage for 
“delinquent and defective females who had been venereally affected.”  
The appropriation was secured because: 
The construction of a cottage for the housing of delinquent feeble-minded 
females from around the army and navy camps [w]as a protection to enlisted 
men. This change in the use of the appropriation was made as an urgent war 
measure supported by the state government and the federal government.255  
 
Articulating eugenics institutions “as an urgent war measure,” reformers both 
capitalized on the war economy, and heightened the sense of the defective class as an 
internal threat. In order to face the enemy “over there” on the warfront, the menace of 
the defective class urgently demanded scarce state resources be invested at home. 
Susan Buck-Morss argues that defining an enemy against which the state must 
wage war is the very act that constitutes the collective that modern sovereignty 
represents.256 There is no collective, no “the people,” to undergird sovereignty until 
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the sovereign names the enemy. The power of the modern liberal sovereign is exactly 
this power to decide who counts as “the people” by naming who does not count as the 
people and exposing non-people to state terror in the name of “the people.” 
Importantly, as Foucault observes, the racialized “other” against whom modern war 
must be waged is not necessarily an external foreign enemy, but is produced 
internally in the domestic.257 Paradoxically, the liberal order and modern sovereign 
state power itself is secured through the practice of conducting a perpetual internal 
war that relegates the racialized other to both social death and premature physical 
death.258  
Lisa Marie Cacho argues that the internal “other” in the modern era in the 
U.S. has been the immigrant and the criminal.259 Cacho insists that the denial of 
personhood to some through the practices of criminalization, produces other lives – 
non-criminal, non-alien -- as valuable. The disavowal of valuable life for those 
incarcerated and detained “others,” constitutes the ground on which the notion of 
valuable life is consolidated for those outside of prisons and detention centers. For 
Cacho, twentieth century practices of criminalization work to obscure earlier logics of 
racialization: on-going experiments in assimilation and otherwise disappearing 
indigenous people, the articulation of the alien/immigrant as an menace that must be 
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purged, and to the crafting of the criminal as a legally colorblind practice enforcing 
labor extraction in the U.S. south. 
I insist that eugenics articulated another internal enemy that was corollary to 
the late nineteenth century racializations. The Progressive state in California was 
materialized through the discursive production of the defective class as an internal 
enemy that threatened the social order, and the insistence that the menace of the 
defective required a modern state apparatus that could deploy technologies of 
containment over bodies and collectivities. Through the struggle to fund the programs 
that eugenics theory demanded, Progressivism elaborated technologies of modern 
liberal governance that legitimated low-grade, peaceful war against internal domestic 
enemies. The biopolitical state targeted the very bodies and collectivities that were 
enacting radical practices of freedom in the early twentieth century.260  
Governing Women’s and Girls’ Desire for Freedom 
The biopolitical state required a different kind of subject who sought a 
specific, constrained kind of freedom under the rule of the liberal state. The female 
members of the defective class, according to Progressive reformers, clung to an 
instinctual desire for an anachronistic kind of freedom. In the eyes of these reformers, 
the desire for freedom of movement and freedom from the ties of family marked the 
defective class as abnormal, backwards, and even anachronistic to the new spiritual 
economy. Reformers sought to craft a new kind of female subjectivity in those who 
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expressed such abnormal dreams. They needed to suppress any so-called instinctual 
desires for freedom and replace this with self-government and deference to the state.  
Reformers conceived of the female members of the defective class as giving 
into what they called “ungoverned instinct.” Those conscripted as defective were 
subjected to a “civilizing mission,” designed to civilize their “ungoverned instinct” 
through the inculcation of ideations, habits, and discernments. As the Superintendent 
of the California School for Girls argued in a 1916 report to the state legislature:  
In the case of most of our girls, as would be expected, ungoverned instinct is a 
part of the problem which confronts us…Civilized life requires the control, 
though not the complete suppression, of practically all forms of instinctive 
action. The only way in which such control can be exercised is through the 
force of ideas which [sic] direct the activity along the line opposed to the 
instinct. When ideational activities become habit, a permanent control over 
instinct is established.261 
 
Suppressing instinct, including any instincts for freedom, became the goal of state 
rehabilitation. So-called borderline cases of defectiveness exasperated staff and 
administrators, because girls and women who resisted discipline and self-discipline 
lead to the conclusion that “It is practically, if not actually, impossible to develop 
enough resistance within her so that it is ever safe for her to become a free member of 
society.”262 The new freedom imagined by Progressive reformers was thus a 
paradoxical freedom that required internalized restraint or “resistance” to instinct. 
A seven point plan for disciplining girls and women into good citizens 
included: first, the treatment of the body, especially venereal disease, and the teaching 
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of proper personal hygiene; second, training in “women’s work” of cooking, cleaning, 
and serving; third, school work in the domestic sciences, the household arts, and 
secretarial skills; fourth, engaging in “wholesome” recreation; fifth, participation in 
“self-government” of their dorms, in order to inculcate “respect for the law”; sixth, 
attendance at religious services; and finally, the cultivation of a sense of beauty.263 
The inculcation of beauty demonstrates the intensity of the intervention here; an 
inmate was not expected to be rehabilitated to citizenship if she merely got a job and 
obeyed the law, but she also was expected to discern and appreciate normative beauty 
and also to work to create herself and her surroundings as things of normative beauty. 
At the end of the report, good citizenship is noted to include heteronormative gender 
roles:  
The girls are constantly taught that, having been sent to the School by the 
courts of California, they are at the School to be trained into good citizens; 
that honorable self-support is required of them by the state; that service goes 
hand in hand with joy; and that happy marriage is one of the noblest means to 
these ends.264  
 
The ultimate goal of this program was to discipline sexually deviant females into the 
narrow confines of able-bodied, middle-class, and white supremacist conjugal 
marriage. 
This project of “making good” women and girls was active not just in the 
reform schools, where it is to be expected, but spans the eugenics institutions. There 
was an interest in the rehabilitation and “re-education” of the demented, the insane, 
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the blind, the crippled, the promiscuous, and others in the defective class. A 1912 
report for Stockton State Hospital discussed plans to “re-educate” the insane that 
involved military drills, calisthenics, pretend “battles,” dances, basketball games, 
camping in the mountains, basket weaving and fancy work, and job re-training.265 
“Re-educative work among the demented women” at the state hospital included 
gymnastic exercises -- “women who were unable to thrust their arms to the front have 
developed wonderfully” -- plus sewing and fancywork.266 Years later the Board of 
Institutions pontificated that the purpose of these rehabilitative activities was that they 
worked at:  
Stimulating functioning on right lines, by surroundings that appeal to the 
higher consciousness through the senses…Much of the physician's direct 
mental treatment in all cases must be made along the line of suggestion 
aiming at self-control in physical, mental and moral actions. This must be 
preceded and accompanied by therapeutic measures to induce a condition of 
suggestibility and strengthen its power.267  
 
The work at the hospitals mirrored the work at the reform schools in this sense that 
they worked to re-order the thinking of the mad, to re-introduce executive control 
functions over the subconscious or wild instinct run amok. 
A first step in re-education or making good, was to learn to defer to the 
judgment of institutional administrators: 
I am more than satisfied with our policy of open hospital, depending, not on 
barriers and too curtailed liberty, but on stimulating self-control and an 
understanding why here, on activity of work, diversions and amusements, on 
maintaining a general good feeling and contented atmosphere among patients 
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and employees. Added to these pleasant and comfortable conditions and 
surroundings, kind and considerate treatment and evident sympathy and 
interest in them, a large proportion of our patients are reached and made, if not 
contented, at least willing to await our judgment about going out.268 
 
In this passage from the medical superintendent at Agnews State Hospital dated 1914, 
affective re-orientation started with relinquishing resistance to being locked up. 
Inmates were to await the decisions made by administrators, and preferably, they 
were to await those decisions content in the knowledge that there was a reason why 
they were institutionalized.   
Relinquishing resistance through deference and patience was assumed to 
eventually turn into cheerfulness and happiness about being institutionalized: “Our 
work in re-education has been very satisfactory--patients who were stupid and untidy 
before entering the class are now cheerful, showing marked improvements in mental 
condition and habits.”269 In a 1928 report to the legislature, the Board of Institutions 
1928 insisted:  
As a therapeutic measure employment must not be drudgery and distasteful, 
but engaged in cheerfully and with interest…A normal person likes 
employment that is interesting and agreeable or that brings remuneration or 
produces something beautiful or elicits commendation. We are using these 
psychological facts to incite in the abnormal the normal feeling and attitude 
toward life.270 
 
According to the board, a normal person expressed cheerfulness toward a job that was 
either interesting, paid, produced “something beautiful,” or brought someone 
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recognition. Using the word “or” in this list, the board included “remuneration” or 
being paid as something that should make one want to engage in work “cheerfully 
and with interest.” The consequence is that any person who did not express 
enjoyment at the chance to have any job that paid, or, for that matter, any job that did 
not pay but which brought verbal reward, could have been categorized as resistant to 
treatment and reformation.  
Desire for the state was achieved when female inmates were grateful to and 
appreciative of the state for institutionalizing them. The Board on Institutions 
memorably described the achievement this way: 
Slowly, but effectively, the feeling of hostility and rebellion at being deprived 
of what they are pleased to term ‘freedom’ is being replaced by a sense of 
gratitude and appreciation for the protection and opportunities offered by the 
state. This must of necessity result in a higher type of citizenship…To this end 
all efforts must bend toward raising the status of the school from that of 
custodial care to one of protective opportunity.271 
 
From patience and deferment to the judgment of one’s superiors, to a contentment 
and happiness that came from relinquishing resistance to the process, ultimately 
eugenics administrators attempted to cultivate within female inmates a recognition 
that they had been offered an opportunity for which they should be grateful and 
appreciative. The Board of Institutions insisted that eventually because “Inmates are 
given the best of scientific care and treatment ... Inmates are apparently happy and 
decidedly grateful to the state for what is being done for them.”272 
This deep gratitude for the protection offered by the state would thoroughly 
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replace any previous desire they may have had for what the board derisively calls 
“freedom.” Rehabilitative success, or “making good” was to be demonstrated not just 
by “stability and industry of the girl,” that is, not just by participation in the financial 
economy, but also by “her appreciation of the justice and fair play of the school in 
directing her conduct.”273 The reformed girl who wanted to make good was to express 
her gratefulness to the state for the opportunity to be rehabilitated. Making good 
meant relinquishing the yearning for freedom in favor of gratitude for the protection 
and opportunities offered by the state. 
Adopting this new affective orientation was a prerequisite for what the 
superintendent of the California School for Girls called “right” and “good” 
citizenship: 
This purpose we explain in season and out of season to officers, to girls, to 
state boards, to courts, to visitors, is to set the girls' feet on the road to right 
citizenship … Into the texture of this life enter the threads which enter into the 
life of the good citizen everywhere. Some of these are the building and 
maintaining of sound bodies, useful work, vital schooling, wholesome play, 
respect for law, practical religion, beauty, hope, vision.274 
 
Among the seven elements of reformation and rehabilitation was a “respect for law.” 
The superintendent went on to detail at length the school’s strategy for inculcating 
respect for law: 
Every Saturday afternoon, all the pupils of the School assemble with the 
Superintendent for a discussion of current events presented by the pupils 
themselves. After this discussion pupils who have been a month on the honor 
roll of the School remain. These constitute the voting body of the School and 
in the current month number eighty-two, over half the School…This voting 
body elects a delegate from each cottage community to represent it on a 
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central council of which the four heads of departments of the faculty are 
members and the Superintendent chairman…Its delegates report to their 
respective cottages the proceedings of the council and, at need, bring before 
the voting body measures for action.275 
 
Of course, as the report goes on to remind the legislature, this council offered only 
nominal power, because the superintendent of the school would override any 
decisions that did not conform to the overall vision of rehabilitation into good 
citizenship. Despite the exercise in self-government, the inmates were stuck in a state 
of transitology, endlessly deferring to state power.  
These examples illustrate the paradox of the progressive reformers’ project of 
cultivating desire for the state within feminized inmates. Assigned female inmates of 
the state’s eugenics institutions were denied autonomy in the process of becoming 
inmates, submitting a program of coercion and incentives for them to adopt the affect 
of right and good citizenship. This paradox is illustrated by eugenics administrators 
declaration that eugenics institutions were “not so much places of detention from 
freedom as places in preparation for freedom.”276 The central measurement of 
preparation for the new kind of freedom the Progressive’s imagined was that the 
inmate adopted a desire for the state that exceeded the inmate’s desire for the wrong 
kind of instinctual freedom.  
At the same time that Progressive reformers challenged the corporate 
monopolies in the legislature who resisted social control programs, they also enclosed 
on any desires for freedom from the women and girls in the defective class that might 
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have challenged the capitalist order or eugenicist visions of the state. At both ends, 
Progressives relied on eugenics to materialize in a California state that could 
intervene and act independently from capital to enclose threats to the health and 
futurity of the social order.  
Disrupting the Inevitability of the State: The Stakes  
In this chapter, I developed a biopolitical economy of eugenics, analyzing 
how Progressive reformers articulated a liberal state power that could both 
collaborate and compete with capitalism to exert control over bodies, subjectivities, 
and affects. Revealing the historical contingency of the transition from laissez-faire to 
the social welfare/biopolitical state has implications for us concerned about liberal 
state violence in the present. Specifically, my depiction of the emergence of social 
welfare/biopolitics challenges the presumption that the liberal state of the present is 
timeless, natural, and inevitable.   
To make perceptible the subtle ways that the liberal social welfare state is 
presumed to be timeless, consider the following passage from a current web page 
titled “The History of the Division of Juvenile Justice” hosted by the State of 
California: 
1850 - California became a state. There were no correctional facilities for 
juveniles. Some consideration was given to the need for a reform school at 
that time, but none was authorized. Serious cases, about 300 boys under the 
age of 20, were sent to the state prisons at San Quentin (Marin County) and 
Folsom (Sacramento County), between 1850 and 1860.277  
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According to the passage, on September 9, 1850 when California became a state, 
there were no “correctional facilities for juveniles.” Never mind that they were not 
called “correctional facilities” until the end of the nineteenth century. Never mind that 
the first state prison at San Quentin did not open until 1852, and Folsom State Prison 
did not open until 1881. On top of the factually misleading wording of the entry, what 
is of more interest to me is that the wording of the passage implies that the “need” for 
juvenile correctional institutions always already existed, even before the 
establishment of the state. This history of the state’s “correction” system lends a 
timelessness, naturalness, and inevitability to both the prison system and the juvenile 
justice system. As both systems are central to the identity of what it means to be state, 
this narration also lends a kind of naturalness and inevitability to the state apparatus 
itself.  
 Consider a second passage from the state sponsored web page for the recently 
shuttered Sonoma Developmental Center: 
Sonoma Developmental Center (SDC) is the oldest facility in California 
established specifically for serving the needs of individuals with 
developmental disabilities. The facility opened its doors to 148 residents on 
November 24, 1891, culminating a ten-year project on the part of two 
prominent Northern California women who had children with developmental 
disabilities… Many changes over the last 110 years include attitudes, 
philosophies, values, and beliefs in regard to the treatment of developmentally 
disabled people. There is one constant that ties the present and the future to 
every epoch of the Center’s history: As society's understanding of 
developmental disabilities has improved, SDC has consistently responded by 
improving services. SDC has always been and will always be committed to 
continuous improvement of its comprehensive array of therapeutic services.278  
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This history assumes that the place that exists now as Sonoma Development Center is 
doing the same work, under the same mission, as the original Home for the Care and 
Training of Feeble-Minded Children. This is further enforced by the claim that the 
site was opened to house “developmentally disabled” individuals, although that 
category was not invented well into the twentieth century. The passage assumes that 
there is a direct line from the then understanding of feeble-mindedness to our 
understanding of developmental disability. The last sentence of the passage lays out 
quite succinctly: “SDC has always been always will be.” Here SDC exists out of time 
to serve a population of people that have always needed, and will always need, state-
sponsored care. This exemplifies how the liberal state would also like to conceive of 
it itself as having always existed and will always exist into the future. Ironically, SDC 
closed its doors permanently in December 2018. 
Because the state has always been here and always will be, we as subjects of 
the state have difficulty imagining a different way of organizing life. In tracing the 
precise moments wherein Progressive reformers dreamed the biopolitical state into 
being through their eugenicist desires, and then channeled and tempered the 
revolutionary dreams of freedom bubbling up in the underclass, I challenge the 
assumption of the liberal state as an inevitability. Furthermore, I challenge the 
assumption that the liberal state is the only alternative to extreme capitalist 
exploitation. By depicting these past enclosures of queer and crip futures, I create 
space for dreaming of an otherwise. 
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Post Script 
Failures to be Enclosed: Evidence of an Otherwise 
 
I did not expect to find kinship at the California State Archive. Yet as I 
squinted into the microfiche screen, or carefully handled illegible delicate papers, I 
saw myself in the traces the state had recorded of those called the defective class. 
This girl had a goiter, an enlarged thyroid gland in the neck – proof of her 
abnormality. This woman was “excitable” and nervous – evidence that she needed to 
be institutionalized. This gendered female person surrounded herself with “queer” 
family – an explanation for her defectiveness. Sharing some of these characteristics, I 
was confronted with the possibility that had I lived in the late nineteenth or early 
twentieth century, I could have been marked as defective.  
Through researching and writing about the defective class, I have cultivated a 
queer and crip kinship with these ghosts from eugenics’ past. This does mean that I 
retroactively categorize the inmates of eugenics institutions as “queers” or “crips.” 
Rather, I draw a lineage from their ways of being that exceeded what the state 
construed as “normal,” to the excessive ways of being that today self-identify as 
queer and crip. This dissertation builds kinship with those “defectives” who were 
targeted for assimilation, segregated from normal society, and, in some cases, 
prematurely killed by the state. It is a queer and crip kinship in the “chosen family” 
sense, wherein queers are forced/liberated to create their own structures of care and 
build connections with elders of their choosing, creating new lineages after having 
been rejected and cast out from one’s blood family of origin. 
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I practice this kinship building as a strategy of what Lisa Marie Cacho names 
as “disremembering social value” through the work of “re-membering the other.” 
Cacho calls for re-membering:  
[T]he populations who are most frequently and most easily disavowed, those 
who are regularly regarded with contempt, those whose interests are bracketed 
at best because to address their needs in meaningful ways requires taking a 
step beyond what is palatable, practical, and possible.279 
 
For Cacho, this practice of re-membering the disavowed is necessary for rejecting the 
politics of respectability that attach social value only to those subjects who assimilate 
to dominant norms of respectable behavior. The genealogy of eugenics that I offer re-
members those disavowed by eugenics in order to question the technologies of 
sex/gender, carcerality, and the biopolitical state that structure social value in the 
present.  
Building kinship with those disavowed through eugenics requires pushing 
against both the politics of respectability and the politics of recognition that tend to 
structure LGBT and disability history. Scholarship on institutions for women and 
girls in early twentieth century California has tended to center those figures that were 
wealthy enough to leave ample archival documentation of their lives, and specifically 
documentation that marks them as recognizably “gay” or “lesbian.” One such figure 
is Miriam Van Waters, a white, middle-class woman professional who helped to 
establish and superintend the School for Girls in Ventura, California. Attention to 
Van Waters’ comes because her professional career was besieged by accusations that 
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she was a closeted homosexual and was too lax on homosexuality among the 
incarcerated girls and women she supervised. However, according to biographer 
Estelle Freedman, Van Waters denied her own homosexuality by distinguishing 
“between woman-centered relationships and institutions, in which women nurtured 
each other through spiritual love, and on the other hand, homosexual perversions, in 
which women harmed each other through obsessive and aggressive pursuits.”280 
Freedman argues that Van Waters created a space for women loving women in her 
reformatories, only at the expense of “true homosexuals.” However, the continued 
historical fascination with  middle class women who show evidence of same-gender 
partners, such as Van Waters, fails to grasp the extent to which such women created a 
form of carceral feminism involved in containing working class and poor women who 
are involved in far more radical experiments in desire and sociality than is captured 
by the category of “true homosexuals.” Rather than pursue forms of kinship with 
respectable and recognizably “lesbian” figures like the white, middle-class, and 
highly educated Van Waters, or even to seek evidence of the “true homosexuals” 
under her care, this dissertation seeks to reclaim all those ancestors whose diverse 
ways of being were denigrated by their woman-loving-woman captors, and who are 
unrecognizable to us as kin in the present if we stick to identity historicizing only 
deviant identity formations. Preceding and exceeding the label of “homosexual,” the 
defective class signifies an amorphous collectivity of unruly bodies, whose kinship 
requires abandoning historical politics of both respectability and recognition.  
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Rather than a kinship predicated on respectability or proof of same-sex 
romantic and sexual partners, the kinship I propose with the defective class is instead 
predicated on tracing what Jose Muñoz names as “misrecognition,” or, failures to be 
interpellated into heteronormative able-normative white supremacist capitalism and 
citizenship.281 To frame the defective class as failures to be interpellated means that it 
does not matter whether there is evidence of same-sex relationships, or cross-
dressing, or claims to a sexual minority identity. Some of these ancestors consciously 
chose to resist, but others unconsciously refused, or even lived in bodies that were 
simple not capable of conforming. Their bodies serve as evidence of ways of being in 
the world that could not be fully disciplined into normativity.  
Evidence of this failure to be interpellated seeps through in the archive. Some 
examples of this failure are more respectable than others, including the use of the 
legal system to seek justice and gain freedom. An example of the first is an assigned 
female inmate at the Sonoma State Home who was successful at using legal means to 
escape, indicated only by the short note that she had been “Discharged September 
1920 by writ of habeas corpus.” In other instances, organized campaigns against 
eugenics institutions are evidenced by pervasive public distrust, to the point where 
there was apparent reluctance to cooperate in the commitment of defective people. 
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The State Board of Charities and Corrections, for example, lamented, “In one locality 
an open and organized effort to discredit the state hospitals was encountered.”282  
Other examples of failure to be interpellated eschewed legal means, such as 
the dozens of inmates each year who attempted, or were successful at, escaping from 
various eugenics institutions. In addition to the reference to “at large” or “escaped” 
inmates reported annually to the legislature, narrative evidence references escapes 
such as one from Sonoma State Home in 1915, where a woman “Escaped with her 
husband who had come to visit her.” While some inmates acted alone, others 
launched collective rebellions. A brief but tantalizing note says that inmates of the 
girls’ dormitory at Whittier State School launched a riot in 1911, “in which the girls 
held possession of the premises for several hours, smashed windows and raised 
trouble generally.”283 A few years later girls at the state school in Ventura were 
caught systematically teaching other girls how to cheat the IQ tests in the reform 
school. As the superintendent of the school recounts: 
If the test is done satisfactorily it is necessary that the subjects get the idea of 
doubling the last number given. The final answer will be the doubling of 16, 
or will be 32. After several months work we began to get the answer 32 even 
from some of our defectives. We immediately carried the test one step farther 
and obtained the most peculiar answers. If the girl had really formulated the 
idea back of the test, all she would have to do was to double the 32, giving the 
answer, 64. Even when allowed paper and pencil most of the girls who were 
so ready with the answer, 32, gave us 40, or 45, 50, or any other absurd 
answer, showing that they had simply learned the answer to the test from other 
girls, usually in the detention home or in some other institution where these 
                                                      
282 “Report of the State Board of Charities and Corrections, 1914-1916” (Appendix to the Journals of 
the Senate and Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California: Sacramento, California: 
California State Printing, 1917), 46. 
283 “Report of the State Board of Charities and Corrections, 1910-1912” (Appendix to the Journals of 
the Senate and Assembly of the Legislature of the State of California: Sacramento, California: 
California State Printing, 1913), 28. 
  196 
tests had been given as a part of the Stanford Series.284  
 
Less spectacular than organizing a riot, the effort to uplift each other by teaching 
other assigned girls how to “pass” the IQ test is nevertheless a collective failure to be 
interpellated into the terms laid out by the test-makers. 
More persistently, the failure of those targeted by eugenics to be interpellated 
is evidenced by references to general unruliness and excitability. Documents from 
Sonoma State Home and Stockton State Hospital note about assigned female inmates: 
Resists very actively throughout examination. 
Girl smokes and uses alcohol. 
Moral irresponsibility + general inefficiency + unreliability. 
Desires to run away and drown herself…Unmanageable. 
The archive also registers the lives of assigned girls and women who expressed 
similar unruliness in their lives outside of the eugenics institution: 
Runaway – stole uncle’s car – ven infection.  
Running away from home many times. 
Hitchhiked to LA. 
Vagrancy. 
Been wandering for 3 months. 
Has been having immoral relations with Joe Banauto + others. 
Girl married Filipino.  
Child paroled to do housework. Found soliciting among Chinamen.  
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Counterfeiting. 
These inmates stole from their families, printed fake money, ran away, hitchhiked, 
refused to settle down, and engaged in interracial non-monogamous and commercial 
sex. These failures to be interpellated into gendered norms of propriety are forms of 
resistance to heteronormativity, whether they were consciously articulated as such, or 
whether they involved same-sex desire or relations.  
Pushing even further from respectability and recognition, in some cases 
unruliness extended into threats to use violence. A Stockton State Hospital patient 
was observed being “Restless at night, attacks nurses, threatens to kill them.” An 
inmate at the California School for Girls was returned after parole because she 
“Threatened to kill boarding mother.” Another girls’ school inmate “Set 2 houses on 
fire,” while a third was in a runaway plot that involved “attacking matron.” In 
addition to forms of unruliness that included crimes, including use of violence as 
evidence of a failure to be interpellated properly pushes the bounds of the politics of 
respectability, and it is here that the work of “dis-remembering social value” can 
begin. 
Similarly, describing as resistant those sexual behaviors that exceed the 
bounds of vanilla same-sex sex. Sexual unruliness can be glimpsed in the concern 
among staff at Sonoma State Home that certain inmates that were “addicted to 
masturbation.” There is no way to know in the present whether such behavior was 
actually interfering with the other functions of an inmate’s life – the definition of 
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addiction -- or whether some people engaged in masturbation in an act of defiance. At 
the School for Girls, administrators noted:  
The girls are not here through lack of knowledge of sex hygiene--they know 
everything…It seems wiser to encourage modesty under the supervision of the 
night dormitory watch, than to permit them to continue wrong practices alone 
in single rooms.285  
 
This note suggests that because such sex was reserved for time when the defective 
girl was alone, that it was likely not an addiction, but rather an act of defiance against 
the gendered norms of sexual propriety. However, I insist that even those bodies that 
did engage in public masturbation must be included in an accounting of resistant 
failures to be interpellated. Most in need of “re-membering” are all those forms of 
failure that are not recognizable as respectable.  
Finally, I call for claiming kinship with those ancestors that engaged in what 
Audra Simpson and Ruha Benjamin have separately insisted are forms of resistance 
that present as acts of refusal.286 Recall, for example, the story of Elise from the 
introduction, who failed to respond to questions that would enable staff at Sonoma 
State Home to complete a family history. Elise refused to give away any information 
through which the state could claim to know her truth. The state was forced to admit 
that “Little is known about [Elise],” revealing the limitations of the state to know 
bodily difference.  
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In other instances, even though their consent was not required by law, 
administrators did often ask for family member consent to sterilize an inmate as a 
kind of courtesy. Some inmates and their families, however, refused to perform good 
biocitizenship by refusing to give even legally unnecessary consent to sterilization 
surgery. Notes in the Record of Operations of Stockton State Hospital recall: ‘Rec’d 
letter June 29, 1919 stating did not want him sterilized.’ Another indicates: ‘Brother 
in Law Mr. B proved that relatives did not give their consent.’  
When all else failed, inmates used their bodies to refuse. The state archive 
records one woman who “Refuses to eat” and another “Lying on the floor would not 
stay in bed.” Women and girls were institutionalized as a result of engaging in refusal 
outside of the institution, such as a girl who “Refuses to obey orders or directions of 
parents.” While these refusals to eat, lie in a bed, or take direction, were pathologized 
by state administrators as evidence of defectiveness, these refusals are also forms of 
unrespectable and unrecognizable civil disobedience against the strictures of state 
containment.  
These notes of resistance and refusal in the archive gesture toward ways of 
being in a body, forms of intimacy and kinship, desires, affects, and temporalities that 
persistently exceeded the efforts to contain them under the heteronormative, white 
supremacist, and able-normative terms of eugenics. Observing these failures to be 
interpellated provides evidence to support my theorization that the discourses and 
practices of eugenics that I have described in this dissertation were material 
technologies of enclosure. As I have explored throughout this dissertation, early 
  200 
twentieth century eugenics in California was a process of enclosing on the otherwise -
- other ways of being and being in relation that could have led to other possible queer 
and crip futures. I mourn the loss of these other possible queer and crip futures, yet I 
also mobilize this affect as a challenge to the perception of present conditions as 
normal, natural, inevitable, timeless, and teleological.  
One, I have examined the development of gender norms, sexual deviance, 
disability, madness, and the temporality of white supremacy in California through the 
construction of the defective class. This examination, I argue, aids in denaturalizing 
these categories and hierarchies in the present. By following one technology through 
which California’s came to establish what it means to be a woman, a female, sexually 
respectable, disabled, mentally defective, and respectably white, the contingency of 
these definitions comes into focus and their stability breaks down. Other meanings 
could be attached to bodily difference, including ones that do not situate body-mind 
difference in unjust hierarchies of human value. Queer, queer of color, crip, and mad 
artists and cultural workers are busy dreaming these other possible meanings of body-
mind difference.287 By developing my own queer and crip method for deconstructing 
the construction of one localized category of difference, I invite other scholars and 
activists to engage in similar methods, or to develop radically different methods that 
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can also dismantle hierarchies of sexual, gendered, disabling, and racialized 
difference that seem natural, normal, and inevitable in the present. 
Two, I have described state institutions of care – state hospitals, state homes, 
and reformatories – as technologies of eugenics, and have situated these institutions 
within a broader carceral infrastructure and logic. I insist that this undermines the 
present-day false choice between state punishment and state treatment. In today’s 
climate of bi-partisan support for jail and prison reform in the United States, state-
sponsored (even if privately organized) programs of care, treatment, and 
rehabilitation are frequently offered as the best (and only) alternatives to 
incarceration. However, this conception of “alternatives to incarceration” continues to 
perpetuate the logic of carcerality by replacing the terms of criminalization for the 
corollary terms of pathologization. There are other ways to organize community 
responses to harm and violence and to suicidal ideation, just as there are other ways to 
create access and support independent living, that reject the carceral logic of 
pathologization. Prison abolitionist, queer of color, and crip community have been 
engaged in dreaming horizons that resist the categorical division of humans into 
normal and abnormal, and the consequent spatial and temporal organization of 
humans into “free” and “incarcerated.”288 Those who do not live in abolitionist, queer 
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of color, and crip community may have difficulty dreaming their own ways of 
organizing social, political, and economic life beyond the medical model. Yet, I insist 
that we expand the community engaged in this dreaming of queer and crip abolitionist 
horizons. By situating my own speculations within the disciplinary formation of 
political theory, I invite others to imagine a politics that moves beyond replacing one 
carceral policy prescription for another carceral program.  
Third, I have identified one moment in time in which the liberal state became 
established as a corollary source of power to capital. The liberal state, as we know it, 
was a “third way” future chosen by primarily white, bourgeois reformers against the 
futures being articulated by monopoly capitalists and by socialist, communist, and 
anarchist laborers at the turn of the twentieth century. Further, liberal state power was 
a future chosen that invested thoroughly in eugenicist ideals of human perfection. 
This theorization of eugenics-based state power in early twentieth century California 
challenges the presumption that liberal state power is inevitable, timeless, and 
teleological. Because liberal state power came to be through specific discursive 
formations and policy practices, it means that the state does not always have to be. 
There are other possible ways of organizing political, social, and economic life that 
do not distribute resources based on unjust hierarchies of human value. I invite us to 
dream of ways to affirm the diversity of ways of being in a body-mind, embrace 
diverse forms of intimacy, and experiment with fantastic, fabulous forms of 
collectivity.  
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Revisiting the history of eugenics illuminates the forms of enclosure that took 
place in the early twentieth century, and the future horizons and trajectories that were 
foreclosed in days past. Yet this is within a framework of hopefulness, as re-
membering also gestures toward the possible queer and crip futures we could create 
in the present. This is a study of past discourses in order to expose the possibilities for 
an otherwise, and to spark change to how we organize political, social, economic, and 
cultural life. Splitting the future wide open from its eugenicist determination, I offer 
this history of eugenics in order to invite us to dream queer and crip futures into 
matter. 
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